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This dissertation explores the modern history of Amman during the British Mandate 
and how the city’s development was closely tied to the evolution of the Hashemite 
state. This study explores the significant cultural and political hybridization of the 
local population in Amman because of the state’s centralization project. Few 
historians of the Middle East have examined in depth the formation of capital cities in 
nascent nation-states and even fewer have studied the city of Amman. The 
development of Amman must be understood in its regional context because it acts as 
a mirror for the development of the Jordanian state as a whole. This dissertation 
posits that Amman developed as a hybridized amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and British 
characteristics. The Transjordanian state could not have existed if it had not borrowed 
countless Ottoman institutions and practices. The Anglo-Hashemite state used the 
Legislative Council of Transjordan to incorporate formerly autonomous elites into the 
machinery of the Jordanian state, transforming Amman into a Hashemite Versailles. 
By the end of the Mandate, Amman’s gilded cage both constrained and supported the 
elites within. The cage of Amman simultaneously limited elite influence and power, 
while protecting and reifying their muted authority as Transjordanian officials. 
Furthermore, Amman’s urban fabric was a reflection of its diverse heritage and 
  
cultural practices. The development of Amman as a “dual city,” divided between 
prosperous Westernized “West Amman” and the impoverished traditional “East 
Amman,” originated in the Mandate period. Finally, Amman’s central square, Feisal 
Square, became the figurative embodiment of the heart of Amman and the heart of 
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A Note on Transliteration 
 
Arabic names found in the British records have been left in their original spelling in 
order to be faithful to the archival material. Places and proper names that are 
commonly used in the English language have been spelled according to standard 
journalistic norms (e.g. Amman, not ‘Amman). Similarly, Arabic author’s names 
have been spelled according to the Romanized way in which the author spells his or 
her name. All Arabic names, newspaper, and book titles have been transliterated 
according to standard IJMES practice but I have chosen not to use full diacritics (e.g. 
Filastin, not Filastīn, or ‘Abd al-Rahman Munif, not ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Munīf).  







- Figure 1-1 image of the main entrance of Darat al-Funun on Nadeem Al Mallah St 
next to a public staircase (author’s image) 
 
Hidden behind a high stonewall and through an innocuous metal gate in the Jabal 
al-Weibdeh neighborhood of Amman is one of Amman’s premier art spaces, Darat al-
Funun (House of Art). This art gallery is a compound of three homes built in the early 
1920s. The Khalid Shoman Foundation renovated the main building (also known as the 
Humud House) and turned it into a gallery space in 1993. However, before these 
buildings became exhibition halls, they had a former life. The main building of Darat al-
Funun (Darat I), was the home of Arab Legion Commander Colonel Frederick G. Peake 
from 1921 until he retired and left Transjordan in 1939. Peake, one of the two most 
powerful British administrators (along with British Resident Henry Cox) shaped the 





Glubb Pasha replaced Peake in Amman, the house became a residence for British officers 
and an army officer’s club until the Arabization of the army in 1956.1  
 The rest of the Darat al-Funun compound (Darat II and Darat III) also has strong 
connections to Amman’s Mandate era past. Ismail Haqqi Abdo built both homes in the 
1920s. Abdo served as the Ottoman Governor of Acre before moving to Amman in the 
1920s, where he acted as an adviser to Peake through the mid-1930s. Darat II, named 
“the Blue House” for its Circassian wooden porch, served as Abdo’s residence during the 
Mandate. Darat III’s most famous residents were the Great Arab Revolt poet Sheikh 
Fouad al-Khateeb and Prime Minister Suleiman Nablusi (who held the office in the 
1950s).2 Below these three buildings, at the bottom of the sloped compound, lie the ruins 
of a Byzantine Church with an impressive vista of Amman’s citadel. 
As you descend the steps that flank the Darat al-Funun complex into the central 
corridor of downtown Amman, al-balad, you are simultaneously experiencing Amman’s 
past and present. This collection of buildings span Amman’s entire history connecting the 
ancient city of Philadelphia to the small village of Mandate era Amman, all the way to 
the modern metropolis of Amman with its population of well over two million people. 
This physical embodiment of Amman’s storied past underscores its complex and at times 
hidden lineage.  Unlike the more traditional cities of the Levant, such as Damascus and 
Jerusalem, in Amman you have to search for its urban heritage. This hidden and obscured 
legacy motivated anthropologist Seteney Shami to proclaim famously, “Amman is not a 
                                                 
1 Mohammad al-Asad and Bill Lyons, eds., Old Houses of Jordan: Amman 1920-1950 (Amman: Turab, 
1997), 84. The house was built by Nimr Abdullah al-Humud by 1920 but the exact construction date is 
unknown. The Arabization of the army in 1956 was a result of King Hussein’s expulsion of Glubb and all 
other British officers out of the country and transitioning the army to Arab leadership.  
2 Pat Binder and Gerhard Haupt, “25 Years of Darat al Funun in Amman,” Nafas Art Magazine, January 






city.”3 For Shami, Amman’s urban confusion is a byproduct of the state’s “efforts to 
create itself at the expense of the nation and the city at the expense of urbanism.”4 
Although Shami was analyzing Amman’s modern identity and urban imagination, these 
same indictments can easily be leveled at Mandate era Amman (1921-1946).  
 
- Figure 1-2 image of Darat al-Funun’s main house and the Byzantine ruins that lie 
below it. (author’s image)  
 
At the root of Amman’s identity crisis is the manner in which it developed. 
Amman became a symbol for the Anglo-Hashemite government first and a city second. 
Amman became the personification of the new centralized government. It was shorthand 
for the might of the Mandatory state. The Mandatory government orchestrated the 
development of Transjordan from its capital of Amman. The utility of Amman’s 
                                                 
3 Seteney Shami, ““Amman is Not a City” Middle Eastern Cities in Question,” in Urban Imaginaries: 
Locating the Modern City, eds. Alev Çinar and Thomas Bender (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis 
Press, 2007), 208.  





institutional power always trumped its urban function during the Mandate period. From 
1921-1946, Amman became the economic, cultural, and administrative center of 
Transjordan. Despite its diminutive size during the Mandate period, the city of Amman 
housed all of the integral components of a successful and cohesive centralized and 
bureaucratized state by the end of the British Mandate in 1946. However, the Transjordan 
government, despite its modernizing and controlling ambitions, did not control all facets 
of life in Transjordan. Instead, the story of Mandatory Transjordan is a story of tension 
between the aspirations of the state and its reality. It is a story that privileged government 
utility and security over anything else. Nearly every government action or goal was 
checked by fiscal, bureaucratic, and societal limitations. These confines did not prevent 
the government from functioning successfully, but it did force the government to scale 
down their aspirations. Regardless of these constraints, the growth of the Anglo-
Hashemite state imbued Amman with physical, political, and symbolic significance. 
Amman’s expansion forced the inhabitants of Transjordan to adapt to a new centralized 
power housed within the city. As a result, the history of Amman during the British 
Mandate (1921-1946) is to a large extent the mirror for all of Transjordan.  
The British Transjordan Mandate intended to create a new centralized state 
emanating from Amman where one had not existed for millennia. Although the 
prehistory of modern Amman stretches back to biblical references to the Ammonites, and 
was an important Roman and Umayyad settlement, Amman was not even recognized as a 
settlement in the Ottoman cadastral survey of 1586.5 Transjordan was a blank spot on the 
                                                 
5 5 Alastair Northedge, “The History of Ammān in the Early Islamic Period,” in Studies on Roman and 
Islamic ‘Ammān: The excavations of Mrs C-M Bennett and Other Investigations, Volume 1: History, Site 
and Architecture, ed. Alastair Northedge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 47-55. For more on 





map of the Middle East for the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers of Europe in the 
early nineteenth century. The extent of Ottoman involvement in the region was minimal 
protection of the hajj route. The only settlements were Salt, Ma’an, and Karak. Large 
swaths of Bedouin-controlled territory surrounded each of these settlements, which held 
sway over the towns. The Bani Sakhr were dominant in Salt, the al-Majalis in Karak, and  
Ma‘an was split between tribes who owed allegiance towards Damascus or the Hijaz.6 It 
is important to remember that there was no “Ottoman Transjordan.” Ottoman officials 
only recognized the region by its districts (which were not administrative units): ‘Ajlun, 
al-Balqa’, al-Karak and Ma’an. Of these regions, the only one that formally 
acknowledged Ottoman authority was Jabal Ajlun, whose largely settled non-Bedouin 
population regularly paid taxes to Damascus.7  
In 1878, the Ottomans directed a group of Circassians to repopulate the largely 
abandoned area in order to reestablish it as part of the Ottoman Empire. This Ottoman 
resettlement policy was a means to alleviate a shortage of manpower throughout the 
empire as well as an attempt to increase the number of lawful Muslims in the region.8 
Provincial Ottoman officials often prohibited immigrants from the Caucasus, most of 
whom were rural people in any case, from settling in cities. Instead, immigrants 
established new villages on empty land. In the Balqa region of Jordan, the Circassians 
formed settlements in Amman, Wadi Seer, Sweileh, Jerash, Naour, and Rusaifa. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Mrs C-M Bennett and Other Investigations, Volume 1: History, Site and Architecture, ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992); Christa Paula, David Saunders and Ammar Khammash, Jordan: A 
Timeless Land (London: TransGlobe Publishing Limited, 2005).  
6 Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 27-34.  
7 Rogan, Frontiers of the State, 21-26.  
8 Seteney Shami, “Historical Processes of Identity Formation: Displacement, Settlement, and Self-





Although the Circassians settled in the Balqa in agricultural peasant communities, their 
primary function for the Ottoman Empire was as a buffer against dissident nomadic 
Bedouin. 9 Amman grew from fifty families in 1878 to a town with a population of 1,000 
people in 1893 and reached nearly 5,000 people in 1914.10 However, it is important to 
remember that despite its early development that Amman still paled in comparison to 
Salt.11  
 Even with this resettlement, by 1921 Amman had fewer than 5000 inhabitants. 
The creation of a capital city in the Levant that owed no fealty to another regional power 
was a novel development. The centralization project undertaken by the Mandatory state 
caused the cultural and political hybridization of the local population in Amman. Amman 
developed as a hybridized amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics that are 
evident in the expansion of state programs, urban infrastructure, and local cultural 
practices. This development always unfolded as a slurry of lofty goals and compromise. 
Despite British antipathy towards the Ottoman Empire and their lasting imprint on 
Transjordan, the Mandatory state could not erase their legacy. Contrary to the narrative of 
the Hashemite state, the Transjordan government heavily relied on Ottoman structures 
and institutions already in place at the time of its founding. Only towards the end of the 
Mandate period did the Transjordanian state begin to move beyond this largely Ottoman 
framework. Amman’s hybridized identity is a byproduct of a government that could not 
afford to start with a blank slate. Instead, the Mandatory government and Amman both 
built upon a foundation of monarchical order, borrowed elites, and colonial negotiation. 
                                                 
9 Shami, “Historical Processes of Identity Formation,” 146-49.  
10 Jane Hacker, Modern ‘Amman: A Social Study (Durham: Duke University Press, 1960), 59. Salt in 1914 
had a population of roughly 40,000 people.  





Very few things in Amman were not a personification of the tension, duality, and 
limitations inherent in the state itself. 
 
Monarchical Regimes and Patrimonial Networks 
At all times during the Transjordan Mandate, the power of the state was divided 
between its monarch and its colonial overseers. These two poles of authority controlled 
the development of Transjordan’s institutions and jockeyed for control over its future.12 
These competing forces shaped the development of Jordanian governance and the 
enduring legacy of the Anglo-Hashemite state. The construction of the Transjordanian 
regime happened in Amman. This new state evolved in Amman, gradually incorporating 
disparate influences while silencing dissonant actors.  In this way, the entire city of 
Amman was a realm of patronage and governance. The capital city acted as an extension 
of the government. The creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was the 
culmination of Amir Abdullah’s monarchical machinations throughout the Mandate 
period. Amman functioned as a “Hashemite Versailles;” the government constantly 
negotiated with its elite populace through a combination of co-option, persuasion, and 
punishment. Transjordan may have started as a weak tribally oriented monarchy but it 
evolved into a modern state through the efforts of the Abdullah, the British, and the elites 
and notables of Transjordan.  
                                                 
12 The early foundational works on Transjordan include Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the 
Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); P.J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the 
Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967); Uriel 
Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920-1949 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). These works 
largely focused on the development of the Jordanian military and the relationship between Abdullah and 
the British. Recent works on Transjordan have begun to move away from this elite-centric interpretation of 





Although monarchies in the Middle East are popularly conceived as a traditional 
aspect of governance in the Arab world, the majority of monarchies in the region are 
modern inventions. With the exception of Morocco, and Egypt and Iran to a lesser 
degree, the monarchies of the Middle East can all be traced back to the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire after World War I.13 The first of the post-Ottoman monarchs was 
Abdullah’s father, Sharif Hussein ibn Ali, ruler of the Hijaz. Hussein was the first to 
adopt the title of malik (king) when he rebelled against the Ottomans. Prior to Hussein’s 
coronation as King of the Hijaz, Muslim rulers for centuries had avoided the title of malik 
as derogatory and the designation of foreign non-Muslim rulers. However, with the 
ascendancy of European monarchs in the west, the title of king became less problematic. 
By adopting the title of king, Hussein hoped to be able to negotiate with the British on a 
more even footing.14  
Historian Ami Ayalon argues that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire two 
types of monarchs emerged in the Middle East. The first category were the “traditional” 
or “tribal” kingdoms, who adopted “Western royal titulature but little else.” The second 
                                                 
13 Morocco’s ruling dynasty, the Alawi, have ruled Morocco since the seventeenth century. Egypt became 
and protectorate and Sultanate of Great Britain in 1914. Before 1914, Egypt had been semi-autonomous 
from the Ottoman Empire under the rule of the dynasty of Muhammad Ali. Iran has a long history of ruling 
monarchies dating back to the Persian Empire. Iran, unlike Morocco, did have a dynastic change as a result 
of foreign meddling. The British, at least in part, orchestrated the 1921 coup against the Qajar dynasty. 
Despite British support of the coup, it is unlikely that the British suspected that Reza Shah would become 
shah and the first member of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1926. For more on the transition from the Qajars to 
Reza Shah and Great Britain’s role in Iran see Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar 
Collapse to Pahlavi Power (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Mohammad Gholi Majd, Great Britain & Reza 
Shah: The Plunder of Iran, 1921-1941 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001). For more on the 
impact of colonialism on Morocco and its ruling dynasty see C.R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: a History 
(London: Hurst, 2001); Edmund Burke III, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial Protest and 
Resistance, 1860-1912 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). For more on colonial Egypt see Juan 
R.I. Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi 
Movement (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1991); Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and 
the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
14 Ami Ayalon, “Post-Ottoman Arab Monarchies: Old Bottles, New Labels?” in Middle East Monarchies: 





category of kingdoms was more modern in style. These monarchs both adopted Western 
titles and European-style institutions, which theoretically checked the king’s power. This 
second category frequently featured some combination of constitutions, elected 
parliaments, responsible cabinets, political parties, and a free press. These aspects of 
“modernity” were frequently foisted on Arab monarchs by foreign powers.15  Although 
Ayalon depicts these categories as distinct from one another, the interwar period was 
characterized by monarchies in transition. Places like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Transjordan 
may have started as tribal monarchies but slowly evolved into modern centralized and 
bureaucratized states.  
The heavily patrimonial rule of the monarchs of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and 
Transjordan underwent similar transitions and transformations during the interwar 
Mandate period. According to the political scientists James Bill and Robert Springborg 
patrimonial leadership in the Middle East was predicated on the rulers’ willingness to 
compromise, his personal charisma, his ability to utilize his personal connections, and the 
overall unity of the community. Monarchies in the Middle East evolved as extensions of 
the leader through paternal, patriarchal, and patrimonial systems. Over time, the royal 
household was able to develop this patrimonial network into a discrete bureaucratic 
network.16 This transition from personal rule to bureaucratized and centralized state 
occurred throughout the Middle East during the interwar period.  
Historian Joseph Kostiner argues in The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936: from 
Chieftaincy to Monarchical State that the title “chieftaincy” is more applicable to the 
early years of the Saudi state because it had no clear boundaries, no elaborate 
                                                 
15 Ayalon, “Post-Ottoman Arab Monarchies,” 24 and 28.  
16 James Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 3rd edition (London: Scott, 





administrative institutions, and a loose political structure based on tribal cooperation.17 In 
contrast to other historians, Kostiner maintains that Ibn Saud never had a master plan for 
the construction of Saudi Arabia.18 Great Britain’s shifting and fractured policy on Saudi 
Arabia gave Ibn Saud more flexibility and leeway in formulating the policies of the 
nascent state.19 Ibn Saud reacted to a changing political situation and was able to harness 
military conquest as a turning point for the state in the mid-1920s. Expansion turned the 
Saudi chieftaincy into a “conquest movement,” which in turn aided the centralization of 
the state. By 1936, the Saudi chieftaincy had transitioned to a centralized monarchical 
state with a growing bureaucracy. The royal family reinforced patrimonial connections 
through intermarriage with the various tribes of Saudi Arabia. Saudi princes spread 
throughout Saudi Arabia further reinforced preexisting patron networks.20  
There is no evidence of the British encouraging any centralization policies in 
Saudi Arabia. Any bureaucratic expansion or centralization policies undertaken by the 
Saudi state were done so independent of foreign intervention or influence.21 This pattern 
of development is analogous to Mandate Iraq and Transjordan. In both Iraq and 
Transjordan, the early years of the state relied on tribal cooperation and monarchical 
charisma in place of any centralized power structure. Both Mandates only transitioned 
away from the title of chieftaincy as their bureaucratic infrastructure was developed. The 
Hashemites in Iraq and Transjordan tended to marry their cousins instead of 
                                                 
17 Joseph Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936: from Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4.  
18 David Dean Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 103. 
Commins argues that it was Ibn Saud’s plan to tame the zeal of the Ikhwan after they were no longer 
needed to conquer new territory.  
19 Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia, 7-8.  
20 Joseph Kostiner and Joshua Teitelbaum, “State-Formation and the Saudi Monarchy,” in Middle East 
Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity, ed. Joseph Kostiner (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 
132-136.  





intermarrying with the local tribes. As a result, the royal family was not as integrated or 
as expansive in Iraq and Transjordan as it was in Saudi Arabia.22 As well, in contrast to 
Saudi Arabia, state centralization and control was at the behest of the British in Iraq and 
Transjordan, not in spite of them. 
Similar to Saudi Arabia, no singular British policy applied to Mandatory Iraq. 
Differences in colonial administration and subsidy created a sense of colonial instability 
and uncertainty within the Mandate. In Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 
1914-1932 Peter Sluglett argues that a forced rapid state formation, plagued by a chronic 
lack of revenue, led to the formation of a government that was little more than a façade 
for an increasingly oppressive rule. In Sluglett’s opinion, political freedom in Iraq during 
the Mandate amounted to little more than “glorified cronyism.”23 Toby Dodge agrees 
with Sluglett and argues in Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History 
Denied that British liberal aspirations in Iraq were never realized. The tenuous financial 
situation of the Mandate prevented the formation of a sustainable liberal state. The British 
chose to implement an entirely new system in Iraq, largely ignoring the urban notables 
that had made the Ottoman system work in favor of tribal sheikhs.24 This decision to 
reinforce the chieftaincy aspects of Iraq through “institutionalized” tribal land control 
privileged the “simpler” rural tribal sheikhs over their urban counterparts.25 In addition to 
courting tribal leaders, the British administration in Iraq was predicated on the king being 
                                                 
22 No work has been completed on the marriage practices of the Hashemites in Jordan. To the best of my 
knowledge, there was no discrete marriage policy. The only scholarship on the Mandate period that 
discusses marriage in any facet in Joseph Massad’s Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in 
Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Massad discusses the function of marriage in 
nationality laws and status, not in relation to patrimonial connections or networks.  
23 Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914-1932, 3rd edition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 216.  
24 “Urban notables” and their impact on Transjordan will be discussed in the next section.  






the keystone of their policies. For the British the king “was seen to provide the central 
point of control for the High Commissioner.”26 This reliance on patrimonial allegiances 
and comprises, when combined with the reduced financial capacity of the Mandate, 
created a shallow social foundation for the Iraqi monarchy and state.  
Although similar to its Iraqi neighbor, the relationship between the tribes and the 
monarchy in Transjordan was slightly different. It does not appear that the same lofty 
goals discussed in Iraq were ever applied to Transjordan. The disruption between the 
Ottoman and Mandate period was perhaps more jarring in Iraq because of the British 
decision to shift its elite structure and bureaucratic function. Transjordan, which had little 
preexisting elite infrastructure, was not burdened by such a power shift. Instead, the 
supremacy of the tribes was largely maintained. Yoav Alon highlights the tribes’ pivotal 
role in the creation of a stable state in The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the 
Modern State also. Alon contends that the mutually beneficial relationship between the 
Anglo-Hashemite government and the tribes of Jordan helped to buoy the Mandatory 
government. Alon, like Kostiner, refers to Transjordan as a “chieftaincy” that was heavily 
dependent on patrimonial relations between the Amir and the tribal sheikhs of 
Transjordan. Alon also describes the evolution of Abdullah’s chieftaincy into a modern 
state.27 However, while Alon’s study grants the tribes much needed agency and 
rationality, it only discusses the government in amorphous terms. The central government 
frequently interacts directly with tribal sheikhs but there is no discussion as to how the 
political culture and institutional might of the capital of Amman was critical to these 
                                                 
26 Toby Dodge, “International Obligation, Domestic Pressure and Colonial Nationalism; The Birth of the 
Iraqi State Under the Mandate System,” in The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives, 
eds. Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (Boston: Brill, 2004), 150-51.  






exchanges. Alon views the government from the perspective of the tribes outside of 
Amman. By focusing on the development of the regime itself, this study will trace the 
evolution of governance from the inside out. Overall, it is clear that the Transjordanian 
monarchy followed a similar pattern of development to neighboring Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia. All three kingdoms had monarchs who were forced to constantly readjust their 
relations with the established elites of their lands. The patrimonial relationships of all 
three monarchies were critical to their stability. The incorporation of new and old elites 
into these evolving state systems shaped their institutional growth and the gradual 
expansion of their bureaucracies.  
 
Urban Notables in a Colonial Regime 
Financial limitations and shifting British colonial policies limited the ability of the 
British to ignore and ostracize the preexisting elite of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and 
Transjordan. Both Great Britain and France had no choice but to incorporate the existing 
notables of their imperial possessions in the Middle East. These elites fell roughly into 
two groups, the urban notables of the late Ottoman period and tribal sheikhs. Albert 
Hourani first coined the phrase “urban notables” in his seminal paper “Ottoman Reform 
and the Politics of Notables.”28 Hourani, who first used the term to describe the urban 
elites of nineteenth century Cairo, categorized Azhar sheikhs, guild leaders, and wealthy 
merchants as urban notables. These notables were crucial for the understanding of 
political functions in the Middle East because they acted as intermediaries between the 
Ottoman rulers and the remainder of the population. Philip Khoury brought these 
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Ottoman urban notables into the Mandate period in Syria and the French Mandate: 
Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945. It was in the best interest of the urban notables 
to work with the colonial regime in order to protect their positions of power, privilege, 
and influence. Khoury notes that the opposition to the colonial administration only came 
from the young civil servants (efenidiyya) who fought the Mandatory state through the 
rhetoric of Arab nationalism. The established urban notables, on the other hand, worked 
with the French in “honorable cooperation.” These collaborators formed the National 
Bloc in the 1930s and lost power in post-independence Syria.29  
Throughout the colonized Middle East, these former Ottoman elites reinvented 
themselves to be colonial intermediaries with their new European overlords. Though the 
exact makeup of this group changed from colony to colony and Mandate to Mandate, 
both the British and the French utilized these elites in their imperial endeavors in the 
region. Transjordan was no different. However, because Transjordan did not have many 
preexisting urban centers many of its urban notables were imported from neighboring 
Syria and Palestine by Abdullah and the British alike. These foreign elites belonged to 
two groups. “Naturalized” Transjordanians were the elites who had lived in Transjordan 
since 1923, while “foreign” elites had moved to Transjordan thereafter. Although viewed 
as suspect by the native inhabitants of Transjordan, the “naturalized” Transjordanians 
were eventually accepted in a way in which the foreigners never were. This infusion of 
foreign urban notables into the administration of Transjordan was necessary given the 
dearth of educated and politicized elites within the Mandate. These individuals, in 
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conjunction with the tribal sheikhs and few native urban notables of Transjordan, filled 
the bureaucratic, administrative, and political roles of the Mandate. 
Betty Anderson discusses the development of an early nationalist period during 
the late 1920s and early 1930s in her book Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and 
the State.30  Anderson connects early elite objection to the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian 
Treaty to the later formation of a discrete nationalist movement in post-independence 
Jordan. This early opposition movement, largely organized by the National Congress, 
generally opposed British action in Transjordan as a curtailment of local autonomy. The 
National Congress’ members were a collection of naturalized and native urban notables 
and tribal sheikhs from all of Transjordan. Anderson also points out that the civil servants 
and bureaucrats of Transjordan, akin to neighboring Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, came 
from the same cadre of Ottoman educated elites (efendi). However, Anderson references 
the movement as a precursor to her true focus, which is the nationalist movement of the 
1950s. Anderson does not acknowledge that Amman became the political nexus of 
Transjordan during the Mandate period. This use of the National Congress and the 
Legislative Council as a necessary first step towards Jordanian nationalism does not 
recognize the evolution of the Legislative Council during the Mandate period itself. The 
Council was not a static entity. Its membership, its autonomy, and its reach changed 
dramatically throughout the duration of the Mandate. Anderson’s analysis does not 
connect the Legislative Council to the political centralization of the Anglo-Hashemite 
state in Amman.  
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The opposition movement has been referenced elsewhere by scholars such as 
Maan Abu Nowar in The Development of Transjordan, 1929-1939: A History of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan but again these discussions are only quick summaries that 
do not discuss how the opposition movement was connected to Amman and the lasting 
impact of the Legislative Council more generally.31Abu Nowar’s analysis depicts the 
Legislative Council as purely adversarial to the Mandatory government. This perspective 
ignores the myriad of actors involved in these events in favor of a purely binary loyalty 
arrangement, either for or against the government. Nowar’s analysis, unlike Elizabeth 
Thompson’s description of Mandatory Syria and Lebanon in Colonial Citizens: 
Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, fails to 
give the elites their own agency.32 Thompson argues that Syria and Lebanon’s “colonial 
citizens” created a “civic order” in which the colonizer and the colonized interacted and 
negotiated with one another. The new Mandatory paradigm created a hierarchy of 
citizenship based on patriarchal privilege that placed Christian over Muslim, Lebanese 
over Syrian, and men over women. Similar to Mandatory Syria and Lebanon, the 
relationship between the elites of Transjordan and the Mandatory regime was not static. 
The elites of Transjordan, whether they were members of the Legislative Council, 
regional administrators, or civil servants in Amman acted out of self-interest and self-
preservation. These individuals were constantly negotiating with one another in order to 
privilege themselves and their patron networks.   
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Where British and French colonial policy differed was the scope of authority 
afforded to these Ottoman elites, and how often these elites rebelled and differentiated 
themselves in contrast to the Mandatory government. In Transjordan, elite actions were 
predicated on patrimonial networks and survival, which only rarely amounted to united 
action against the Anglo-Hashemite state. Mandate Transjordan, unlike Iraq, Syria and 
Lebanon, was mainly peaceful during the Mandate. It was not burdened by sectarian or 
ethnic strife. Instead, in the words of historian Asher Susser, Amir Abdullah and the 
British “were almost entirely undisturbed by domestic opposition, in what was a 
relatively small and underdeveloped political society.”33 Although Susser’s comments 
ignore the political opposition sustained by the Legislative Council of Transjordan 
throughout the Mandate, he is correct to highlight the lack of widespread opposition and 




Imperial Politics and Mandatory Administration 
The evolution of the Mandate system in the Middle East was intrinsically tied to 
the evolution of both the British and French Empires as a whole. Given the scope of both 
empires, it is impossible to discuss a single unifying imperial policy for either European 
power. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler’s edited volume Tensions of Empire: 
Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World stresses the fact that colonial regimes were not 
monolithic. There were no uniform “agents of empire.” According to Cooper and Stoler 
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the social, cultural, and political practices of both the colonizer and the colonized shifted 
constantly.34 Instead, it is more fruitful to discuss the imperial aspirations of both powers 
in the Middle East before and after World War I. The Great War fundamentally shifted 
the way in which both Great Britain and France interacted with their colonial holdings. In 
A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914-1922, David Fromkin 
notes that the Middle East was the last unclaimed piece of the world, it “was the only 
native bastion that the Europeans had not yet stormed” on the eve of the twentieth 
century.35 However, Fromkin argues that the imperial system that led to the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement in 1916 was already out of date the subsequent year. By 1922, British society 
generally rejected both the idealistic (advancing civilization) and practical (that it 
benefited Britain to extend the empire) arguments for imperialism. The British public 
only acquiesced to British involvement in the Middle East because Winston Churchill 
convinced them that it would be an inexpensive imperial venture. By the time the 
Mandate agreements were concluded in 1922, the British had committed themselves to a 
settlement that they themselves no longer believed in. 36  Similarly, British internal 
divisions complicated policy in the region. The division between the pro-Hashemite 
Foreign Office championed by T.E. Lawrence and the pro-Saudi Indian Office 
championed by Arnold Wilson muddled British affairs from 1917-1920. Timothy J. Paris 
argues in “British Middle East Policy-Making after the First World War: The Lawrentian 
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and Wilsonian Schools” that this internal division stymied British action in the Middle 
East during the pivotal post-War years. Although the Foreign Office eventually won, this 
internal division and divided Middle Eastern policy haunted the region throughout the 
interwar period. This loss of faith and conflicting goals resulted in the shoestring budgets 
and reduced colonial staffs of the British interwar period in the Middle East.37  
Similarly, the French Empire was also at a turning point after World War I. In The 
French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society Martin Thomas 
contends that although the French Empire was at its geographical zenith in the interwar 
period, the French imperial system was actually trending downward. The system “was 
more diffuse and unmanageable than ever.”38 Similar to Great Britain in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I, parliamentarians and the press in France were more excited by 
the prospect of imperial expansion than the arduous task of further developing their 
existing colonial territories. However, the escalating financial difficulties of France 
quickly soured the public’s taste for expansion.39 This fervor for expansion was an 
extension of the French mission civilisatrice. However, in the intervening interwar period 
French colonial policy, with the exclusion of the anciennes colonies, shifted from an 
assimilationist (mission civilisatrice) to an association (preservation of local cultures 
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through cultural sensibility and urban planning) approach.40 This shift away from 
assimilation began before the war in France’s North African colonies (which did not 
include Algeria). This policy change was largely a result of the decreased financial 
capacity of France. This reality underscored one of the central questions of the French 
Empire: Did the empire exist to serve France, or was it France’s duty to protect the 
colonies? Thomas argues that it was clear that the empire served the needs of France, not 
vice versa. By 1928, the colonial empire became France’s most important trading partner. 
In the ensuing years of worldwide depression, France was forced to increasingly rely on 
its colonial periphery for financial stability.41  
In the end, neither the British nor the French truly encouraged the formation of 
national administrations in their Middle Eastern colonial holdings. According to D.K. 
Fieldhouse’s Western Imperialism in the Middle East-1958, the distinction between 
British and French rule in the Middle East was nothing more than a façade. Both the 
British and the French utilized roughly the same number of European administrators in 
their Mandates. The key difference was that the French ruled more directly in Syria and 
Lebanon while the British in Iraq and Transjordan acted as “advisers” to Arab 
ministers.42 Despite the veneer of difference, both the British and the French 
administered their Mandates with a focus on economy. Humanitarianism and the need to 
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civilize the natives no longer justified the price tag of empire. Instead, the colonial 
holdings of both empires needed to be able to support the metropole. The empire needed 
to protect the homeland. This security imperative necessitated close colonial 
administration. However, this imperial oversight was always limited by a lack of 
resources and strained budgets. Mandate Transjordan, although important in the 
geopolitical stability of the British Empire, never garnered more than a paltry budget and 
a handful of British administrators. This fiscal economy constantly limited the aspirations 
of the Anglo-Hashemite state.  
Joseph Massad examines the role of direct and indirect colonial administration in 
depth in Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan. Massad believes 
that the infrastructure and institutions created by the military and Jordanian legal codes 
are the cornerstones of the Jordanian state and Jordanian nationalism. 43 British officers 
(Frederick Peake and later John Bagot Glubb) directly led the Transjordan military. The 
Jordanian military only shifted to purely Arab leadership in 1956. The Transjordan legal 
system, on the other hand, had an Arab ministerial head who was advised by the British 
Judicial Adviser. Although Massad utilizes military and judicial development to frame 
the inception of a larger sense of Jordanian nationalism, he ignores the city of Amman 
completely. Massad’s Hashemite state and Jordanian nationalism exist in a conceptual 
realm without any discussion of locality. Massad’s work touches on the centralizing 
aspects of the judiciary and the Arab Legion but does not actually connect these 
developments to Jordan’s capital. Although the military and the judiciary existed 
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throughout Transjordan, their headquarters and physical and symbolic power emanated 
from the capital.  
Similarly, Tariq Tell’s The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan 
focuses on the Mandatory origins to Jordan’s regime stability. By focusing on the 
periphery, Tell argues that the institutions and political economy developed during the 
Mandate period buttressed the Hashemite regime through the first two decades of King 
Hussein’s rule. The most important of these social pacts was what Tell refers to as the 
“Hashemite Compact.” This social compact emerged during the Mandate as an exchange 
of resources for political loyalty of the Bedouin and the fellahin (peasants). However, by 
Tell’s own admission, the “Hashemite Compact” only becomes truly important post-
independence. Tell’s work adds an important dimension to the evolution of Jordan’s 
sociopolitical underpinnings but purposefully does so from the outside. 44 This approach 
does not engage with Amman’s development or the centralizing aspects of the Mandatory 
state. For these reasons, it is critical to chronicle the government’s development from the 
vantage point of Amman. The Mandatory state must be analyzed from the inside out in 
order to identify how the goals of the state became reality. The evolution of Transjordan 
must be understood on its own terms, not as a prologue to political turmoil and identity 
questions that unfold after Jordanian independence in 1946. Only by analyzing the 
Anglo-Hashemite government from its home in Amman can we determine where the 
state succeeded and where it fell short.  Instead of understanding the Mandate as a series 
of divergent themes and institutions, the state must be understood as a single entity 
housed in Amman.  
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Urban Practice and the Colonial City 
The one arena in which a significant difference between British and French 
colonial practice exists is in urban policy and planning. The British and the French had 
very different opinions on the function of the colonial city. It is not appropriate to talk 
about a single “colonial city” any more than a monolithic conception of imperialism or 
colonialism.45 Both British and French interventions into the Middle East during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created either de facto or de jure colonies in 
former Ottoman lands. Urban change in these imperial settings followed similar goals of 
economic growth in tandem with improved control and security through infrastructural 
advancement. However, these goals were accomplished through vastly different means 
and varying degrees of success in each imperial setting.  
The nature and configuration of the French colonial city was heavily dependent 
upon its region and overall economic importance. The French made urban culture a 
cornerstone of their political endeavors throughout the empire. The French, renowned for 
their mission civilisatrice, believed in direct intervention in order to shape and improve 
their colonial cities. This policy existed throughout the French Empire, not just in the 
Levant and North Africa.46 This focus on cultural improvement and advancement was at 
the core of the French colonial ethos and directly influenced French colonial urban 
planning. In Algeria for example, the French followed the set pattern of taking over the 
Casbah (headquarters of the Ottoman military forces) and transforming it into their own 
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base, appropriating the grand buildings of the city for their own purposes, and then 
beginning to expand the urban spaces of the city as needed to necessitate the movement 
of French troops.47  
This interventionist approach emphasized altering the urban fabric of the city. 
Gwendolyn Wright argues in The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism that 
the colonial city was an experimental space to test solutions for problems that existed in 
the French metropole such as overcrowding, sanitation problems, class conflicts, and 
economic stagnation. The colonial city for the French was a space to combine aspects of 
modernism and tradition.48  However, in reality, urban practices in France did not 
substantively change until after World War II. As already mentioned, the goals of French 
colonial policy slowly shifted away from assimilation. After World War I, the French 
approach was “to protect certain aspects of cultural traditions while sponsoring other 
aspects of modernization.”49  
The result of these policies was the creation of the “dual city”: a European 
settlement separate but adjacent to the indigenous town. Wright argues in “Tradition in 
the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy 1900-
1930,”  that although the “dual city” model originated in the North Africa it was 
employed throughout the French Empire in places such as Morocco, Indochina, and 
Madagascar. The “dual city” originated in Morocco under the rule of Resident-General 
Hubert Lyautey. Under Lyautey’s leadership, old and new buildings in Morocco, were 
always separated by a no construction zone (“sanitary corridor”). The French villes 
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nouvelles used the tenets of modern urban design, clean lines, and strict building 
guidelines, while also incorporating some local architectural accents. The problem with 
this approach was that the French did not predict the rapid growth of the Arab Moroccan 
populace. Overtime, the new French urban settlements walled in the medinas in 
Casablanca and Rabat, stymieing Arab economic development.50  
This process occurred throughout the Maghrib (North Africa) in Algiers, Bône, 
and Tunis. Each of these cities was designed with grand architecture, monuments, large 
streets and public squares. All of these characteristics further separated the new European 
quarters of the city from their traditional counterparts.51 This pattern of rule continued in 
the Levant under the French Mandates for Lebanon and Syria. This was particularly 
evident in the development of Beirut’s transportation and communications infrastructure 
during the French Mandate. New construction transformed Beirut into a spectacular 
display of French power.52 These examples of “dual cities” in the Middle East were 
deliberate policies of the colonial power. However, this was not true everywhere in the 
Middle East. The emergence of a dual city became a de facto separation of modern and 
traditional urban spaces. In Amman, the western half of the city, in particular Jabal 
Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh, developed independently from the traditional urban core 
of Amman. In these neighborhoods, the "dual city" segregated Amman's growing 
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elite, a collection of Ottoman urban notables, tribal sheikhs, merchants, and civil 
servants, in modern Western-style enclaves from the impoverished lower classes. 
Although the government did not impose this division of Amman, it functioned in nearly 
the exact same way. 
The “dual city” approach was also implemented elsewhere in the French Empire 
in Indochina and Madagascar. Urban development in French Indochina, led by Ernest 
Hébrard focused on “visual decentralization” by dividing the city into quarters to 
juxtapose different classes and function rather than phobic racial segregations. In 
Madagascar, on the other hand, the French constructed public buildings and markets 
utilizing traditional forms with modern innovations to improve their sanitation and 
general hygiene. These buildings in the old city were complimented by garden cities 
around a ring road that separated the new and old urban spaces. Wright convincingly 
asserts that the dual urban practices of traditional protection and modern development 
formed an important part of French imperial policy during the interwar period.53 
Although the French first used the “dual city,” it became a common colonial practice 
outside of the French Empire. This rise in the bifurcation of urban spaces was an 
outgrowth of changing colonial realities. Every imperial power became increasingly 
limited in their goals and their financial capabilities. Urban planning became an extension 
of a paternalistic understanding of heritage and cultural authenticity. It was simpler to 
undertake new construction that did not require the changing of traditional urban practice 
or have to worry with altering an established urban structure. 
                                                 





The British colonial city, on the other hand, generally did not undergo the same 
level of seismic shift that occurred in French colonial cities. Urban planning in French 
colonial cities was undertaken directly by the French colonial administration. Akin to 
their indirect approach to general colonial administration, the British rarely directly 
implemented urban plans. R.K. Home argues in “Town Planning and Garden Cities in the 
British Colonial Empire 1900-1930” that the scale and mechanisms for urban planning 
that the British utilized was highly dependent on the colonial status of the territory. Areas 
of direct rule, usually port cities such as Bombay (The Bombay Town Planning Act of 
1915) and Madras (the Madras Planning Act of 1920), were amongst the first places in 
the empire to have complete urban plans developed and executed.54 Far more common 
than these direct urban plans was the British practice of recruiting urban planners from 
Britain to design new administrative headquarters and commercial centers. The stunning 
administrative architecture of New Delhi was the grandest example of this approach.55 
Generally, this approach was used in small towns such as Enugu, Nigeria, which over 
time grew from towns into cities. This urban planning, according to Home, was clearly 
designed to benefit the colonial officials and British business interests, not the local 
inhabitants.  
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The British adopted an approach similar to the French association model in 
“historic” cities such as Alexandria, Cairo, and Jerusalem.56 Leila Fawaz and Robert 
Ilbert argue in “Political Relations Between City and State in the Colonial Period” that in 
Cairo the British did not so much implement a new urban plan as continue the urban 
redevelopment begun by Khedive Isma‘il. The construction of this new European-style 
city to the west of the medieval center was largely completed by the end of the nineteenth 
century. This “dual city” became a default colonial enclave.57 Otherwise, in “historic” 
cities, the British took a paternalistic conservationist approach that was implemented 
indirectly through the “consulting” of a local/native authority.58  
A prime example of British paternalistic efforts to “protect” traditional elements 
of the cities they controlled was the rule of Ronald Storrs in Jerusalem. Ronald Storrs, the 
British Governor of Jerusalem from 1917-1927, prohibited any renovations in the old city 
without his explicit permission. According to historian Nicholas Roberts, the British 
believed they could “redeem” Jerusalem through urban planning. The urban planning of 
Jerusalem mirrored French “dual cities” of Rabat and Casablanca, protecting and 
separating the old city from the new.59 However, Annabel Wharton is clear to point out 
that this preservationist attitude did not apply to structures of the Ottoman period. 
Ottoman urban heritage was deemed as being inauthentic. Although Storrs led a strong 
anti-Ottoman heritage campaign, the British government lacked the funds to complete the 
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work. Instead, Storrs founded the non-government pro-Jerusalem Society to fund and 
execute these projects. The pro-Jerusalem society included Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini, 
the mayor of Jerusalem, the Orthodox and Latin Patriarchs, and the head of the Jewish 
community amongst its members. The pro-Jerusalem Society removed numerous 
Ottoman markers from Jerusalem’s urban fabric, most notably its nineteenth century 
clock tower. 60 This same disregard for ottoman urban heritage existed in Transjordan. 
The British removed an Ottoman fountain from in front of the Husseini Mosque 
(Hamidiyye Sabeel) but were anxious about the destruction of any Roman ruins (such as 
the citadel, roman theater, or the Nymphaeum). 
The one area in which conservationist policy deviated slightly was in regard to 
infrastructural improvements. It was infrastructural concerns, according to historian May 
Seikaly, which necessitated the creation of an urban plan for Haifa. Britain developed 
Haifa as the strategic center of Palestine. The 1930 master plan created by C. Holliday 
focused on the core area that contained the newly expanded harbor, the Iraq Petroleum 
Company pipeline, and the Palestine railway headquarters. The urban plan called for 
minimal construction and urban development outside of this core area of Haifa. Seikaly 
argues that problems arose in Haifa because the Arabs were unfamiliar with the concepts 
of urban planning and could not lobby accordingly. Zionists, on the other hand, fully 
understood the advantages to be gained from infrastructural development taking place on, 
or adjacent to, Jewish land.61 The urban plan of Haifa was the only urban planning 
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beyond Jerusalem directly undertaken by the British. Urban development and planning in 
Palestine was exceptional in the British colonial world because the Zionists lobbied for 
and created their own urban plans. In particular, the Zionists favored the creation of 
“garden cities” throughout Palestine. In general, the British did not utilize garden cities 
because they broke down class and colonial divisions. It was for exactly this reason that 
the Zionists enthusiastically endorsed garden cities because they homogenized an area as 
simply “Jewish” instead of culturally, socially, or religiously diverse.62   
In general, the British did not advocate the formation of new colonial spaces in 
their dealings in the Middle East. The British simply did not have the funds to invest in 
anything that did not serve an explicit military or security purpose, let alone urban 
development. Because of the mixture of British paternalism and fiscal conservatism, 
there was no singular model of a British colonial city. Instead, the British more or less 
preserved what already existed while they made necessary infrastructural improvements 
motivated by security concerns. This model of British colonial paternalism was evident in 
their attitude to Amman’s growth and urban development.63  
One of the few works that discusses the development of Amman during the 
Mandate period is Eugene Rogan’s short article “The Making of a Capital: Amman 1918-
1928.”64 Rogan argues that the state did not have the funds to inspire legitimacy through 
large building projects. Instead, it relied on grand ceremonies such as the Amir’s weekly 
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procession to Friday prayers in order to establish authority.  Another Amman-centric 
work is a recent dissertation by Marwan Daoud Hanania, “From Colony to Capital: A 
Socio-Economic and Political History of Amman, 1878-1958,” which focuses on the 
social development of Amman’s urban fabric. Hanania argues that ethno-national groups 
coexisted with minimal conflict and that class categories were far more important in the 
stratification of Amman.65 However, Hanania’s argument also minimizes the Mandate 
period and instead over-stresses Ottoman continuity and the large impact of Palestinian 
refugees after the 1948 war. This approach belies the importance of Mandate Era 
institutions, infrastructural development, and local elite involvement.  
The city of Amman is the nexus of multiple competing powers and influences 
during the Mandate period. Amman is the intersection of imperial might and local 
autonomy. Amman is the extension of Abdullah’s monarchical patrimonial network. 
Amman is evidence of a robust Ottoman legacy. Amman is the product of a declining 
British Empire. By concentrating on the capital of Amman, we can begin to understand 
how elements outside of the city were forced to adapt to a new centralized authority and 
the importance of localizing that power in a new space. The Mandate period is critical for 
understanding not only how the capital was constructed but also how the rest of 
Transjordan was slowly forced into accepting a centralized power in Amman. This 
creation of an independent central government in Transjordan was an unprecedented 
enterprise for this region. Studying this early period of Amman’s institutional history not 
only highlights the development of Amman and Jordan more generally, but also the shifts 
in the political climate of the entire region. The early years of Transjordan’s government 
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shared a great deal with the early chieftaincies of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Similar to these 
surrounding countries, Transjordan developed over the Mandate period into a discrete 
modernizing state. The study of Amman during the Mandate is the story of the evolving 
governance of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Governmental policy and approach in 
Transjordan was not static. Although it started as a weak chieftaincy with little, if any, 
centralizing aspects it became a bureaucratic modernizing state by the end of the 
Mandate. Amman became the manifestation of the Anglo-Hashemite state and its shadow 
loomed over the rest of Transjordan.   
Furthermore, the creation of Amman as a new capital city allows scholars to study 
its urban development in context with other Middle Eastern cities during the interwar 
period. Amman’s urban evolution still poses a number of similarities and common 
characteristics to other regional centers such as Ankara, Beirut, Jerusalem, and 
Damascus. With the exception of Ankara, a common Ottoman urban heritage can be 
found in all of these urban spaces. Unfortunately, comparisons to other new capital cities 
outside the region such as Brasilia and Washington, D.C. are not as fruitful because 
Amman never had an urban plan.66 Unlike most purpose built capital cities, which were 
planned meticulously, Amman was left to develop without government plans or 
limitations. This choice not to shape the cityscape in Amman was a discrete decision 
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undertaken by the Mandatory state. Transjordan’s governmental authority did not rely on 
the geography and architecture of Amman. Instead, it relied on the young government’s 
institutional authority. Amman, unlike Washington, D.C. or Brasilia, could not afford to 
awe its inhabitants into accepting the supremacy of the central state. Focusing on urban 
change in Amman facilitated by its institutional and infrastructural centrality provides an 
excellent opportunity to highlight the importance of locality and transnational political 
and cultural forces in the development of the Modern Middle East. The city of Amman 
changes the vantage point from which we can understand the evolution of governance in 
Transjordan. By looking from the inside out, this study values both British administrators 
and Transjordanian administrators alike in their ability to create the new Transjordanian 
state. 
 
Theory, Methodology, and Sources 
The framework of this study relies on the inherent tension between the aspirations 
of the state and its reality. The Mandatory state’s goal was to control its populace. 
Governmental power was the synthesis of all of Government actions, which in turn 
generated oversight over Transjordan. However, in every aspect of the Mandate, its 
governmental power had clear limitations.67 The Anglo-Hashemite government’s chief 
concern was the maintenance of the status quo of the region. British focus in Transjordan 
was the protection of their regional assets. This meant the protection of Iraqi oil, the port 
of Haifa, the Suez Canal, and the ever-important route to India. Because Transjordan was 
not important unto itself, the thrust of government interest was security and control as a 
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means to stabilize the entire region. In order to facilitate these goals, the government 
needed to discipline the population to accept the role and function of the new centralized 
state apparatus.  
However, despite the aspirations of the Mandatory government, its reach never 
fully enveloped Transjordan. Instead, the history of Transjordan during the Mandate is a 
story of duality and tension. Amman’s desires never fully came to fruition. In this way, 
Transjordan satisfies what political scientist Nazih Ayubi calls a “hard” state in Over-
Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East by the end of the Mandate. 
Ayubi defines “hard states” as states that were “relatively late-industrializers, with strong 
executives and higher levels of centralization, that try to enforce a detailed, standardized 
regulation of the economy and society.”68. A “hard state” may have strong coercive 
control but it is not a “strong state” because it “lacks rationality and because it lacks the 
necessary moral, ideological, and educational supports.”69 Although Transjordan did not 
possess coercive attributes at the onset, the government’s desire to control its inhabitants 
was its constant goal. The Mandatory government’s controlling and coercive aspirations 
were undercut by its shaky ideological backing. This dearth of ideological support was 
the reason for the opposition movement of the late 1920s and early 1930s in Transjordan. 
The elites of Transjordan did not accept the nascent Mandatory state simply because 
Amir Abdullah and the British foisted it on them. The inhabitants of Transjordan fought 
this increasing institutional control. For this reason, Amman was both the seat of political 
power during the Mandate while simultaneously being the home of the opposition.  
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The ultimate goal of the state was to control all of Transjordan from Amman. In 
essence, the functional goal of the state was to transform the city of Amman into a 
Foucauldian Panopticon. The panopticon was an enclosed, segmented space, in which 
individuals were constantly observable and supervised. The constant uninterrupted gaze 
of a hierarchical figure induced “in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.”70 There was no articulated 
security program undertaken in Transjordan. Instead, in a piecemeal and somewhat 
random fashion, the government slowly centralized the machinery of state control in 
Amman. This haphazard method meant that the government never realized its controlling 
aspirations. Government control over Transjordan became quite strong, but it was never 
absolute.  
As an extension of the will of the government, the city of Amman conditioned the 
population of Transjordan to accept its new centralized control and read Amman as a 
symbol for government authority. Dissident elites were slowly cowed to accept Amman’s 
power through imprisonment in Amman’s central prison, exile, and most tellingly, 
domestic exile away from Amman. However, these threats of discipline did not eliminate 
dissent in Transjordan. The Transjordan government also used Abdullah’s patrimonial 
network to reward formerly dissident elites with position, prestige, and financial 
incentives. The remaining oppositional voices were silenced by the extensive censorship 
activities of the state. Although Amman’s gaze had a curative effect, being removed from 
the locus of power became its own form of punishment. This simultaneously reinforced 
the importance of proximity to Amman. The ability of the government as personified in 
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the city of Amman to condition Transjordanian elites turned Amman into a “Hashemite 
Versailles.”  
Modern scholarship on Louis XIV and Versailles has taken steps away from an 
all-encompassing absolutist perspective. Instead, scholarship belonging to the 
“revisionist” school suggests that Louis XIV needed to incorporate elites into a system 
that was no longer medieval, but not yet modern.71 To reinforce the control of the 
monarchy Louis XIV placated formerly rebellious elites by providing them with 
ideological support, tax breaks, and including them in consultation of certain government 
projects.72  Additionally, the idea of a monolithic “royal faction” is outdated. The French 
nobility at Versailles organized themselves along social, religious, familial, and 
ideological lines. There was no binary relationship pitting the crown against the 
nobility.73 The purpose of Versailles was not to force the nobility to pay fealty to the 
king. The Palace at Versailles and Louis XIV represents the shift of nobility loyalty from 
the king to the king and the state’s administration. Louis XIV “re-educated” the nobility 
to utilize their skills in the new bureaucracy of the state.74  
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Over the course of the Mandate, the elites of Transjordan were brought into 
Amman and were cajoled into gradually accepting the legitimacy and authority of the 
Anglo-Hashemite state. The Mandatory state slowly eliminated the feasibility of 
Transjordanian tribal sheikhs, landowners, and merchants to operate independently of the 
government in Amman. The elites of Transjordan had no choice but to accept the Anglo-
Hashemite regime and the supremacy of Amman. Similar to Versailles, Transjordanian 
elites were brought into Amman to be incorporated into the growing machinery of the 
state. The only way for elites to protect their position and status was to assume posts in 
the bureaucracy of Transjordan. The forced incorporation of elites into Amman was 
feasible because of the Amman’s centralized and bureaucratized authority. This 
arrangement in turn allowed the Mandatory government in Amman to discipline 
economically.75 This arrangement differed from Iraq where tribal sheikhs had their 
authority reified as landowners and did not need to participate in the administration 
directly. The Transjordanian approach to elite incorporation was in lieu of intermarriage 
or more traditional patrimonial networking (e.g. Saudi Arabia). The Anglo-Hashemite 
state needed the elites to directly acknowledge the supremacy of Amman and what the 
capital stood for if the state was to be successful. This was not an immediate product. 
Instead, over time Transjordan’s governing policies shifted limiting the feasibility of 
autonomous elites. This narrowing of political opportunity was particularly evident in the 
government’s changing treatment of the tribes of Transjordan.  
Overall, this dissertation’s study of Mandate Era Amman will not attempt to apply 
any overarching model or definition for the Middle Eastern city. Although the 
                                                 





dissertation does discuss the development of the urban fabric of Amman, a discrete 
analysis of the use and meaning of space as a social and cultural construct is not 
productive because of the inherent Marxist undertones of these theories. Amman’s 
development was not a byproduct of economic initiative or action. It was the result of 
state centralization and machinations. As a result, Marxist space theories such as those of 
Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, or Paul Rabinow are not applicable.76  Instead, I will 
contrast the development of Mandate Era Amman with other colonial “dual cities” like 
Jerusalem, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. Nineteenth century Ottoman administrative and 
infrastructural reforms, in conjunction with the policies of their colonial overlords, 
affected all of these cities. 
The available source material necessitated a focus on the constrictive effects of 
power and control utilized by the Anglo-Hashemite state. As a result, this dissertation is a 
study of the creation of the institutional framework of the state from the vantage point of 
Amman. In the British records, there is a constant focus on control and economy of 
action within Transjordan. There is a wealth of materials documenting the varying stages 
of infrastructural and institutional development, both inside and outside Amman. 
Unfortunately, it is often difficult to determine where these prerogatives originated due to 
a lack of private papers. Both Jordanian and British records group the actions of the 
Anglo-Hashemite government into a singular and at times monolithic “government.”77 In 
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a similar manner, it is often hard to separate the individual actions of the Amir from those 
of the Mandatory government. Because the majority of British and Jordanian officials did 
not leave private records, it is hard to delineate, what actions were the prerogative of the 
British colonial authority, and which organically developed amongst the Arabs in the 
Mandatory government.78 In response to these limitations, this study chooses to focus on 
the physical, political, and symbolic meaning of Amman for all of Transjordan. This 
study chronicles the development of Transjordan’s governing institutions, their 
connection to Amman, and the incorporation of elites into this new government system. 
However, this dissertation is not a cultural history of Amman. It does not delve into the 
development of non-elite Ammani society during the Mandate. My inability to find 
Jordanian newspapers of the period curtailed my ability to discuss non-elite actors. As 
well, the focal point of Amman grounds the study in how elite actors negotiated and dealt 
with the central state. It does not leave Amman to discuss how new state policies affected 
the individual regions of Transjordan or their inhabitants.   
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 This study will be divided into three parts. Part I will explore the institutional and 
infrastructural development of Amman as a hybridized amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and 
British characteristics. Chapter 2 addresses how safety, stability, and centralized control 
determined the scope of the expansion of transportation and communications 
infrastructure as well as the growth of the Departments of Health, Education, and Justice.  
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The most important of the various political and cultural legacies for the Transjordan state 
was its Ottoman legacy/heritage. The Mandatory state could not have existed if it had not 
borrowed countless Ottoman institutions and practices. Utilizing this preexisting Ottoman 
framework, all infrastructural and institutional expansion undertaken by the Mandatory 
government was in the service of security and centralization. However, despite the efforts 
of the state, Transjordan was never completely under the control of the central 
government in Amman. Throughout the Mandate, dual realms existed separating tribal 
affairs from the rest of the state. The government was slowly able to incorporate this 
tribal sphere into the affairs of Amman, but its control was never complete. This chapter 
establishes the limiting effects of the Transjordanian budget on the scope of 
governmental control and the aspirations of the state. Subsequently, Transjordan’s limited 
financial resources could not cover numerous aspects of the modern state.  
The Mandatory government’s budget could not address all of Transjordan’s 
infrastructural and institutional needs. Transjordan, like other Mandates, had to rely on 
external capital to fulfill the basic needs of the state. The reality of Transjordan’s 
governmental reach was directly connected to its budget. The failings of the Mandatory 
state to provide for its populace eroded its legitimacy and functionality. Chapter 3 
explores the limitations of the Transjordanian budget. In this context, the chapter explores 
the utility of extraordinary funding in Amman and Transjordan’s infrastructural growth 
through such measures as the Colonial Development Fund, foreign concession 
agreements, and local entrepreneurial practice. Despite influxes of imperial capital 
through the Colonial Development Fund, the British failed to leave a lasting impression 





in Jordan were found in institutional development and function. In general, each of these 
investments was only successful if the local population viewed the venture as legitimate 
and non-exploitative. Regardless of the source or amount of capital devoted to any 
project, local acceptance and investment were crucial to the success of development in 
Transjordan. 
 Part II of this dissertation focuses on the government’s utilization of the 
legislature for elite manipulation. Through the Legislative Council housed in Amman, the 
Anglo-Hashemite state was able to incorporate formerly autonomous urban notables and 
tribal sheikhs into the machinery of the Jordanian state, transforming Amman into a 
Hashemite Versailles. This was not an instantaneous process. The first Legislative 
Council was created in 1929 to ratify the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement. After 
the initial outburst of opposition and free political discourse, the government spent the 
remainder of the Mandate slowly closing this political space. In this way, Amman 
became both the nexus of governmental control and political opposition. Chapter 4 traces 
the ratification battle that ensued over the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement and 
marked the beginning of the tempering of elite sovereignty and autonomy in Transjordan. 
Chapter 5 continues the story of the Legislative Council after the Agreement’s 
ratification. Slowly, the authority and freedom of the Council diminished and were 
overtaken by the shadow of the state. By the end of the Mandate, Amman’s gilded cage 
both constrained and supported the elites within. However, the elites of Transjordan were 
not coopted by the state unilaterally. Patrimonial networks and the need to protect their 
influence and authority in their home districts slowly mollified the agendas of the 





the legislative system than to be ostracized from Transjordan’s halls of power. By the end 
of the Mandate, the cage of Amman simultaneously limited elite influence and power, 
while protecting and reifying their muted authority as Transjordanian officials. 
While Parts I and II dealt with the formation of the machinery of the Anglo-
Hashemite state, Part III analyzes the development of Amman’s urban fabric.  Although 
Amman was, and remains, the seat of the Hashemite government, it was not just the 
government’s headquarters. The centralization project undertaken by the Mandatory state 
brought about the cultural and political hybridization of the local population in Amman. 
British indifference towards urban planning in Amman is in stark contrast to the strong 
colonial oversight that the government employed throughout Transjordan to maintain 
security. Amman never had an urban plan during the Mandate period and was left to 
develop without direct government oversight. British concerns about Amman had more to 
do with the symbol of the Anglo-Hashemite state it presented than any specific planning 
or security concerns. This allowed for an open urban space that reflected the various 
cultural heritages of the Mandate: Ottoman, Arab, and British. The varied architecture of 
the city highlights a clear Ottoman continuity while allowing for both Western and local 
influences. This amalgam of architectural styles resulted in numerous hybridized 
architectural styles in Amman. These diverse architectural styles highlight the inherent 
contradiction in Amman. The government worked to transform Amman into a Hashemite 
Versailles but they did so without focusing any of their energy on the actual space of 
Amman. Instead, Amman became an unruly contested urban space. The government did 





of the Mandatory state. It wanted to control all of Transjordan but could not even control 
its own capital.  
 Although the government did not implement an urban plan during the Mandate 
period, Amman did develop new residential districts. New neighborhoods like Jabal 
Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh became the neighborhoods of the wealthy and the 
powerful while lesser citizens were pushed towards the outskirts of the city. Jabal 
Amman became an elite enclave that signaled the growth of a “dual city” in Amman. The 
central valley of the city, called al-balad, became the central economic corridor of the 
city and its main area of cultural and social exchange. Feisal Square, located in the center 
of the balad, became the symbolic beating heart of Amman.79 Whether it was a religious 
celebration for Eid al-Fitr, or a victory parade commemorating the Arab Revolt of 1916-
1918, any event of significance took place in Feisal Square. This divided usage and the 
bifurcated urban identity remain among the most lasting legacies of the colonial period in 
modern Amman. Amman’s dual aspects are a reflection of the aspirations of the state and 
its limitations. The Mandatory state pursued a strong modernizing and centralizing 
agenda but was never fully successful. Abdullah’s patrimonial networks may have 
garnered him authority but they did not give him the control he desired. Similarly, 
although the British promoted security in the name of regional stability above everything 
else, their own financial limitations hamstrung efforts to attain any semblance of control 
in Transjordan. The overall urban fabric of Amman during the Mandate period depicts a 
city that is very much a part of the Transjordan government and managed to operate as a 
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space independent from official control. Amman is the physical reality of colonial 
















































2: For the Sake of Security: Infrastructural and Institutional  
Development of Amman 
 
“No country was less ready for independence than was Trans-Jordan in 1922. The 
government was weak and the finances in disorder, while relations with Syria, or more 
correctly with the Mandatory power of that country, were very bad and the subject of 
much heart-burning in London and Paris.”80 
- Arab Legion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Peake reflecting in his 
memoirs on what Transjordan was like shortly after his arrival in the country 
 
From its inception, the Mandate of Transjordan, and its capital Amman, held 
conflicting levels of importance for the British. Transjordan was the least important of the 
British imperial holdings in the Middle East. At the same time, despite its lack of natural 
resources or historical pedigree, Transjordan and Amman were vital for British imperial 
interests in the region. Britain needed to control Transjordan in order to protect its 
interests in neighboring Palestine and Iraq. Towards that end, the ultimate goal of the 
Mandatory regime was security throughout the Mandate. The British approached the 
maintenance of regional security through the development of the Transjordan state. The 
ability of the state to control the land and pacify its inhabitants was paramount to the 
security of the region as a whole. This level of control was only possible through 
infrastructural development emanating out of Amman. Quite literally, all roads led to 
Amman, and the centralization of power and influence within the city was integral to the 
                                                 






development of the state and its legitimacy. The Anglo-Hashemite government in 
Amman became the locus of power, attempting to control all aspects of movement and 
communication in Transjordan. However, the government never achieved these lofty 
goals. A tight budget and limited manpower constantly limited the feasibility of 
government plans. Although the government’s control was never all encompassing, the 
Mandatory government did drastically change the relationship that the inhabitants of 
Transjordan had to their government. 81   
Despite the fact that Transjordan was a new state, it did not emerge from nothing, 
as Commander Peake insisted. Preexisting Ottoman institutions and traditions shaped 
Amman and the Mandate as a whole. The earliest phases of the Mandate were 
functionally the continuation of the Ottoman Empire and its governing apparatuses under 
a new name and a new monarchy.  Through 1924, the government tried to return to the 
same levels of administration and control that had existed in Ottoman times. Prior to 
1924, Amir Abdullah and Chief British Representative Philby operated with minimal 
imperial oversight. The Mandatory government only needed to protect larger British 
imperial regional interests. The shape and function of specific aspects of the Mandate’s 
government were irrelevant. This early lack of interest led to the creation of numerous 
“Potemkin ministries”; ministries and purported government oversight that existed in 
name only.82  
After the arrival of Colonel Henry Cox as the Chief British Resident in 1924, the 
situation began to change. The British imperial government began to pay far closer 
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attention to Transjordan’s finances and development. After 1924, the Transjordan state 
slowly began to move away from Ottoman institutions in an effort to increase the degree 
of control the central government exerted over Transjordan. Slowly, the previously 
hollow ministries of the government became actual governing entities with legitimate 
agendas and oversight. The slow growth of the Transjordan state required the balancing 
of a myriad of local, regional, and imperial interests by both the Mandatory government 
in Amman and the imperial government in London. The British Resident and a select few 
British advisers were the avenues through which these conflicting interests were 
channeled, balanced, and contained.  
The political economy that motivated these investment decisions is critical in the 
understanding of how Transjordan’s government developed within Amman. British 
grant-in-aid combined with Transjordan tax revenue funded the physical infrastructure of 
Amman (roads, utilities, buildings, and security apparatus) as well as new bureaucratic 
structures (ministries, councils, and courts). The financial constraints of the Mandate 
limited the ability of the Mandatory government to invest in large-scale infrastructural 
growth. The development of Transjordanian statecraft, on the other hand, grew through 
the Mandate’s normal revenue streams. These governmental functions included the 
creation of new ministries, new government programs, and new levels of oversight into 
Transjordanian society. All of these programs built upon preexisting Ottoman structures 
and developed in two discrete arenas: the modern realm of the state and the tribal sphere. 
Both arenas of government incorporated new British characteristics into the state and its 





Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics. This hybridized legacy became evident in all 
the arenas of the nascent state and its young capital Amman. 
 
 
Potemkin Mandate: Early Years of the Mandate away from Imperial Oversight 
1921-1924 
 Even before the establishment of the Transjordan Mandate in 1921, the British 
had a strategic interest in “the land east of the Jordan River.”83 The land that would 
become Transjordan had its inhabitants fighting on all sides of the war. Tribes fought 
under the command of the British, Sharif Hussein, and the Ottomans. Although Arab 
tribal loyalties were divided during the war, Circassians from Amman were amongst the 
staunchest Ottoman loyalists within the Empire. Circassian volunteers protected the Hijaz 
Railway and fought against the Arab Revolt in the south. The British Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force, led by Field Marshall Edmund Allenby, captured the provincial 
Ottoman capital of Salt on March 25, 1918. After the initial conquest, Allenby and his 
forces were pushed out of Salt twice (March 31 and May 3). However, Allenby 
eventually successfully broke the seventh and eighth Ottoman Arab armies in August of 
1918 by pushing up coastal Palestine instead of going through Transjordan.84  The British 
established loose military control over the region from 1918-1921. 
After World War I, the victorious European powers divided the defeated 
territories into class A, B or C mandates. Class A designated former Ottoman territories, 
which were ostensibly most ready for self-rule. From 1918-1920, the Occupied Enemy 
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Territory Administration (OETA) East controlled Transjordan. 85 During this period, 
Transjordan fell under control of Sharif Feisal’s Arab Government (Sharif Hussein’s son 
and Abdullah’s brother) headquartered in Damascus, which essentially continued 
Ottoman policies during its two-year rule. The San Remo conference formalized the 
Mandate system and granted Great Britain control of the Palestinian Mandate in April of 
1920. However, there was still no clear plan on how to deal with Transjordan. 86  
The British posted military officers in Transjordanian towns during Feisal’s rule. 
Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner of Palestine, called on these agents to 
gather Transjordanian notables from Irbid to Tafila for a meeting in Salt. On August 21, 
1920, Samuel told over 600 townspeople and tribesmen Great Britain’s plan for an 
autonomous Transjordan separated from Palestine. No notables from ‘Ajlun attended due 
to a dispute between the notables of ‘Ajlun and the Bani Hasan tribe. The British planned 
to encourage the development of a number of local governments with local British 
advisers. The goal of these local governments was to separate Transjordan from 
Damascus and to promote trade with Palestine. Samuel also promised that there would be 
no conscription or disarmament of the population. The British formed governments in 
Irbid, Amman, Karak, Ma’an, Salt, and Moab. ‘Ajlun notables rejected the idea of 
Samuel’s “national government plan.” The ‘Ajlun notables used this opportunity to 
reassert their autonomy and argued that their absence from the meeting in Salt absolved 
them from having to take part in any new government. In reality, the ‘Ajlun elites were 
able to dismiss the “national government plan” because there was no authority or strength 
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in these small local governments.87 By December 1920, it was obvious that the local 
government plan had failed and that a new solution was necessary.  
When Abdullah marched to Ma’an on November 21, 1920, the British were 
unsettled. By early December, Abdullah had amassed a force of 800 trained men, 20 guns 
and up to 2000 irregulars. Field Marshall Lord Edmund Allenby, who had led the 
campaign against the Ottomans in the Levant during World War I, was prepared to 
occupy Amman to block Abdullah’s advance.  In his communique to the War Office, 
Allenby acknowledged that Amman was already the most important site in the region. 
Allenby did not provide a rationale for his assertion.88 Amman’s strategic location on the 
Hijaz Railway increased its economic and political standing in comparison to the more 
geographically isolated Ottoman provincial capital of Salt.89 At the Cairo Conference in 
1921, the British chose the path of least resistance and granted Abdullah probationary 
control over Transjordan for a six-month period. This agreement also guaranteed 
Abdullah a security force and financial aid in the form of grant-in-aid from imperial 
funds dispersed through the High Commissioner.90  
Abdullah, the second son of Sharif Hussein ibn Ali and Feisal’s older brother, has 
frequently been described in both the West and the Middle East as a simple Bedouin from 
the Hijaz. In reality, Abdullah grew up in two of the central cities of the Ottoman Empire, 
Mecca and Istanbul.91 Sixteen years in Istanbul made Abdullah as much an Ottoman as 
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he was a Sharif of Mecca. Abdullah served as the Hijaz’s representative in the Committee 
of Union and Progress’ (CUP) parliament in Istanbul from 1910-1914.92 During World 
War I, Abdullah was eager to align the Hashemites with the British. The ensuing 
Hussein-McMahon Correspondence motivated Abdullah after the war to endeavor to 
create the Arab Kingdom promised to his father.93 To this end, Abdullah was granted 
probationary control over Transjordan for a six-month period at the Cairo Conference in 
1921.94 Abdullah’s establishment in Transjordan was the crowning of both a Sharifian 
Amir and a member of the Ottoman elite. Abdullah’s familiarity with Ottoman practice 
and precedent remained a dominant characteristic of his rule throughout his lifetime.95  
Shortly after naming Abdullah as the Amir of Transjordan, the British ensured 
that the Balfour Declaration did not apply to the new Emirate.96 This was accomplished 
on September 23, 1922, by exercising article 25 of the Palestine Mandate, which granted 
the British the right to withhold certain provisions of the Mandate.97 Thereafter, 
Transjordan was legally immune to Zionist immigration. The clear separation of the 
Palestine and Transjordan Mandates allowed the British to embrace different goals and 
administrative techniques in these neighboring territories. The British administrative 
approach in Transjordan evolved into an exercise in minimalism and simplicity, which 
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was strikingly different from the shifting Mandatory policies in Palestine. Despite this 
legal precedent, however, members of the Transjordan government and Legislative 
Council in particular, would fear Zionist incursion for years to come.  
The first years of the Transjordan Mandate were marred with inconsistencies and 
uncertain policy. After the establishment of the Mandate in 1921, the British sent Harold 
St. John Philby to be the Chief British Representative. Almost immediately, the political 
realities of the Emirate of Transjordan became apparent. The British and Abdullah were 
now responsible for a territory that had never existed before as an independent state. The 
appearance of state building became paramount, but the British had not dictated the 
responsibilities or structure of the new Transjordan government. As long as the region 
was pacified and not antagonistic towards the French in Syria and Lebanon, the British 
were content.98 This laissez-faire attitude is evidence of Britain’s disinterest in the 
administration of Transjordan. Transjordan did not need to function as a true State. From 
the onset, the Transjordanian government, akin to a Potemkin village, only needed to 
project the façade of legitimacy and control so that it appeared that the terms of the 
League of Nations Mandate were being satisfied. As long as the Mandatory government 
maintained the regional status quo, the British were content. British administrative 
indifference and economy of action barely acknowledged the existence of the 
Transjordan Mandate. Control over Transjordan enabled the British to safeguard their 
more important imperial holdings in the region, notably Palestine and Iraq.  
That is not to say that Transjordan, and its Amir Abdullah Ibn Hussein, always 
wanted to be a part of the British imperial project. The British quickly realized that 
                                                 





granting Abdullah a free hand in Transjordan was problematic for a number of reasons. 
Abdullah’s usage of British grant-in-aid funds was rash and irresponsible in the eyes of 
the British. Even more worrisome was that Transjordan appeared to be only a temporary 
interest for Abdullah, who nurtured greater regional ambitions. The Amir had clear 
designs on creating the Arab Kingdom promised to his father in the Hussein-McMahon 
Correspondence.99  
In 1921, the actual administration of Transjordan was ineffectual. Poor levels of 
public security, little tax collection and widespread government unpopularity hampered 
the early efforts of the Mandatory government. Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) 
Frederick Peake, who was responsible for stabilizing the security situation in 
Transjordan, had difficulty in even recruiting a small military force. Peake eventually 
succeeded in the recruitment of locals when he paraded enlisted foreigners through 
Amman. The local inhabitants quickly realized that “their refusal to enlist in the new 
force would not prevent it from being raised.”100 Peake’s reserve force officially became 
the Arab Legion in 1923.101  
 The only arena in which Abdullah was successful, according to the British, was 
his treatment of tribal disputes.102 Abdullah placated tribal elites with gifts and promises 
of position. Yoav Alon argues that this patrimonial and paternalistic approach was in 
keeping with the reforms of the late Ottoman period. Abdullah ruled over Transjordan as 
the premier sheikh in a large chieftaincy. These tribes had been amenable to a state 
system in the Ottoman period as long as it granted them a degree of autonomy and the 
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latitude to exercise leadership over their own tribespeople. The Emirate’s weak 
government likewise necessitated this approach of non-confrontation, which was a 
continuation of Ottoman precedent. The tribes accepted the token existence of the Anglo-
Hashemite state without having to alter drastically their own lives. The early need to 
placate the tribes necessitated the creation of a dual system with discrete “state” and 
“tribal” spheres. This limitation on government oversight decreased overtime but the 
central government never had complete control over the tribes of Transjordan during the 
Mandate. The division between these two realms blurred in the later years of the Mandate 
but exists in Jordan today.103  
 Despite his successes with the tribes, pro-Zionist High Commissioner Herbert 
Samuel was fed up with Abdullah. He wanted the British to give Abdullah enough rope 
to “hang his reputation.”104 It is unclear if his frustration with Abdullah was a result of 
Abdullah’s administrative mismanagement or an attempt to open Transjordan to Zionist 
advances. At this point, as far as Samuel was concerned, the only reason that the British 
allowed Abdullah to remain in power was that there was no ready alternative available. 
Abdullah’s decision to include numerous foreign nationals in his government further 
antagonized the British. These men, most of whom were Arab nationalists in the Istiqlal 
(independence) party, did not care a great deal about Transjordan’s state development. 
The Istiqlal party comprised anti-Ottoman pan-Syrian nationalists who had fled Syria 
after the collapse of Feisal’s government in 1920.105 The Istiqlal ministers harbored great 
resentment towards the French for crushing their dreams of a pan-Syrian state. Akin to 
Abdullah, they saw Transjordan as a launching pad into the rest of Greater Syria. The 
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lack of concrete British policy allowed Abdullah and his Syrian Istiqlal ministers to 
operate with a degree of autonomy.  
Chief British Representative (CBR) Harold St. John Philby also operated largely 
independent of imperial oversight by design from November 1921 to April 1924. The 
Colonial Office envisioned the Chief British Representative as someone who would not 
make policy but someone who would be free when necessary to exert force on the 
Transjordan government to ensure proper policy decisions.106 Philby was a former 
member of the Indian Civil Service and had most recently served in Iraq, where he had 
annoyed Iraqi High Commissioner Percy Cox, who had asked him to leave.107 High 
Commissioner Samuel described Philby as “a man of much energy, ability and 
knowledge of the East … Unfortunately, he is so fully conscious of the possession of 
these qualities, that he regards his own judgment as infallible, and everyone else’s as very 
much the reverse.”108  
Although stubborn and opinionated, Philby was a good administrator who was 
fluent in Arabic. This attitude of infallibility was evident in Philby’s own assessment of 
the Transjordan government. In 1922, Philby was astounded that the local government 
“was beginning to show a tendency to deal with their task with a high hand and were 
apparently trying to avoid asking or taking my advice.”109 The idea that the Mandatory 
government could act independently without his input was anathema. Philby, who was 
the second Chief British Representative for Transjordan after the short tenure of Albert 
Abramson, oversaw the slow growth of the Transjordan state with a heavy hand 
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throughout his tenure. Philby’s main task as the Chief British Representative was to 
define the borders of the new territory vis-à-vis Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. 
He was able to accomplish all of these tasks with the exception of the Saudi border 
during his tenure. The Hadda agreement, which delineated the Transjordan-Saudi border, 
was signed in 1925.  
Philby’s handling of the Hijaz Railway during his term as Representative was 
indicative of his self-assured and frequently inflammatory approach in Transjordan. 
Philby strongly believed that the railways were waqf (religious endowments), as they 
were during the Ottoman period, and should not be run for profit. High Commissioner 
Herbert Samuel scorned Philby’s autonomy in Transjordan. “Without consultation or 
sanction, he transferred the administration of the Hijaz railway between Amman and 
Ma’an, to King Hussein, a step which has caused great embarrassment, and which his 
successor has had to revoke as best he could.”110 This unilateral decision by Philby 
threatened British control over the transportation networks of Transjordan and Palestine 
that was critical to the maintenance of the region’s security. Philby’s reckless actions left 
the Transjordan segment of the Hijaz Railway nearly bankrupt by the time of Philby’s 
resignation in 1924.111 Adding insult to injury, no real improvements to the line happened 
under his supervision due to a lack of funds.112 The matter of the Hijaz Railway remained 
problematic for Mandatory administrators long after Philby’s departure from Transjordan 
in 1924.113  
                                                 
110 MECA, Philby Collection, HC Samuel to J.H. Thomas, private and confidential, 18/7/1924.  
111 IWM, Peake autobiography, 97. 
112 MECA, Richard Mumford Collection, recollection of time as clerk to Philby.  





Despite the resolute and bullheaded approach of Philby and the detached interest 
of Abdullah, the situation in Transjordan did improve from 1921-1924. However, the 
scope of these improvements was little more than the reestablishment of Ottoman norms 
from before the war. The short-lived local governments from 1920-1921 were abolished 
in favor of district administrations (liwa) of Ajlun, Balqa and Karak which mirrored the 
Ottoman administration. Each of these districts had an administrative council (majlis al-
idara) responsible for daily matters and a governor (mutesarrif) to oversee their general 
execution.114 Municipalities created under the Ottomans (baladiyya) were reconstituted. 
Each baladiyya had its own municipal council (majlis al-idara) and was formerly 
separated from the civil service by the 1925 Municipal Law. Amman was a separate 
distinct unit called “Ward of the Capital” (Muhafazat al-Asima).115 This system closely 
mirrored the Ottoman reforms enacted with the 1864 Ottoman Vilayet Law with Amman 
supplanting Salt as the provincial center.  
This period also saw the creation of numerous government ministries. By the end 
of July 1923, the institutional framework of the state included the departments of District 
Administration, Justice, Finance, Customs, Public Health, Education, Agriculture and 
Forests, Land Registry, Public Works, Post and Telegraph, Printing Press, and the Arab 
Legion (later Arab Army).116 The majority of these ministries were largely empty names 
devoid of clear policies or goals for a number of years. Their establishment was an early 
step in the formation of a centralized state in Amman, but the ministries announced the 
importance of the state without having much substance. Similar to the structure of the 
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entire Transjordan Mandate from 1921-1924, it was more important for the individual 
ministries to project power and oversight, rather than actually wield it. The ministries 
were largely ineffectual throughout the first years of the Mandate. The little 
infrastructural improvement undertaken by these ministries focused on erecting and 
repairing telegraph lines and repairing roads to aid in the pacification of Transjordan’s 
tribes and dissident elites.  
These hollow ministries propped up the edifice of the central government without 
adding much substance. Evidence of how empty these ministries were was the frequency 
with which the various members of the Executive Council (i.e. Cabinet) were shuffled 
back and forth between them. Ministers purportedly helmed numerous ministries 
simultaneously and on occasion, no minister whatsoever was appointed.117 The ministries 
gradually filled out throughout the Mandate, but their institutional existence remained 
more important than their functional usage for quite some time. In this way, the 
component ministries of the central government operated in a remarkably similar fashion 
to the entire city of Amman. They both existed at the onset of the Mandate but only 
earned legitimate importance and substance over time. Both the ministries of the state and 
the capital of Amman only gained importance through the centralization of state activities 
in Amman.  
 
The Fiscal Breaking Point and the Extension of Imperial Oversight 
During the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman state had been flexible in 
the application of laws to the population of Transjordan. Certain statutes applied to 
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cultivators, but not pastoralists, and vice versa. In general, the longer the Ottomans and 
their associates were established in a district, the more amenable the local population was 
to their continued presence. However, this policy of tolerance ended under the Young 
Turk regime from 1908-1919.118 During this period, the Ottoman government attempted 
to impose direct control and taxation over Karak, directly clashing with the local 
leadership (mainly the al-Majali family). The Karak Revolt of 1910 was a result of this 
policy of Ottoman rigidity.119  
For many of the same reasons, there was a series of tribal revolts against the 
Transjordan government from 1921 to 1923, including the Kura revolts in 1921-1922 and 
the Adwan rebellion in 1923. These rebellions were largely in response to large increases 
in the tax burden from the Ottoman period. Similar to the Karak Revolt, the transition 
from tribal partial autonomy and regional flexibility to a discrete inflexible taxation 
schema led to opposition.120 Of course, the growth and actions of the Transjordan 
military, the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF), played a crucial 
role in the pacification of Transjordan during this turbulent time. Historians P.J. 
Vatikiotis and Joseph Massad have discussed the growth and development of the 
Transjordan armed forces at length.121 Both historians focus on the important role that the 
military had in the formation of state identity and security in Transjordan. This study will 
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not focus on the military itself, but the institutional and infrastructural framework that the 
military employed to maintain security throughout the Mandate.  
Theoretically, British grant-in-aid was meant to aid in tax collection and to 
provide resources with which Abdullah could curry favor amongst the tribes. The British 
followed a similar approach with Abdullah’s brother Feisal and the tribal sheikhs in 
Iraq122 It would also cover expenditures beyond the means of internally generated 
revenue.123 This financial model, however, did not function as intended in the early years 
of the Transjordan Mandate. Bertram Thomas, the Treasurer in Palestine seconded to 
Amman, was highly critical of the financial practices of the Emirate, blaming both 
Abdullah and Philby. He estimated tax increases of as much as 100% with few tangible 
improvements to the government and for its people.124 Philby reported in October 1923 
that the government had not paid the local police or government officials for a period of 
three months. These lax financial practices were complicated further when the state 
refused to submit its financial accounts to the Chief British Representative’s office.125 
Something had to be done in response to these financial difficulties and irregularities. In 
1923, the British suspended grant-in-aid, but that had little effect. Peake noted the impact 
was minimal because much of the grant-in-aid money funded the reserve force, not day-
to-day government function.126 After this period of fiscal irregularity, it was clear that 
Philby was unable to exert the necessary financial and administrative control over the 
Amir and his government.  
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In June 1924, Philby resigned in the midst of the turmoil. Philby notes his 
resignation was due to “general disagreement with the policy pursued in the Near East in 
recent years.” Philby had also grown tired of the “personal extravagance” of Amir 
Abdullah whom he considered a poor administrator and ruler. Philby believed Abdullah 
“brought his administration into disrepute and the fact that he has not given satisfaction to 
his own people is evidenced by the attempted rebellion in September last of the Adwan 
tribe and its associates.”127 It is possible that Philby’s displeasure with Abdullah was tied 
to his Indian Civil Service background. During World War I and its immediate aftermath, 
the Foreign Office and the India Office disagreed over whether or not to support the 
Hashemites. The India Office favored the Saudis over the Hashemites in general.128 It is 
telling that immediately after leaving Transjordan Philby went to Saudi Arabia, 
established a business, and became an unofficial adviser to Ibn Saud. Philby remained in 
Saudi Arabia for much of the rest of his life. Philby’s resignation may also have been to 
preempt the inevitable. High Commissioner Samuel had grown weary of Philby’s antics 
and would have likely removed him either way. In response to the Philby resignation, 
Samuel noted that the problems of finance were largely due to Philby’s mismanagement. 
Samuel agreed that tighter control was necessary over Abdullah’s finances, but argued 
that Philby should have been able to accomplish this.129  
Shortly after Philby’s resignation, Colonel Henry Cox became the new Chief 
British Representative (the title changed to British Resident shortly thereafter). Cox had 
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served in Sudan before the war and had most recently been the district governor of 
Nablus. Unlike Philby, Cox “fitted into the British Colonial Hierarchy” according to 
historian Mary C. Wilson.130 Cox, a “dedicated and unsentimental colonial official,” was 
ordered to rein in Transjordan’s runaway finances and to make Amir Abdullah 
understand the need for tighter financial control. Abdullah, not surprisingly, opposed 
more direct British control. In 1929, Cox reflected upon his initial meeting with the Amir: 
“Abdullah desires to rid himself of British interference for he believed that if Transjordan 
were allied with, or amalgamated in, the Hejaz the two countries would need no 
European assistance. I well remember him telling me that Westerners could not hope to 
show Orientals a better way even if they made the brims of their hats a yard wide.”131 
Shortly thereafter, Cox delivered an ultimatum from the Chief Secretary of the Palestine 
Government, Sir Gilbert Clayton, to Abdullah in July 1924. This stipulation required 
Abdullah to accept new financial controls, to expel political undesirables (the Syrian 
Istiqlalists), conclude an extradition agreement with the French in Syria, and abolish the 
Department of Tribal Administration.132 Abdullah understood the veiled threat that if he 
did not acquiesce to these British demands that the British would find someone else to 
lead Transjordan. Abdullah begrudgingly agreed on August 20, 1924. Cox remembered 
the incident years later noting that the Amir “was obliged to agree to the terms laid down 
for his acceptance by His Majesty’s Government … I venture to believe, also the 
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evidence of progress following a closer British control led him to accept that control with 
increasingly good grace.”133  
After Abdullah’s agreement to Clayton’s ultimatum things began to change in 
Transjordan. The degree of British imperial oversight in Transjordan increased a great 
deal. All budgetary decisions now ran through the entire imperial hierarchy. Increased 
British colonial oversight coincided with an increased focus on the development and 
shape of the Mandatory government. After 1924, the shadow ministries that existed in the 
early years of the Mandate slowly began to disappear. Early financial and administrative 
shortcomings had necessitated a more forceful British presence in Transjordan. After 
1924, the Transjordan Mandate needed to function like a normal British colonial holding, 
not merely a supporter of the regional status quo. In short, if the British had to be more 
involved, the Mandate was going to run more efficiently. This decision led to the 
appointment of British officers in positions of administrative oversight such as the 
financial adviser, judicial adviser, director of customs and director of antiquity. The 
British colonial administrators believed that because of these appointments that  “the state 
of affairs advanced by leaps and bounds towards progress.”134 However, it is important to 
note that the British staff in Transjordan rarely exceeded twenty officers. It remained by 
far the smallest British colonial staff in the region when compared to Palestine, Egypt, 
and Iraq.135 Similar to Iraq, the administrators in Transjordan were “advisers.” The 
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British preferred the appearance of local rule whereas the French generally administered 
their Mandates more directly. After 1924, budgets and other expenditures originated from 
the Transjordan government or the British Resident. After local approval, these figures 
went to the High Commissioner, then to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with final 
approval being at the behest of the British Treasury.  
In tandem with this increased financial attention, the British concocted a more 
concrete policy for the entire Middle East. Previously, there was policy confusion 
because of the overlapping interests of the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, and 
Colonial Office. The creation of the Middle East Department on March 1, 1921, 
somewhat remedied this problem.136 However, at no time in the British Empire was there 
a uniform policy for political or economic development in the colonies. In this regard, the 
conception of a singular “British Empire” is inherently misleading.137 Lord L.S. Amery 
further clarified British imperial interests in the region in 1924 when he became the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (SoS). Amery’s tenure, which coincided with British 
Resident Cox’s arrival, focused on the importance of Palestine in the British geopolitical 
system. The new policy depended on the ability to protect the southern flank of the 
British Empire running through Cairo, Baghdad, Calcutta, and Sydney. This defensive 
position was critical to prevent German infiltration and aggression in the region during 
World War II. According to historian Ronald Hyam, “[t]he keystone of this geopolitical 
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arch would be in Palestine, with British influence established on the ruins of a defeated 
Ottoman Empire and lined with the patronage of Zionism.”138  
The increased strategic importance of the region necessitated tighter control and a 
more hands-on approach to Transjordan’s administration. As a result, the British Resident 
became simultaneously a more important and less autonomous figure than he had been 
from 1921-1924. After 1924, the office of the British Resident was, “though nominally 
advisory, in reality the controlling force which makes possible any semblance of 
government in Transjordan.”139 The Resident was now answerable to the imperial 
hierarchy in a more direct way than he had been before. However, he also took on an 
increased level of logistical importance. The British Resident became the avenue through 
which both imperial policies and local pressures would shape actual Mandate policies. 
The British Resident acted as the “man on the spot.” “They [British colonial 
administrators] stood at the intermediate point of interlock in a chain of responsibility 
between decisions handed down and a self-seeking initiatives mediated at the center.”140 
The more direct control and influence exercised by the British Resident led to increased 
infrastructural growth and the further development of the Transjordan state in Amman. 
Although the British now dictated more of the policy decisions of the Transjordan state, 
they did not start from scratch. Ottoman structures provided the institutional bedrock 
upon which post-1924 infrastructural developments took place. Although financial 
constraints always curtailed the scope of possible improvements in Transjordan, the 
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security and stability of the Mandatory state did improve a great deal. With these new 
financial controls, the British were able to focus more explicitly on the development of 
Transjordan’s infrastructure.   
 
Ottoman Infrastructural Precedent 
In order to understand the infrastructural and institutional developments of the 
Transjordan Mandate, it is critical to understand what reforms were undertaken by the 
Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Prior to the 
nineteenth century, few Ottoman reforms affected the administration and development of 
Ottoman Levantine cities.141 In general, these provincial cities were more or less left to 
their own devices and only loosely tied administratively to the Ottoman state. There was 
little if any form of direct control from Istanbul over the Levant. Some administrative 
offices did exist, such as wali (governor), mushir (commander in chief of local army 
units), daftardar (revenue administrator), and qadi (senior judge). However, these offices 
did not form a single centralized institution or administration. There was a little 
regulation of social, economic, and political affairs. Interaction amongst social groups 
was largely determined “by religion, family, district, profession or guild and their 
respective leaders.”142   
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The character of local administration changed drastically in 1864 with the 
Regulation of Provinces (Vilayet Nizamnamesi), which established provincial capitals. 
The Vilayet Law also created a standard municipality model, based upon the system in 
Istanbul.143 The implementation of the Vilayet Law in 1864 divided the Ottoman Empire 
into provinces (vilaya), regions (sanjaqs), cities (medina) and quarters (mahalla).144 
From 1848-1882 there were six major urban planning regulations: the 1848 Building 
Regulation (Ebniye Nizamnamesi), the 1858 Regulation on Streets (Sokaklara dair 
Nizamname), the 1863 Street and Building Regulation (Turuk ve Ebniye Nizamnamesi), 
the 1875 Regulation on Construction Methods in Istanbul (Istanbul ve Belde-i Selasede 
Yapılack Ebniyenin Suret-i İnşaiyesine dair Nizamname), the 1877 Istanbul Municipal 
Law (Dersaadet Belediye Kanunu), and the 1882 Building Law (Ebniye Kanunu).145 
These combined reforms divided and transformed Istanbul through mandated 
modernization reforms. By 1900, Istanbul was a dual city with westernized Galata and 
Pera on one side and traditional Istanbul on the other side of the Golden Horn.146 Many 
of these regulations focused on regimenting building construction, height, and a 
correlation of scale between building height and street width. New parameters, 
dimensions, and statutes enforced regularity and standardization in urban redevelopment. 
These new regulations were meant to aid communication efficiency as well as travel 
speed and trade. 147 This focus on speed, communication, and centralization also led to a 
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number of large transportation and communication projects throughout the empire such 
as the Syrian, Baghdadi, and Hijaz railways, the Damascus-Beirut road, and the Medina 
telegraph line.148  
This focus on provincial development was reinforced by the 1869 Regulation on 
Roads and Streets (Turuk ve Meabir Nizamnamesi), which created three categories of 
roads throughout the empire: imperial roads that led to Istanbul, secondary and tertiary 
roads that linked provincial centers, and roads leading to smaller towns and villages. The 
Transjordan Mandate used these same laws with Amman replacing Istanbul as the central 
destination. The goal of the Ottomans’ new road program was to increase trade, 
profitability, and communication speed throughout the empire. However, these reforms 
were undercut by the Empire’s dire financial situation (the Ottoman Empire went 
bankrupt in 1876).  As a result, foreign concessions (e.g., Beirut-Damascus road opened 
in 1863 by Edmond de Perthuis) funded many roads and railways throughout the empire. 
Despite these limitations, the Ottoman Empire had over 900 kilometers of roads by the 
early twentieth century. 149  
Perhaps the most important infrastructural project of the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century was the Hijaz railway. At the onset, the Ottoman government 
planned the Hijaz railway as a purely domestic project. The hope was that the empire 
could handle planning, financing, and constructing the railway without any external 
assistance. This proved to be impossible and a large proportion of the materials and 
technical expertise came from outside of the Ottoman Empire.150 There was no real 
economic motivation for the rail line. The Hijaz railway was justified as a means to 
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reinforce the Islamic credentials of the Ottoman Empire by aiding pilgrims on the hajj. It 
was also hoped that the railway would strengthen Ottoman control over southern Syria 
and the Hijaz. The line reached Medina in 1908 but never made it to Mecca.151 Although 
World War I destroyed a number of telegraph lines, damaged roadways, and damaged 
some railways there was a distinct Ottoman infrastructural network on which the 
Mandatory government could improve. This Ottoman legacy was critical in the 
development of Transjordan’s physical infrastructure as well as its institutional and legal 
apparatuses. Municipal reforms modernized cities throughout the Levant and left behind 
a clear Ottoman urban heritage.152 The Anglo-Hashemite government did not start from 
scratch in 1921.  The development of Transjordan’s transportation and 
telecommunication network was evidence of this Ottoman legacy.  
 
Infrastructural Improvements: The Department of Public Works and Connecting 
Amman to the Rest of Transjordan 
 
The Transjordan government’s transportation and communication networks in 
1924 were far from ideal. The improvement of both networks was vital if the government 
hoped to increase the centralization and maintain the security of the young state. The 
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articulation of a modern transportation and communication system was critical to the 
government’s ability to rule over and stabilize Transjordan. Government control over 
these networks was necessary to promote the Mandatory state’s disciplining gaze 
throughout Transjordan. In particular, the borders of Transjordan needed tighter control 
to deter tribal raiding. The improvement of the transportation network fell to the 
Transjordan Department of Public Works. One of the first jobs of the Department of 
Public Works was to repair and improve the Ottoman road network. Only a few roads 
existed in the region during the Ottoman period. The Circassians had only reintroduced 
wheeled transport into Transjordan in 1878.  
At the outbreak of World War I there were approximately 280 km of roads, of 
which only 30 km were passable by motor traffic. There were only two major north-south 
roads. The oldest was the tariq al-rasif (the paved way), first created by the Romans, 
which ran southwest from Amman through Madeba and Karak, and terminated in Ma’an. 
The second north-south route, tariq al-bint (the maiden’s way) was largely a pilgrimage 
route running along the desert edge. The Hijaz Railway later used this same path. There 
were several east-west routes connecting Transjordan with Palestine. None of these roads 
was paved and they were only passable in dry weather. These roads connected Salt to 
Jerusalem, Irbid to Nazareth, and Karak to Hebron. The only railroad during the Ottoman 
period and the Mandate period remained the Hijaz Railway running from north to south 
in Transjordan, terminating in Ma‘an. The track originally went to Medina but was 
destroyed by Feisal and T.E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt and was never repaired. 
153  
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During World War I, the Ottoman military constructed a paved all-weather route 
that linked Amman to Salt and Jerusalem across the later named Allenby Bridge.154 This 
route remained the most important travel artery of Transjordan throughout the Mandate 
period. When the Department of Public Works was established in 1921 with Khalid al-
Hakim as its first director, one of the first tasks of the Department was the repair and 
repaving of the Amman-Allenby Bridge road. This route’s importance highlights the 
imperative to connect Amman to other British holdings, most notably, Jerusalem. For the 
British, Amman, and by extension Transjordan, were only important in their relation to 
the larger imperial system. Imperial connections always took priority in the allocation of 
construction funds throughout the Mandate. Roads only used by domestic traffic were of 
secondary importance. Additional dirt path roads were also opened connecting Amman 
with Madaba and Zarqa and Suwailah to Jarash (completed by volunteer labor).155  
Although never particularly well-funded, the Department of Public Works became 
one of the most crucial ministries carrying out work vital to the continuation of the 
Hashemite state. Similar to neighboring Palestine, the Department of Public Works 
focused on road construction and road maintenance throughout the Mandate. Larger 
infrastructural improvements, both in Transjordan and Palestine, required special funding 
and generally fell outside the scope of the Department of Public Works. This fiscal 
limitation curtailed the degree of control that the central government could exert over 
Transjordan.156 The Department of Public Works, through the roadway system of 
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Transjordan, defined the reach of the centralizing state. After 1924, the Department of 
Public Works continued upkeep on existing roads and began to improve preexisting 
roadways. The roads during the Mandate period can be divided into three groups: all-
weather roads (also referred to as metaled roads), covered in asphalt and suitable for any 
traffic, moto-track roads composed of compressed gravel for dry motor travel, and by far 
the largest category, was earth-track roads only passable in dry weather.157  
Throughout the Mandate, the military utility of Transjordan’s roads always took 
predominance over any economic motivations. Maintained roads enabled a small military 
force to travel quickly throughout Transjordan, to suppress uprisings, and curtail tribal 
raiding. Tribal raiding was particularly problematic along Transjordan’s southern border. 
Tribal raiding was one of the primary reasons for continuing antagonism between 
Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. Since both Transjordan and Saudi Arabia were British 
clients, the British were highly motivated to remove this source of regional unrest. The 
new level of discipline and order that the central government aspired to was in stark 
contrast to the Bedouin conception of travel. Bedouin had never paid attention to borders 
before the creation of the Mandatory states.158 This division of Bilad al-Sham into several 
discrete political units with their own borders only began to affect the nomads in earnest 
in the 1930s. Over time, the Bedouin of Transjordan came to rely on Amman to arbitrate 
disputes and to protect them from the Wahabis in Saudi Arabia and the French in 
Syria.159  Transjordan’s road network bounded and controlled a previously amorphous 
and decentralized region. Roads created a regulated and controllable network with 
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Amman at the center. The improved transportation infrastructure, in conjunction with the 
rapid growth of the military, gave the government tighter control over Transjordan. The 
state, for the first time, could now quickly respond to any action the government deemed 
illicit.  
 The increased level of connectivity throughout Transjordan aided merchants and 
farmers but this occurred only as a positive byproduct. Rough earth-track roads remained 
by far the most common road type during the Mandate, and required frequent 
maintenance. New roads, particularly after 1928, continued to open nearly every year 
further connecting the far reaches of Transjordan with Amman. Every village and town in 
Transjordan was connected by road to Amman by 1929. The distance maintained by the 
Department increased gradually from 575 km in 1927, to 962 km in 1929, to 1599 km in 
1939.160  By 1942, all-weather roads ran from Irbid in the north all the way to Wadi Musa 
in the south.161 In 1926, there were 110 cars, 4 buses and 16 trucks while in 1938 there 
were 335 cars, 24 buses and 230 trucks. By 1944, there was a total of 599.2 km of all-
weather roads in Transjordan.162  
In the more rural areas of Transjordan, the villagers themselves undertook much 
of the roadwork. British Resident Cox was keen to encourage this initiative where the 
Public Works Department provided the supplies to create the roads and the villagers 
supplied the labor.163 Government reliance on villager-constructed roads emphasizes the 
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financial and labor constraints of the state. The Mandatory government had no choice but 
to rely on this type of voluntary infrastructural advancement. By building their own 
roads, villagers were voluntarily choosing to be incorporated into the growing 
infrastructure of the state. The villagers understood that a higher degree of connectivity 
throughout the country was beneficial to trade and security.164 The emphasis on paved 
roads highlighted the government’s desire to control the travel of its inhabitants. Roads 
dictated the flow of individuals and goods through a transportation network with Amman 
at its center. This was in stark contrast to the roaming “pre-modern” travel of the 
Bedouin.   
However, financial limitations hamstrung further road improvements. According 
to the 1931 economic commission, no more than LP (Palestinian pounds) 10,000 could 
be used annually on road maintenance. By 1937, this expenditure restriction left large 
swaths of Transjordan’s road system unmaintained due to lack of funds.165 These 
budgetary constraints curtailed the important work of the Department of Public Works. 
Only the outbreak of WWII in 1939 allowed for the lifting of this restriction. The war 
necessitated the building of new roads to shore up Transjordan’s defenses. These new 
defense-driven road initiatives always placed imperial regional interests above those of 
the Mandatory government. Examples of these defensive roads were the Jisr Sheikh 
Hussein to Ma’an road, a military road from Rematha to Deraa, the 64km road from 
Amman to Mafrak, which included the critical 4 km link between Amman and the 
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Amman Hijaz Railway station in 1944. 166 A new influx of cash from the War 
Department made these new roads possible.  
The largest of these projects was the Haifa-Baghdad road built from 1938 to 1941. 
The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) used the same route during the construction of the 
IPC pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa in the early 1930s. Starting in August 1938, the 
340km Transjordan section of the road was upgraded from dirt track to all-weather status. 
A special agreement signed on July 19, 1941, recognized the road as the British Imperial 
Highway. This agreement stipulated that the Transjordan government maintained the 
road but was reimbursed for the maintenance by the British government.167 The British 
Imperial Highway was a road maintained for imperial interests, not for the use of the 
Transjordan government. This is obvious because the road did not run through Amman.  
The British Imperial Highway also reinforced the limited British interest in the 
development of Transjordan. The War necessitated the construction of new roads to 
protect British imperial interests throughout the region. Transjordan only benefitted from 
this construction boom because it was in the middle of other strategic British holdings. 
The construction of the British Imperial Highway also underscores the limitations of the 
reach of the Transjordan government and Amman. Transjordan was little more than the 
land on the way to Palestine for the British. However, even with additional funding 
coming from the British military the Department of Public Works was still underfunded. 
British Resident Alec Kirkbride, who succeeded Cox in 1939, reported in May 1943: 
“Owing to the increase in wages and cost of materials and the fact that the vote for the 
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maintenance of roads in TJ has not been increased since the outbreak of the war, it has 
been necessary to restrict drastically the road maintenance program for 1945. It seems 
probable that an increase of expenditure for this service will be necessary in 1944.”168 
The officers of the Department were on the verge of striking in January 1944 because of 
the government’s refusal to increase rates to keep pace with inflation.169 The chronic 
financial constraints of the Transjordan budget limited the scope of any infrastructural or 
developmental program throughout the Mandate period. Any large-scale infrastructural 
projects were simply beyond the means of the Mandatory government. These fiscal 
restrictions checked the government’s control aspirations. The Anglo-Hashemite state 
simply did not have the resources to completely dominate its subjects.  
 This same broad desire for control through increased communication capabilities 
necessitated the revitalization of Transjordan’s telegraph and telephone network. The 
Ottoman telegraph network in Transjordan was an outgrowth of the Medina telegraph 
line and the Hijaz Railway. The earliest telegraph line connected Salt and Damascus in 
1890. Telegraph service did not travel further south in Transjordan until 1900. Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II chose to extend the line south from Salt to Medina in order to eliminate 
the expense of funneling Ottoman communications through the British Eastern Telegraph 
Line. Construction began in 1900 and linked Salt, Madaba, Karak, Tafila, Ma‘an, Aqaba, 
and eventually Medina by 1901. Istanbul used these lines to stay informed on the 
progress of the Hijaz Railway construction, which was completed in 1908.170 
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In the wake of World War I, the telegraph system was in an alarming state of 
disrepair. Somewhat ironically, this was largely a result of the Hashemite-led Arab 
Revolt. Among the first lines restored by the British military in 1920 were those directly 
connecting Amman to Jerusalem through Salt, Madaba, and across the Allenby Bridge. 
Similar to the repair of the bridge itself, the importance of this travel and communication 
artery was wedded to tighter imperial control from Jerusalem and increasing centralized 
oversight throughout the state. The Department of Posts and Telegraphs was established 
in 1922 with Nasib al-Khatib as director. The regional unrest from 1921-1923 reinforced 
the need for telecommunications throughout Transjordan connecting Amman to the more 
remote areas of the country. By 1925, there were connections via telephone between 
fourteen police posts around the country and the Arab Legion headquarters in Amman. 
The Royal Air Force (RAF) also operated a wireless link between Amman and Ma‘an, 
where telephone service was unavailable. Further upgrades of existing lines continued 
throughout the 1920s with the laying of both telegraph and telephone lines in all cases. In 
order to keep up with the increased demand, the government hired a new class of eleven 
telegraph operators in 1927.171  
Telephone service continued to grow in popularity and gradually replace the 
telegraph. British Resident Cox attributed the large increases in telephone subscribers to 
trunk calls as a result of a “marked improvement” in service in 1929.172 Similar to the 
road network, World War II provided an increase in funds for the laying of telephone 
lines for defensive measures. The Department of Posts and Telegraphs completed the 
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work while the military authorities provided the funds.173 The improved road and 
communication networks also aided the frequency and reliability of mail delivery. The 
postal network gradually improved throughout the Mandate period with regular mail 
delivery three times a week between Transjordan and Palestine by 1939.174 The postal 
system was one of the few departments that actually generated money for the Mandatory 
government. The Department was self-sufficient by 1938. The Department of Posts and 
Telegraph continued to grow throughout the Mandate to keep up with demand. The 
Department had sixteen post offices and employed over a hundred men by 1938. By the 
end of 1936, motor transport delivered all of the mail to the major towns and villages of 
Transjordan.175 
A dearth of resources limited the scope of telephone improvements during the 
Mandate. Attempts to improve international traffic and replace the Amman telephone 
exchange were beyond the means of normal government revenue.176 Imperial capital was 
only available for projects directly tied to both imperial and Transjordanian security.177 
Despite its limited resources, the work of the Department for Public Works and the 
Department of Posts and Telegraph was vital for the concentration of state authority 
within the capital of Amman. These departments extended the reach of the government 
throughout the Mandate, which allowed the centralizing influence of Amman to slowly 
take hold throughout Transjordan. The reach and oversight of Amman grew with the 
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communication and transportation networks. The Anglo-Hashemite state utilized these 
networks to oversee all of Transjordan. Although government oversight was never all 
encompassing, the transportation and telecommunication networks greatly increased the 
functional sphere of control of the Mandatory state. Any benefits that the transportation 
and communication networks provided beyond control and security were merely 
coincidental. 178 
Infrastructure in the Capital: Developments in Amman 
A great deal of infrastructural development also took place within the capital 
itself. Akin to the rest of Transjordan, security necessitated the majority of the 
infrastructural development in Amman. In 1919 Amman was a village of 650 houses with 
a total population of 6000 people divided into roughly 750 families with roughly 4000 
Muslim Circassians, 2000 Arab, and 167 Christians. There was little industry beyond the 
five steam mills in the town. The majority of goods were imported and there was no real 
concentration of skilled labor in Amman.179 There were few physical improvements 
made to Amman’s infrastructure from 1921-1924, but “it was no longer an obscure 
village, a convenient center for distributing supplies only, but was promoted to a 
capital… it began to exert the attractive force common to all capital cities.”180  
The municipal administration of Amman was reconstituted (originally created in 
1909) in 1925 with a president and seven members who were elected to four-year terms 
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of service. Their stated “general duties” pertained to new construction, maintaining 
public facilities and amenities, “health measures” covering sanitation, licensing, and 
inspection, and “public welfare,” which included caring for the poor, traffic regulations, 
weights and measures, and monopoly prevention. Central and municipal governments 
worked together on public health, construction of roads, and promoting communication 
and security.181 Similar to the Mandatory government, the role of the municipality was to 
ensure stability, security, and control through improved infrastructural capabilities.  
The two largest construction projects in Amman were the Husseini Mosque and 
Raghadan Palace. The construction of Husseini mosque, located in the center of Amman, 
began in 1923. The construction of Abdullah’s palace, Raghadan Palace, took place from 
1924-1927.182 These two buildings emphasized the dual poles of Hashemite authority: 
religious and political.183 Beyond the constructions of these two buildings, the majority of 
government-funded construction that took place in Amman during the Mandate dealt 
with security and health. This dual focus was really two sides of the same coin: each 
perpetuated the other. The government’s focus on health was not oriented to the needs of 
the individual, but towards preventing epidemics, which would threaten the stability of 
the state. The slow imposition of modern health standards in the capital, and throughout 
Transjordan, was another means by which the centralizing Anglo-Hashemite state could 
control individuals and their movements.184  
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Likewise, the construction of a new central prison in Amman both improved the 
hygiene of its prisoners and segregated dangerous individuals who could destabilize the 
control of the new state. The Anglo-Hashemite state project quickly focused on new 
means to discipline and control its population after its inception. This Foucauldian 
approach implemented government-mandated modernity into the nascent capital of 
Amman. Imposed health norms helped the government to control their imprisoned 
population, and the rest of Amman by extension. The previous prison had to be 
abandoned “on account of bad ventilation, insufficient light and limited 
accommodations.”185 The Amman central prison housed anyone in Transjordan 
sentenced to a prison term over three months. Thus, Amman became both the center of 
government and incarceration within Transjordan. This was not mere happenstance. All 
forms of power - physical, psychological, legislative, executive – emanated from the 
capital of Amman. The Public Works Department built the new prison on behalf of the 
Arab Legion to alleviate overcrowding in the old prison. The new central prison’s 
accommodations increased by 55 prisoners. The improvements undertaken by the Public 
Works Department also upgraded the prison’s sanitation by constructing a latrine for 500 
men and installing a water pump into the prisoners’ bathroom and kitchen.186 The 
construction of Amman’s central prison literally disciplined the inhabitants of 
Transjordan into accepting the new ruling status quo of the land. 187 Criminals and 
political dissidents alike were sent to the central prison to be reformed by the state. The 
decision to have the central prison for all of Transjordan in the capital reinforced the 
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perception of a centralized state controlling and punishing Transjordan. Although this 
control was not total, Amman increasingly symbolized the power of the state. 
Beyond the construction of a new prison building, there was a new focus on 
advancing prisoner treatment. Ottoman practice had been that anything beyond bread, 
water, and “perhaps a dirty blanket” had to be provided by the inmate’s family. It was not 
the responsibility of the state to provide for the inmates’ overall welfare. This standard 
changed in Transjordan during the second tenure of Prime Minister Hassan Khalid Abu 
al-Huda (1926-1929). After the completion of the new prison in Amman in 1927, it 
became common practice for the state to provide proper food, clothing, and bedding for 
all inmates in their care.188 This modernizing impulse was in line with the Anglo-
Hashemite state’s ultimate goals of developing a modern bureaucratized state.  
Hygienic concerns in Mandate Amman were not limited to the prison. The water 
supply of Amman remained problematic early in the Mandate period because of the 
spread of malaria and dysentery. Until 1927, the inhabitants of Amman took their 
drinking water from the main stream (Seil) that ran through Amman and the springs 
located nearby.189 A new water supply scheme was completed in Amman in late 1927. 
“Several public taps have been installed and the waste water from these taps is drained to 
the ‘Seil’ (the river running through Amman) through piping. The department, so far, has 
not allowed any private installations for lack of means for the disposal of waste water 
which would then be too much.”190 Once again, the scope of the water project highlighted 
the importance of general public health and hygiene over private or economic benefit. 
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The water project did aid the economic development of the young capital, but only as a 
byproduct of the state’s modernizing control scheme. 
Unfortunately, the 1927 earthquake drastically affected the quality of life and 
sanitation efforts of Amman.  The 6.2 magnitude earthquake shook the region on July 11, 
1927, with an aftershock on July 17, 1927.191 The earthquake caused destruction 
throughout the region, damaging over twenty towns including Jerusalem, Nablus, and 
Cairo. However, the “heaviest toll [was] east of the Jordan.”192 The earthquake killed 
eleven people and wounded thirty-five in Amman. In all of Transjordan, sixty-eight 
people died and 105 were wounded. 278 houses were demolished and 345 houses were 
damaged in Amman itself. The earthquake caused the minaret of the newly completed 
Husseini Mosque to “crash down to the ground as if cut with a pen knife.”193 This 
destruction destabilized the situation in Amman for a number of months. The British 
government provided LP 2000 in loans for the reconstruction of homes. Aid in the 
aftermath of the earthquake came from both the Anglo-Hashemite government, mainly 
the Arab Legion and Department of Public Health, and the public. “Within an hour after 
the earthquake, a central relief committee was formed in Amman, and shortly thereafter 
sub-committees were formed in each of the districts affected.” Despite this aid, many 
inhabitants of Amman lived out in the open for months. People in Amman used the 
“dirty” water from the Seil River to wash themselves and cooking utensils, which helped 
the spread of water-borne diseases.  Eventually, the Department of Public Health 
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“arranged through the municipality the provision of clean water, scavenging, etc. The 
staff of the Department carried out the inspection of those camps daily taking all possible 
measures for the prevention of disease. ” In the opinion of the Director of Public Health 
G.W. Heron, “The fresh air and sunshine helped a lot in keeping those people in a fairly 
good health.”194  
After the earthquake, the Public Health Department further protected the water 
supply by fencing in the reservoir at Ras al-‘Ain in 1928.195 Three water towers were 
erected in Amman by 1930, one in the neighborhood of Jabal al-Weibdeh and two in 
Jabal Amman. These water towers spurred the growth of both neighborhoods. The pattern 
of residential development following new water resources mirrors the growth of Mandate 
era Haifa.196 The steep slopes of Mt. Carmel characterize Haifa’s geography in a similar 
manner to the many hills of Amman. The pipelines connected to these water towers 
expanded in 1932 and continued to expand as the city grew throughout the Mandate.197 
The quick expansion of Jabal Amman as its own discrete district led to the creation of a 
bus line to ferry people from Jabal Amman down to the city center. The Jabal Amman 
bus line was an expansion of Abdullah Abu Qourah’s privately owned bus company that 
began by running a line that ran between Feisal Square and the mahatta. Shortly 
thereafter, he started a new line running between Feisal Square and Jabal Amman.198   
Further water sanitation included the treatment of all open water sources against 
mosquitos. These included the new wells completed in 1927, in addition to the 
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preexisting 342 wells, six cisterns and six springs in Amman. Water treatment against 
mosquito breeding sites was important to prevent malaria outbreaks. This was 
particularly crucial for the growth of Amman because the city developed around a 
number of springs and the Seil River. This same period also saw improvements in waste 
management in Amman. The municipality constructed two incinerators in 1927 to burn 
the town’s waste. The Amman municipality oversaw the repair of the existing public 
latrine and the construction of an additional two new public latrines. These combined 
measures greatly improved general health conditions in the growing capital.199  
Another natural disaster hit Amman in February 1935, when the city faced 
extensive flooding. Over 200 homes were destroyed in the flood.200 However, the flood’s 
effect on the city’s sanitation was shorter in 1935 because of the experience the 
Department of Public Health gained from the 1927 earthquake and new water sanitation 
initiatives completed in the interim. In addition to coping with natural disasters, the 
municipality of Amman also focused on improving the general living conditions within 
the city. These health initiatives took the form of statutes against hazardous trades in the 
city center, minimum road dimensions, speed limits, and proper water usage. In general, 
these statues forbade potentially hazardous activities, such as the storage of lamp and 
motor oil, in downtown Amman. These laws focused on the maintenance of security 
throughout the capital with the positive side effect of being beneficial to the inhabitants 
of the city.201 The British implemented similar municipal regulations in neighboring 
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Palestine to improve public health.202 Improved sanitation and hygiene helped foster an 
increased level of stability in Amman. More importantly, these measures gave the 
increasing powers of the centralized state a charitable and positive connotation. 
The remainder of infrastructural and institutional development that took place in 
Amman during the Mandate period dealt with the establishment of various government 
programs. These programs transformed the shallow ministries of the early Mandate into 
legitimate components of the Anglo-Hashemite state. The municipalities’ lack of funds 
was emblematic of the overall budgetary shortcomings of the Mandate.203 Despite being 
the capital, Amman received only small influxes of cash from the Mandatory budget to 
further security initiatives as discussed earlier in this chapter. Municipalities throughout 
Transjordan, not only Amman, were chronically short of funds.204 Budget limitations 
prevented the construction of many new government buildings. Instead, the majority of 
government offices, including the post-office, courts, police, and municipal buildings 
were rented “box-like buildings, clustered around the Mosque in the centre of town.”205 
Many of these ministerial “Potemkin villages” were nothing more than hollow shells. 
However, the mere existence of these new institutions did add credence to the 
government’s authority. New ministries did not immediately affect the lives of 
Transjordan’s populace but they did signal the government’s desire to expand their scope. 
Each new ministry was an attempt to increase the degree of oversight of the Mandatory 
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state. These new departments and their initiatives changed the public’s perception of the 
Anglo-Hashemite government in Amman.  In particular, the expanding health, education, 
and judicial systems of Transjordan had a substantive impact on Transjordan’s 
population. These departments built upon the preexisting Ottoman structures rebranded 
as part of the Transjordanian state. These institutions gradually differentiated themselves 
from their Ottoman predecessors and developed into a new form of Transjordanian 
statecraft. The varying degrees of British imperial oversight further shaped the unique 
legacies of each of these departments.  
 
 
Bringing order to Transjordan: The Judicial System 
Akin to the physical infrastructure of the Transjordanian state, the government 
utilized the judiciary, the health care system, and education system as a means of 
centralizing state authority in Amman. These departments had a substantive impact on 
Transjordan’s population and built upon the preexisting Ottoman structures. Each of 
these ministries located in Amman, with their power and oversight emanating out of the 
capital over the rest of Transjordan. These departments had constant interaction with the 
general populace of Transjordan and represented the government for the average 
Transjordanian.  
In the earliest days of the Mandate, the Ottoman legal system remained in force 
unchanged. The Law for the Organization of Justice reconstituted the Ottoman legal 
system in 1921, which had fallen into disarray during the war.206 The only modifications 
                                                 





made to the legal code were to adjust the scale of the system from a large empire to a 
small emirate. Three levels of criminal courts existed in Transjordan during the Mandate. 
These criminal courts were the Mandate era embodiment of Ottoman era Nizamiye 
(regular) courts with the highest court located in Amman, instead of Istanbul.207 The 
magistrate courts located in Ajlun, Irbid, Jerash, Amman, Salt, Karak, Tafila, and Ma‘an 
consisted of a single magistrate and dealt with lesser cases.208 The courts of first instance 
were located in Amman, Irbid, and Karak. These courts consisted of two judges who also 
sat on their local magistrate courts. The courts of first instance dealt with any civil case 
with a value over LP 50 or any crime that had a possible sentence over three years in 
prison. The supreme court of the land, the court of appeals, was located in Amman. This 
court was comprised of three judges and only dealt with appeals sent from the two lower 
courts. 209 The act of travel into the capital for these court cases by itself strengthened the 
centralizing aspects of the state and reinforced the supremacy of the word of Amman. 
These courts coexisted with the shari’a (Muslim religious) courts, which had only 
dealt with personal status and waqf (religious endowment) since the inception of the 
Nizamiye courts in the mid-1860s.210 In 1932, non-Muslim religious community councils 
were established. These new courts applied to the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, 
Armenian Catholic, and Latin Catholic communities and functioned akin to the Ottoman 
millet system. Each religious community had its own community council that dealt with 
issues of personal status law. Religious community courts adjudicated the same issues as 
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the shari’a courts. Such issues included marriage, divorce, dowry, alimony, and wills. In 
keeping with Ottoman practice, non-Muslims always had the option to use shari’a courts 
if they so desired.211 Regardless of which legal community an individual belonged to, his 
legal options were essentially unchanged from the late Ottoman period. All that had 
changed was the name of the ruling monarchy.  
The main challenge for the Transjordan court system was the huge scope of 
Ottoman laws that it inherited. “The whole corpus of Turkish law was declared to remain 
in force subject to any amendments which had been made ‘as far as circumstances 
permit.’” This final clause gave the Mandatory government a large degree of leeway in 
amending the Ottoman laws. However, since the overwhelming majority of the laws were 
in Turkish, only officials trained during the Ottoman period were able to understand them 
fully, as the official language of Transjordan was Arabic.212 This linguistic shift was a 
clear break with Ottoman heritage in favor of newly defined Arab and Hashemite 
heritage.  
The designation of Arabic as the official legal language was further complicated 
by the fact that many laws originated from the British Judicial Adviser who then in turn 
translated laws originally written in English into Arabic. The magistrates who adjudicated 
in this new Transjordan legal system were themselves indicative of three periods. Those 
trained under the Ottoman system were capable, but of retiring age. The World War I 
judicial recruits were unsatisfactory, and magistrates recruited after 1921 were trained in 
Jerusalem or Damascus.213 Complicating things further was the mixed heritage of the 
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various legal codes and procedures. The codes of both civil and criminal procedure were 
drafted along French lines, largely the Napoleonic Code, but had both been altered by 
Ottoman government supplements. Some Ottoman legal practices were unworkable in 
Transjordan. For example, the role of public prosecutor and examining magistrate were 
combined in the Transjordan system to save money.  
Although all of the jurists were Arab, the functional head of the Department of 
Justice was the British Judicial Adviser. The British Government created the Judicial 
Adviser post in 1927. Akin to the British Resident, the Judicial Adviser was a key 
member of the Transjordan administration who held significant sway in the Emirate. The 
input and influence of the Judicial Adviser were particularly important early on in the 
Mandate, as he advised on the legality of new legislation. Only two Judicial Advisers 
served during the Mandate period, Mr. A.G. Hooper (1927-1936) and Mr. A.L. Gardiner 
(1937-1946). The Judicial Adviser was always an English lawyer and the only non-Arab 
member of the Department of Justice.214 The Judicial Adviser was the legal draftsmen 
and adviser to the Transjordan government. He attended Executive Council meetings ex-
officio in an advisory capacity.215  
Early on, the Department of Justice was largely in the hands of the Adviser. In 
particular, the Judicial Adviser (Hooper) heavily advised British Resident Cox and the 
Transjordan government on how best to deal with a recalcitrant Legislative Council from 
1929-1934.216  However, a high level of administrative involvement was no longer 
necessary after the first few years. The reduced direct involvement of the Judicial Adviser 
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corresponded to the waning opposition in the Legislative Council. As the Legislative 
Council became more pliable, fewer laws concocted by the Mandatory government were 
opposed, and the Judicial Adviser was less essential to help impose the Anglo-Hashemite 
government’s will. By the end of the Mandate, the only responsibility that the Judicial 
Adviser alone was responsible for was the drafting of new legislation.217 The decreased 
level of importance of the Judicial Adviser coincided with the gradual reduction in the 
functions of most British officers throughout the Mandate. The Judicial Adviser was 
never as powerful or as influential as the British Resident but both Hooper and Gardiner 
shaped Transjordanian legislation, aided the development of a strong central Anglo-
Hashemite state, and determined the function of the Department of Justice.  
The British wanted to simplify the legal system as much as possible in 
Transjordan to ease any administrative complications. The penal code was “the most 
obsolete and undoubtedly the worst of all the codes” in the opinion of the Judicial 
Adviser A.L. Gardiner. 218 Any undue complication or complexity was counter to British 
goals of simplifying Transjordan’s administration. The British rejected a system that they 
deemed a hodgepodge of French law drastically amended by the Ottoman state. This 
British antipathy was a combination of distrust of French legal procedure and a rejection 
of a broken and overly complicated Ottoman legal tradition.  The only reason the entire 
legal system was not replaced was a lack of funds. If the British could have afforded the 
legal training, translation, and publication of a new legal code, they most certainly would 
have done so. This rejection of late Ottoman Tanzimat legal reforms ignored the shifts in 
the Ottoman legal system in the late nineteenth century. There was a massive effort at 
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statutory codification of Ottoman legal precedent between 1850 and the 1880s that 
divided the nizamiye system into criminal, civil, and commercial jurisdictions.219 The 
British did not understand the need for a multi-faceted legal system. The British saw the 
binary nizamiye and shari’a system as inefficient and outdated.220 The Diwan Khas 
(special chamber), was created in 1930, in response to the overlapping and at times 
contradictory legal statutes. The Diwan Khas decided legal interpretations not already 
determined by precedent. This special committee was composed of the Minister of 
Justice, two civil administrative officers, and senior officials from the Ministry of Justice, 
whose main concern was the interpretation of points of stature law. 
The Transjordan legal code for laws from 1918-1930 was translated into English 
and published in 1931.221 This was the only time that the entire corpus of Transjordanian 
law was translated into English. This translation was of more use to the British officers 
stationed in Transjordan than it was to the local magistrates, since the official language of 
Transjordan remained Arabic. After the publication of the Transjordan legal code, the 
Judicial Adviser strongly advised that the government limit new legislation as much as 
possible. “The administrative authorities have at their disposal a large number of 
Ottoman laws adapted to local requirements and it will save an immense amount of 
labour if the Administrative authorities will concentrate their efforts on a sound 
application of those Administrative laws already in existence instead of dissipating their 
energies in an effort to produce a series of brand new laws.” However, Judicial Adviser 
Hooper also contended that the land code, civil code, code of civil procedure, and code of 
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criminal procedure “are badly in need of repeal and replacement.”222 Again, Hooper’s 
criticism of these codes was in response to their difficulty in the administration of these 
laws. The complex legal system required judges and magistrates who had a strong 
mastery of the late Ottoman legal system; unfortunately, such a population did not exist 
in Mandate era Transjordan.  
The scope and responsibilities of the Department of Justice and the Judicial 
Adviser did not extend to tribal matters. Instead, tribal legal issues existed in their own 
discrete arena. The realm of tribal affairs represented the limitations of the new state’s 
authority and reach in Transjordan. The degree of separation that the tribes enjoyed, 
however, diminished during the Mandate. The first Bedouin courts were established in 
1925 as part of the Tribal Court Law of 1924 in Irbid, Karak, Ma‘an, and the desert area 
(Wadi Musa/Wadi Araba area close to Saudi Arabian border). The Bedouin Control Law 
replaced the first Bedouin courts in 1929 by creating the Bedouin Control Board in its 
stead. The Bedouin Control Board determined when and where the Bedouin could camp, 
heard actions within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts law, and investigated any claims 
of raiding. The board quickly had an effect on curtailing raiding by Transjordan tribes.223 
The British used the same approach to arbitrate tribal differences as they had earlier in 
Iraq. In fact, the man responsible for curtailing tribal incursions, Major John Bagot 
Glubb, had learned his tribal techniques in the 1920s as a British officer in Iraq.  The 
British allowed for the existence of a parallel tribal legal system in Iraq and in large part 
employed the same strategy in Transjordan. This approach placed tribal affairs outside 
the purview of the actual state. By excluding the tribes, the government was not forced to 
                                                 
222 BNA, CO 831/17/7, JA Hooper to BR Cox, 29/1/1932.  






confront the reality that they did not have the strength to force the tribesmen to 
immediately assimilate into the new modern state centered in Amman.224 Although the 
government’s control over the tribes was minimal, these tribes still had to interact directly 
with the central government in Amman. Over time, the degree of interaction, exchange, 
and cooperation between the central government and the tribes increased. The regime’s 
development in Amman forced the tribes to accept a new paradigm of governance in 
Transjordan. This shift in the political and administrative realities of Transjordan can 
only be understood by orienting the study of Transjordan from the perspective of its 
capital in Amman. The various tribal laws and boards established throughout the 
Mandate period were attempts to mitigate and transform the chieftaincy of Transjordan 
into a functioning bureaucratic monarchy.  
 The Tribal Offenses Settlement Law of 1933 supplemented the Bedouin Control 
Board giving the Board additional punitive measures to curtail raiding. The Bedouin 
Control Law that created the Bedouin Control Board included the appointment of 
Abdullah’s cousin, the Amir Shakir, within the law itself. After his death in 1934, the 
government chose to eliminate the Bedouin Control Board because the widespread tribal 
raiding that had been the reason for its original formation had been eliminated.225 Thus, 
1934 marks the first rollback of a discrete separate tribal system in Transjordan. 
In 1936, the Bedu Control Law replaced the Tribal Court Law of 1924, the 
Bedouin Control Law of 1929 and the Tribal Offenses Settlement Law of 1933. The 
Mandatory government was able to regn in tribal privilege and exclusion during this 
period because of the growing strength of Amman and the diminished position of the 
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Bedouin in Transjordan. The drought of the early 1930s only further exacerbated the 
faltering ability of the Bedouin to exist outside of the state system.226 The new Tribal 
Court Law regularized procedure by appointing a tribal court in each of the four settled 
districts and a fifth in the desert. The tribal court of appeal was in Amman. As a result, 
even disputes amongst Bedouin as far away as Aqaba had to come to Amman to have 
their disputes resolved. This further reinforced the legal centrality of the capital city. 
Adjudicating tribal matters in Amman essentially ended the separation that had 
previously existed between the state and the tribes. By 1936, everyone in Transjordan 
was answerable to Amman.  The period of the dual realms of tribe and state had ended.  
The government deemed the new system “an unqualified success” and 
adjudicated 251 cases by the end of 1937, the courts’ first year of existence.227 The new 
system relied on the importance and influence of premier sheikhs to control the tribal 
community of Transjordan. Over time, the number of Bedouin declined and tribal 
reliance on the state increased.228 However, despite the decreased autonomy of the tribes, 
tribal dynamics remained integral to state function throughout the Mandate period. 
Although tribal matters were now adjudicated in Amman, the state relied heavily on the 
tribes’ patrimonial and patriarchal networks. Essentially, the state had brought the tribe 
into the realm of the modern state.  
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Amir Abdullah and the royal family occasionally disrupted the proceedings of 
both the civilian and tribal courts. The Amir had a tendency to pardon members of the 
elite class of Transjordan, particularly when it related to tribal matters. The pardoning of 
tribal sheikhs and their dependents reinforced the chieftaincy aspects of the Emirate of 
Transjordan. The British did not approve of this continuation of tribal practice. In the 
opinion of British Resident Kirkbride, “It was necessary to check a growing tendency on 
the part of His Highness, to grant pardons in numerous cases of killings because the two 
parties involved had made peace and blood money paid to the relatives on the victim. In 
certain cases, a pardon on those grounds is justifiable, perhaps even desirable, but the too 
frequent adoption of the course becomes an abuse.”229 Despite the occasionally 
problematic intervention of the royal family, tribal affairs and judicial matters remained 
the one arena in which the Amir retained a degree of direct influence and power. The 
lasting Ottoman legal infrastructure utilized by the Transjordan state allowed for a strong 
executive removed from the judicial system.  
The scope and breadth of law in Transjordan symbolically emanating from 
Amman vastly altered the perception its inhabitants had of the central government. The 
slow realization that law from Amman held sway in rural tribal areas such as Wadi Musa 
and Wadi Araba changed tribal understanding of the Mandatory government.230 The laws 
of Amman now trumped tribal custom in most circumstances. Judicial authority did not 
radiate from any single individual, but it did originate in Amman. The judicial system of 
Transjordan became one of the main tools of the central government in Amman. The 
increased judicial reach of Amman further empowered the office of the Judicial Adviser. 
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The Adviser determined the scope and strength of new law. Over time, the number of 
Bedouin declined and tribal reliance on the state increased. Tribal politics did not 
disappear from Transjordan, but their autonomy did.  The judicial legacy of the Mandate 
period lasted well into the post-independence history of Jordan. 
 
Developing Social Infrastructure: Department of Public Health  
 Although the majority of the Transjordan budget was allocated towards defense 
and security, even departments with small budgets made sizeable impacts on state 
institutional development.231 The Department of Public Health was chronically 
underfunded. In 1929, the Department of Public Health’s budget accounted for roughly 
3.5% of the total expenditure of Transjordan and by 1939, this share had reduced to 
2%.232 The Department of Public Health used this paltry budget to improve upon the poor 
standards of healthcare that existed in the Ottoman period. The only hospital in 
Transjordan before the Mandate was the small Christian Missionary Society (CMS) 
Hospital in Salt, which was built in the 1883 with fifteen beds, a clinic and surgery. The 
Italian National Association opened a small hospital in Karak in 1919 and a Dr. Kumar 
Sanyal opened a private clinic in Irbid in 1920.233 In 1921, Dr. Charlotte Purnell of the 
CMS opened the only hospital in Amman. The hospital was for women and children. Dr. 
Purnell financed the hospital largely from her own personal funds.234  
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The Department of Public Health was one of the few sections of the Mandatory 
government that was unable to build upon Ottoman precedent. The only Ottoman policy 
carried over into the Mandate period was the use of quarantines to contain the spread of 
infectious diseases.235 Although midwives and folk doctors continued to work in 
Transjordan, their existence is far from a continuation of “Ottoman policy” as historian 
Marwan Hanania asserts.236 Instead, the Department of Health had to function 
independently with help from non-government healthcare facilities. Once again, financial 
constraints limited the feasible extent of government oversight and control during the 
Mandate period. 
The Department of Public Health was established in 1923 but did not submit a 
health report until 1926. Similar to many other Mandate era empty ministries the 
Department of Public Health only became a true functioning entity years after its 
creation. Although all of the ministries of Transjordan were created in one fell swoop, 
they did not truly come into functional existence until there was an explicit need for 
improvement. This “need” for improvement was a byproduct of both increased British 
interest and the growing population of Transjordan. The Health Law of 1926 set the basic 
parameters of the Department of Public Health’s mission. The ordinance published on 
March 1, 1926, passed regulations on quarantine, anti-malaria measures, vaccinations, 
proper burial, medical practitioner licensing, and sanitation standards.237 This law should 
be understood as an extension of the government’s security apparatus. The Department of 
Public Health focused on preventive medicine, measures that would prevent epidemics 
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that could destabilize the state. The Department did not focus on individual care; it 
focused on population control.  
Similar to the Ministry of Justice, the leadership of the Department was split 
between the Arab ministerial head and the British administrative director. The British 
Director of Health throughout the Mandate was Dr. G.W. Heron and the first Minister of 
Health was Dr. Halim Abu Rahmeh (1926-1939). As the administrative head, Dr. Heron 
was responsible for submitting annual reports on the level of healthcare in Transjordan. 
When appraising the healthcare situation in Transjordan in 1927, The Director of Health 
noted, “With limited funds, in a country, although thinly populated, with a large area, and 
a population consisting largely of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, the task is a difficult 
one.” In 1927, there were only twelve medical staff employed in government service. The 
Central Medical Board in Amman was responsible for the licensing of all new medical 
staff.238 The country was in dire need of more medical practitioners, particularly 
pharmacists, dentists, and midwives. There were only two certified midwives in all of 
Transjordan in 1927 for a total population of roughly 300,000 people. The staff of the 
Department in Amman consisted of only a handful of individuals to aid the Director.239 
Mirroring the focus on preventative medicine, most of the staff were sanitary inspectors 
(nine in total) who were meant to curtail epidemics and identify possible health problems 
for the state. In addition to the hospitals, dispensaries operated in Irbid, Jerash, Salt, 
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Madeba, Karak, Tafila, Ma’an, and Aqaba. There were also three permanent quarantine 
stations at Remtha on the Syrian border, at the Amman Hijaz Railway station, and at 
Ma’an. 240 The Department added an additional four inspectors in 1932 but was still 
under-staffed.241 
The small staff and budget of the Department made a focus only on curative 
medicine impractical. There was a particular emphasis on anti-malaria measures and 
vaccinations against smallpox, typhoid, and cholera. Epidemics had become a problem in 
Transjordan in the late nineteenth century. The rapid expansion of towns and villages 
without proper sanitation provisions led to outbreaks of typhoid and cholera. Increased 
population density in these growing settlements also led to the spread of “vermin-borne 
diseases such as typhus.” Transjordan, which had been remarkable for its cleanliness in 
the mid- nineteenth century, had deteriorated rapidly by the beginning of the twentieth 
century The danger of epidemics continued to grow in severity as the population of 
Transjordan grew during the Mandate. 242   
“Health issues” were dealt with as extensions of the state’s desire to control and 
regulate the population of Transjordan. Healthcare was simply another moniker for the 
security concerns of the Anglo-Hashemite state. The introduction of the modern medical 
apparatus and system, which Foucault calls “medicalization” allowed the state another 
realm of control over its population.243 Through medicalization, traditional attitudes 
towards health and illness eroded and professional medical services, which had been 
                                                 
240 BNA, CO 831/2/2, “Department of Health Report 1927.” 
241 BNA, CO 831/31/2, “Department of Health Report 1933.”  
242 Rogan, Frontiers of the State, 165. 
243 Michel Foucault, “The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine,” trans. Edgar C. Knowlton Jr. 
and Clare O’Farrell, Foucault Studies, 1 (2004): 12-15. For more on the introduction of the modern medical 
institution see Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. 





previously unknown, took their place. Additionally, this same process diminished the 
independence of the patient while increasing the power of the medical profession.244 In 
the case of Transjordan, the majority of the medical profession was connected to the 
state, which in turn increased the dominion of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Vaccinations 
and quarantine protocols limited free movement in Transjordan and allowed the state to 
control the threat that infected individuals could pose to the rest of the population, and 
more importantly the stability of the Anglo-Hashemite regime.  
Mosquitos posed the largest health threat to the stability of the regime because 
they were a chronic problem in the Jordan Valley and Amman. Malaria had long been 
associated with Amman and the Jordan Valley and had been one of the reasons that 
Amman had remained relatively uninhabited for so long. The Department of Public 
Health’s anti-malaria campaign started in 1926. The campaign consisted of two types of 
activity: the identification and treatment of water sources and the vaccination and 
treatment of the populace. By 1929, malaria rates throughout Transjordan dropped 
substantially. However, malaria remained a persistent problem throughout the Mandate 
period due to the small number of staff and limited expenditure of the Department.245  
The improvement of water sanitation throughout Transjordan also played a large 
role in the prevention of water-borne illnesses, such as typhoid. New sanitation laws were 
passed in 1930 that dictated that anyone who occupied a building was responsible for the 
removal of any “filth, house refuse or sweepings, or other objectionable matter in or on 
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such buildings or in their immediate vicinity.”246 The application of such laws went a 
long way to helping improve the sanitary conditions of towns and villages alike 
throughout Transjordan. The other major preventative campaign dealt with smallpox 
vaccinations. There were over 64,000 vaccinations against smallpox in 1928 alone. The 
total population of Transjordan at the time was under 250,000 people. 247 Improved water 
sanitation and the vaccination campaigns helped to drastically reduce the number of 
smallpox, typhoid and cholera cases. These campaigns were most effective in Amman, 
which saw the sharpest decrease in the number of infectious disease cases. Amman 
possessed the most advanced sanitation and healthcare facilities in Transjordan, which in 
turn improved its overall health. These vast vaccination campaigns brought the 
Transjordan population into direct contact with modern medicine, and by extension the 
modern state. Again, the primary concern of the Department of Public Health was the 
prevention of epidemics, not improvements for individual healthcare.  
The Department also undertook measures to improve infant and child health. The 
establishment of infant welfare centers in Salt and Amman helped reduce infant mortality 
rates. However, the low number of midwives in the country meant that the infant 
mortality rates remained high ranging from roughly 21% in 1932 to 15% in 1943.248 
British Resident Cox acknowledged the need for more midwives and more infant 
treatment centers in 1934, but took no actions to alleviate the situation.249 His inaction 
was likely the result of a lack of available funds. By 1943, there were only fourteen 
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licensed midwives in the entire country.250  The Department of Public Health gave free 
treatment of trachoma and other eye diseases at all government dispensaries and schools. 
These treatments, coupled with sanitation improvements in school buildings throughout 
Transjordan, improved child welfare.  
The combination of the vaccination programs and student health inspections 
brought the majority of the Transjordan population into contact with modern medicine. In 
this way, the process of vaccination acted as a way to medicalize the population and have 
them grow accustomed to the practices of modern preventative medicine and the role of 
the modern medical professional.251 Despite the high efficiency of the Department, 
Director Heron acknowledged that several services considered essential elsewhere were 
almost completely neglected in Transjordan.252 It is likely that Dr. Heron wished he could 
focus more on curative medicine instead of programs that were purely preventative in 
nature. However, the scope of modern medicine in Transjordan remained connected to 
preventive measures and public services that aided the population over the individual. 
The inoculation and treatment of schoolchildren in particular emphasized the importance 
of the group over that of the individual patient.253  
The British government did impose one initiative on the Department of Public 
Health, the need to improve the treatment of the Bedouin population. Dr. Norman 
MacLennan compiled a report on the health of the desert-based tribes in 1934. Dr. 
MacLennan reported intense malnourishment of the tribes, which he described as “a state 
of affairs which is nothing less than a disgrace to the government.” Of the 1030 people he 
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examined, only 164, or about 16%, were “well nourished.” He also addressed alarmingly 
high rates of tuberculosis amongst tribesmen. These distressing findings were a result of 
the drought and famine that affected Transjordan throughout the early 1930s. Dr. 
MacLennan concluded his report by stating, “The incidence of disease is likely to 
increase, for a time, particularly now that they are more in contact with civilization, and 
that their bodily resistance is at such a low ebb. The outlook appears grave and requires 
serious attention.”254 Although he never concedes it directly, Dr. MacLennan’s 
acknowledgment of the impact of civilization on the Bedouin romanticizes their natural 
state apart from the rest of Transjordan. It implies that civilization and modernity are 
inherently problematic and unhealthy for the Bedouin. This description implicitly notes 
the two realms of Transjordan at the time: the sphere of the state and sphere of the 
Bedouin. These dominions blurred as the government attempted to sway the nomadic 
populations of Transjordan to settle throughout the 1930s and 1940s.255 Regardless of 
any romanticized image of the Bedouin, Dr. MacLennan’s findings necessitated the 
formation of the Desert Mobile Medical Unit. The new unit, created in late 1936, roughly 
followed tribal migration east of the Hijaz Railway. The unit’s actions coupled with 
drought relief funds from the British government helped improve the dire situation of the 
tribes in the mid-1930s.256  
Although far from perfect, the Department of Public Health improved living 
conditions in Transjordan. Akin to the Department of Justice, there was both an Arab 
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ministerial post and an English administrator. In both departments, Arabs carried out the 
majority of the day-to-day functions of the Department. Additionally, both departments 
reinforced the centrality of the Mandatory government. The medicalization of the 
Transjordanian populace further engrained in the population the necessity of the Anglo-
Hashemite state. The Department of Public Health determined its own policies and 
programs, with the exception of the Desert Mobile Medical Unit, and was rather 
successful considering its meager resources. Arab control and influence were 
predominant in tribal affairs for both departments as well. By 1938, the Department had 
successfully prevented epidemics in Transjordan for over two years and achieved a 
degree of stability throughout Transjordan. Preventative procedures enabled the state to 
prevent epidemic-induced panic and maintain a calm status quo throughout Transjordan. 
This stability in turn afforded the Department an aura of legitimacy amongst the populace 
of Transjordan.257  
 
Expanding Social Infrastructure: The Department of Education 
Similar to the Department of Public Health, the Department of Education was 
asked to accomplish a lot for the Transjordan government without a great deal of 
financial backing. These tight financial constraints were the only limitations, however, 
that the government imposed on the Department. Beyond its annual budget, the 
Department of Education was able to operate independently of imperial or local 
meddling. This approach mirrored the Mandatory education policies in neighboring Iraq. 
In both Iraq and Transjordan, education was largely left to the local populace with 
                                                 





minimal colonial interference.258This lack of interference was due to the state’s belief 
that education was not a security-sensitive issue. As a result, throughout the majority of 
the Mandate period, government schools in Transjordan ran under Ottoman education 
laws. The majority of male children began their education in an elementary level 
Qur’anic recitation school (al-kuttab). In kuttab, an imam taught Arabic, Qur’an, Islamic 
history and basic arithmetic. The secondary school version of the same institutions were 
known as madrasas. The Ottoman state had begun to expand education beyond Qur’an 
and language study during the Tanzimat period in the late 1830s, though these reforms 
did not make it to Transjordan until the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the 1880s. New 
subjects introduced by the Ottoman reforms included geography, history, mathematics, 
and hygiene.259  
The introduction of new Ottoman government schools into Transjordan coincided 
with the Ottoman state’s efforts to increase control over the region in the second half of 
the twentieth century. Primary schools for boys were opened in Salt in 1880, in Karak in 
1894, and in Tafila and Ma‘an al-Hijazziya in 1897, and Ma‘an al-Shamiyya and 
Shawbak in 1899. Girls’ schools were also opened in Salt and Karak. The government 
opened a secondary school in Karak in 1899, in Ma‘an al-Hijazziya in 1899, and in Tafila 
in 1911. An additional fourteen schools opened in small villages and tribal areas from 
1897 to 1915. All of these schools followed the same curriculum as other schools 
throughout the empire and their graduates were eligible to continue their education in 
Damascus and Istanbul.260  
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The focus on schooling in the late Ottoman Empire was a means to discipline and 
educate the population. The Ottoman state hoped to stress Ottomanist ideals (reinforce 
the connections of the Empire’s population to the Empire itself) through education. The 
Ottoman state introduced the vocational orphanages (islahhanes) in the 1870s to train 
children in a trade and reinforce the centrality of the Ottoman regime.261 The Committee 
of Union and Progress (CUP) attempted to further modernize Ottoman education through 
the Ottoman Elementary Education Law of 1914. This law was meant to levy taxes on 
local immovable property, “the Municipal Education Rates,” but the law was never 
enacted fully during the Ottoman period due to the outbreak of World War II. The 
Transjordan state resurrected the law in 1937, but only utilized it in Amman and Salt.262  
 In addition to government schools, there were also a fair number of missionary 
schools established throughout Transjordan during the late Ottoman period. The Greek 
Orthodox Church (1850 for boys), Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem (1870 for boys and 
1871 for girls), and the England-based CMS school (1867, co-ed) all had schools in Salt. 
By the 1870s, there were seven schools in Salt alone.263 However, the Ottoman state 
closed a number of these schools in the 1880s in an effort to quell the evangelical zeal of 
the missionary schools. The Ottomans also forbade Muslim students from attending 
missionary schools in Salt in 1884. Around the same time, the Greek Orthodox Church 
also pushed back against Western-backed missionary groups who were converting their 
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congregants. By 1886, the Ottoman government had closed all CMS schools east of the 
Jordan River in an effort to quell foreign influence.264  
 After World War I, only four government schools remained in all of Transjordan. 
From 1921-1924, the education system in Transjordan slowly rebounded from the War. 
Missionary schools, which had closed during the War, began to reopen and government 
schools began to spread throughout Transjordan. The Department of Education and 
Antiquities was established in 1923 with Rida Tawfiq as the first Director.265 Adib 
Wahbah succeeded him in 1924 and served until 1937.266 The final Director of Education 
was Samir Rifai who served from 1937 through independence in 1946.267 By 1928, there 
were fifty-seven government schools and a hundred non-government schools (44 
Christian schools, 13 Girls’ Schools, and 43 Muslim Schools).268 In 1929, there were five 
Christian Missionary Society (CMS) schools, four American based Christian Missionary 
Alliance schools, twenty-five Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem schools, nine Greek 
Catholic Church schools, and twelve Eastern Orthodox Church schools. In these religious 
schools, the majority of the teachers were Arab.269  A full education in Transjordan 
included seven years of elementary school (ages 6-13) and four years of secondary 
education. However, few schools in Transjordan actually offered all of the required years. 
Numerous “incomplete” primary and secondary schools only offered a fraction of the 
required course load. As few as ten schools offered full elementary programs in 1935 of 
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the sixty government elementary schools. A limited budget curtailed both school growth 
and the number of years offered at elementary and secondary schools throughout the 
Mandate period.270  
 There were a number of attempts to reform the education system during the 
Mandate period. A technical board of seventeen teachers designed a revised syllabus for 
the state in 1929 in an effort to improve the standard of education in the country.271 
However, early attempts at educational reform were stymied by a lack of suitably trained 
teaching staff.272 Training new staff was expensive and similar to other departments; the 
Department of Education was chronically short on cash. In 1930, the O’Donnell 
Commission exacerbated these fiscal shortcomings when it recommended reducing the 
budget for the Department of Education by an additional LP 9,500. The commission 
argued a budget ceiling of a mere LP 15,000 should be adequate.273 By 1945, the entire 
budget of the Department of Education only amounted to 1.1% of the total budget of 
Transjordan.274 These budget reductions make it clear that education in Transjordan was 
an Arab project and a private project. It was not the domain of the colonizer because it 
was not perceived to have direct security implications. The only exception to this 
imperial indifference related to child hygiene because of its importance for general public 
health. 
Substantive change finally came in 1939, with Education Regulations Number 
One and Two. These regulations made government elementary schools free and 
compulsory for both boys and girls, mandated that private schools obtain the permission 
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of the minister of education before being opened, and that all schools must cover the 
subjects of Arabic (minimum five lessons per week), history, and geography of the Arab 
world. These regulations cancelled all preexisting Ottoman education laws. Even with 
these changes, by 1945, there were only twelve complete elementary schools in 
Transjordan and the only complete secondary school was located in Salt. By the end of 
the Mandate, there were 9,874 total students in seventy-three government schools and 
6,472 students in non-government schools, of which two-thirds were Christian. All of this 
was overseen by a small ministry staff, which included the Director, assistant director, 
and three district inspectors responsible for general administration of schools and 
assuring quality of instruction. 275 
The economic constraints put on the Department of Education during the Mandate 
limited its ability to innovate and improve. As a result, private schools, not government 
schools, offered the premier education in Transjordan. Two of the most prestigious 
schools in Transjordan were in Amman. These two sister Christian schools, affiliated 
with the Patriarch in Jerusalem, were the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) School for 
Girls (later named the Ahliyyah School for Girls), and the Bishop’s School (for boys). 
Both of these schools were located in the elite enclave of Jabal Amman.  
The CMS School for Girls opened in Jabal Amman in 1926. The Bishop’s School 
opened across the street from the CMS School in 1936. The CMS and patriarchate in 
Jerusalem did not provide much of the funding for their respective schools. In fact, the 
CMS only paid for the headmistress in the girls’ school. The CMS School and the 
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Bishop’s School both received funding from the British Council and local investment. By 
1942, the school had 117 students and its staff consisted of its headmistress, Ms. 
Wilkinson, seven full-time teachers and one visiting teacher.276 All instruction, except for 
Arabic classes, was conducted in English. The school taught kindergarten (which 
included boys) through eleventh grade (three years of secondary school). Due to the 
increased demand for English language education by the growing population of Amman, 
the school continued to grow throughout the Mandate period and its premises expanded a 
number of times. Despite its expansions, requests for enrollment and for boarding 
students constantly outstripped the resources of the school in the 1940s.277 The CMS 
School was the only girls’ secondary school program in Transjordan and taught both 
Christian and Muslim students. The CMS School was the first girls’ school in Amman 
and remains one of the preeminent girls’ schools in Amman today. (Appendix 1, figure 2-
1 photo of CMS school entrance) 
 The Bishop’s School, located in the same block as the CMS School, offered nine 
grades from fourth grade through twelfth. The Bishop’s School was one of only two 
boys’ schools in Transjordan to offer all four years of secondary education.278 There was 
a tendency for students to leave after the third year of secondary school to begin 
instruction at the American University of Beirut (AUB). If students completed their final 
year of secondary school and passed the Transjordan matriculation exam, they started as 
sophomores at AUB. The Bishop’s School continued to grow at the same pace of the 
CMS School throughout its first decade of existence and had 212 students in 
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1945/1946.279 The Bishop’s School, unlike the CMS School, taught the lower grades in 
Arabic and as a result, English proficiency was often a problem for secondary students. 
Despite these deficiencies, the school was viewed by the British as a positive force in 
Amman. In 1942, the British Council appraised the school as “doing liberal and 
influential work and while it has received a great deal of financial support from the 
Council, it continues to grow at a steady rate so that expansion is necessary.”280 By the 
end of the Mandate in 1946, the school had expanded beyond its original three-bay style 
central house.281 (Appendix 1, figure 2-2 photo of original building of the Bishop’s 
School)  
 Given its proximity to numerous government buildings and government officials’ 
homes, the Bishop’s School also received direct support from the government on 
occasion. Major John Bagot Glubb, the Commander of the Arab Legion, provided 
financial and logistical support to the school’s division of the Boy Scouts a number of 
times.282 Scouting offered British officials a way to influence youth development in 
Transjordan without being directly involved in the curriculum. Since its inception by 
Robert Baden-Powell in 1907, scouting had spread quickly, and had been promoted by 
the British and the French in their Middle Eastern Mandates.283 High Commissioner of 
Iraq Henry Dobbs said that “[t]he Boy Scout movement has been a resounding success 
throughout the land… The movement is full of hope for the future and does much to 
                                                 
279 Matthews and Akrawi, Education in Arab Countries of the Near East, 321-22.  
280 BNA, BW 60/2, K.M. Wiley, “Report on the Bishop’s School, Amman,” 16/2/1942.  
281 The three-bay house will be discussed in detail in chapter 6 in reference to the different residential 
architectural styles found in Mandate era Amman.  
282 MECA, Glubb collection, J.E. Sutton to Glubb, 27/7/1945.  
283 Jennifer M. Dueck, “A Muslim Jamboree: Scouting and Youth Culture in Lebanon under the French 
Mandate,” French Historical Studies 30 (Summer 2007): 489-90. Scouting in the Levant actually predated 





encourage the tender plant of ‘Iraq[sic] nationality.”284 The British supported the spread 
of the scouting movement throughout their Mandates with individual colonial 
administrators taking leadership roles in local troops, providing supplies, and at times, 
financial assistance. The movement also had religious backing. The Mufti of Jerusalem, 
Hajj Amin al-Husseini, “heartily endorsed the movement in 1931” with little concern for 
its Protestant Christian roots.285 British High Commissioners in Palestine supported the 
scouting movement in the 1920s and 1930s, even accepting the honorific title of Chief 
Scout of Palestine. Since the High Commissioner was in charge of both Palestine and 
Transjordan, it can be surmised that this support extended to scouting in Transjordan as 
well.286  
The Boy Scout movement was introduced in Transjordan in the early 1920s, but 
was not acknowledged as a formal part of the global scouting organization until 1953. 
Girl Guides were introduced in 1938.287 In Transjordan, the scouting movement was not 
as directly tied to the Mandatory officials. There are no indications from the British 
records that the Mandatory government ever officially supported scouting. It appears that 
the leaders of the Arab Legion, Frederick Peake and later John Bagot Glubb, both 
individually supported the scouting movement in Transjordan.288  There are anecdotal 
references to a large scouting movement in Transjordan but no precise figures regarding 
                                                 
284 John Harte, “Scouting in Mandate Palestine,” Council for British Research in the Levant Bulletin 2008 
(vol. 3), 48.  
285 Dueck, “Scouting and Youth Culture in Lebanon,” 491-92.  
286 Harte, “Scouting in Mandate Palestine, 48-50. The British, in time, soured on scouting in Palestine 
because it inculcated an oppositional spirit in its members that was not conducive with the wishes of the 
Mandatory Government. 
287 “The Jordan Association for Boy Scouts and Girl Guides,” World Association of Girl Guides and Girl 
Scouts, accessed January 27, 2015, http://www.wagggs.org/en/world/organisations?mo=72.   





participation or structure.289  Scouting was a regional movement with huge scouting 
groups in neighboring French Syria and Lebanon. Syrian scouts visited and interacted 
with the Transjordanian scouting community in 1942.290 Scouting was the largest 
movement directly associated with education in Transjordan and scout troops were 
associated with both the Bishop’s School and the CMS School in Amman. Although not 
directly connected to the Department of Education, British support for scouting was the 
only colonial intervention into Education in Transjordan. The scouting movement also 
injected a martial and security aspect into Transjordan education, which was otherwise 
absent.  
The departments of Public Health and Education both were responsible for the 
creation of a sizeable portion of Transjordan’s institutional and societal development. 
Neither institution had a great deal of financial backing. Despite their financial 
shortcomings, these departments had to cover a large, sparsely populated territory. Both 
departments operated without a great deal of local or imperial oversight. The Department 
of Public Health did have a British Director associated with its administration, but local 
employees carried out the overwhelming majority of its work. This British presence was 
directly tied to the security implications of the new modern healthcare system. The new 
Department of Public Health was tasked not only with preventing outbreaks, but also in 
tracking the inhabitants of Transjordan through infection rates and mortality reports. The 
Department of Education, on the other hand, operated without any imperial oversight 
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whatsoever with the exception of the appropriation of its annual budget. This colonial 
indifference was a result of the belief that the Department’s activities were benign and 
non-security related. Removed from the security apparatus of the rest of the state, the 
Department of Education was uniquely free to operate independently. Though diminutive 
in size and economic resources, both departments accomplished a great deal and went a 
long way towards creating a functional state in Transjordan. This was only possible 
because both ministries were able to build upon preexisting Ottoman structures. Without 
these Ottoman vestiges, the function and administration of both departments would have 
been nearly impossible. There simply was not enough money in the Transjordan budget 
to create a new education and health system from scratch.  
 
Conclusion 
 Every infrastructural program and investment undertaken by the government, with 
the exception of the Department of Education, served the constant imperative for 
increased security. All of these programs emanated from Amman, constantly increasing 
the new capital’s gravity in Transjordan. Infrastructural advancement improved Amman’s 
functional oversight and concentrated the amorphous authority of the government into a 
new distinct space. British interest in the Mandate shifted from one of passing importance 
during the tenure of Chief British Representative Harold Philby to a degree of direct 
imperial oversight during the terms of British Residents Henry Cox (1924-1939) and 
Alec Kirkbride (1939-1946). Gradually, the Potemkin ministries of the early years of the 
Mandate became legitimate government entities with productive successful programs. 





oversight and concern with Transjordan. This increased British focus on Transjordan 
coincided with the expansion of the powers and responsibilities of the office of the 
British Resident. It became increasingly important for the British Resident and his 
supporting staff (including the Judicial Adviser, Financial Adviser, and Director of 
Health), to both enact and push back against British imperial policy. The “man on the 
spot” was crucial for the development of Transjordan’s government structure and 
function.  
The gradual growth and improvement of the Transjordan government were 
always in the service of promoting regional tranquility. This keen interest in protecting 
surrounding British imperial interests led to the development of Transjordan’s 
transportation and communication networks. However, all infrastructural advancement in 
Transjordan built upon preexisting Ottoman practices and institutions. Almost nothing in 
Transjordan was built from scratch. Everything was an outgrowth of centuries of 
Ottoman imperial practice. This was particularly evident in the development of 
Transjordan’s judicial and education structures. Although the Department of Health had 
little Ottoman infrastructure to build on, it did rely on numerous non-government 
officials and institutions to best serve the populace of Transjordan.  
These three departments’ expansion emanated from their departmental homes in 
Amman. The various British led ministries slowly expanded Transjordan’s infrastructure 
and institutions. Although led by British administrators, these ministries were almost 
entirely staffed by Arabs. The Legislative Council and the Executive Council both shaped 
the Transjordanian budget but final approval always remained in the hands of the British. 





Transjordanian Council members, were executed by local civil servants. In general, 
administrative affairs that fell outside the purview of defense and security concerns 
garnered more fiscal independence. This financial freedom was most evident in the 
Department of Education. Each of these departments helped centralize authority in the 
new capital. However, financial constraints limited the scope of feasible governmental 
control. Tribal affairs remained distinct from the normal affairs of the Transjordanian 
state. Despite these limitations, the growth of Transjordan’s social and judicial networks 
coincided with the limited enlargement and advancement of Amman’s municipal 
infrastructure. Although limited in their scope, these developments helped to fashion 
Amman into a unique amalgam of Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics. This 
singular heritage would permeate nearly every aspect of Transjordan’s government 














































3: Extraordinary Finance: City Infrastructure in the midst of Imperial 
Funds, Private Capital, and Local Actors 
 
“Revenues of TJ are insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of administration, and in 
view of the necessity of limiting the annual grant-in-aid of the TJ government by His 
Majesty’s Government, I cannot recommend that the capital cost of the new equipment 
should be met from the revenues of the territory.”291 
 
Regional stability and defense concerns alone did not build the Mandate of 
Transjordan. The Mandate of Transjordan’s grant-in-aid, utilized to fund security-related 
projects, only went so far.  For the British, the creation of a centralized state in 
Transjordan was critical to the Britain’s imperial interests in the region. Transjordan had 
to be pacified and secure to protect British interests in Transjordan’s neighbors, Iraq and 
Palestine. However, large-scale infrastructural or developmental projects were beyond 
the scope or reach of the Transjordan budget. In order to facilitate more expansive 
projects, and projects without explicit security ramifications, funding had to come from 
outside of the Colonial Office. The quote above by acting High Commissioner Hathorn 
                                                 





Hall is found on every document requesting additional funds from the British Treasury. 
This rather dry language was the magic formula that necessitated the need for external 
funds. Three types of extraordinary funding financed further infrastructural and 
institutional development in Transjordan, and Amman specifically: imperially controlled 
funding of the Colonial Development Fund (CDF), various foreign concessions, and local 
entrepreneurial investment.  
The Colonial Development Fund called for specific formulaic applications and 
each grant or loan had to satisfy a number of key requirements. These proposals would be 
adjudicated by the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC), which would 
then in turn send its recommendations to the British Treasury and Secretary of State of 
the Colonies (SoS). Funding allocations for any given year could not exceed ₤ 1,000,000. 
Other provisions stipulated that the Committee should recommend schemes that will 
eventually fund themselves and that the schemes have the possibility of aiding commerce 
and industry in the United Kingdom.292 After the approval of the Colonial Development 
Bill in 1929, which created the CDAC, Transjordan successfully petitioned to be 
included. As a Mandate territory, Transjordan was able to receive funding from the CDF. 
Other colonial possessions of the British Empire, such as Egypt and Iraq, could not 
receive CDAC funds because they were not formal Mandates.293  
Independent foreign capital in the form of concessionary agreements was another 
option open to the Mandatory government. Concessions were a means to introduce 
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industry and utility infrastructure to Transjordan but at the cost of natural resources and 
control over the infrastructure itself. These agreements were extremely unpopular 
amongst the Legislative Council representatives and general populace of Transjordan 
because they were devised with minimal, if any, local participation. The local population 
knew concessions were colonial and foreign agreements, not Transjordanian agreements. 
The most controversial example of this process was the Palestine Electric Corporation 
Concession, more commonly known as the “Rutenberg Concession.” Local 
entrepreneurial investment, in contrast to the concession agreements, was entirely in the 
hands of the local inhabitants of Transjordan. These Arab businessmen helped to develop 
Transjordan, and Amman in particular, throughout the Mandate. The only shortcoming 
from this type of infrastructural and institutional growth, from the perspective of Anglo-
Hashemite government, was that it did not have the ability to determine the plans or 
scope of these developments. Privatization of industry and utilities personified the 
failings of the Mandatory government. Limited financial resources checked the reach of 
the government and forced it to rely on actors outside its direct control. This tension 
between the government’s desire to control the populace and its fiscal realities 
necessitated the need for local and regional investment in Transjordan.  
CDF projects and concessions within Transjordan had an enormous impact on the 
shaping and development of infrastructure within the Mandate of Transjordan. These 
infrastructural developments were felt most profoundly within the new capital of 
Amman. Many of the CDF schemes specifically focused on the capital itself and those 
that did not were for larger ministerial projects that would be run from Amman. This 





purse strings of Transjordan. The use of imperial funds, instead of grant-in-aid also 
further removed the Arab components of the Mandatory government from the larger 
fiscal decisions of the state. These economic choices were yet another way that the 
British shaped the character and composition of the burgeoning capital of Amman. The 
only domain in which Arab participation remained constant was private entrepreneurial 
investment.  
Each of these funding streams had its own pitfalls, but the overall success of new 
development projects in Transjordan can be determined by the degree of local “buy-in” 
from the native population. This local familiarity, the ancient Greek concept of mētis, was 
a result of local knowledge resulting from practical experience. The degree of 
“institutional stickiness” determined the ability or inability of new institutional 
arrangements to take hold in the Mandate. This “stickiness” was a product of how much 
mētis  each project possessed.294 The success of infrastructural and institutional reform 
and development was directly correlated to how foreign the project felt. The more local 
and organic a project or plan appeared, the more likely it was to succeed.  
 
Amman Infrastructural Development through CDF 
Among the earliest CDF projects were those that helped develop infrastructure 
throughout Transjordan. These projects were not centered within Amman but they did aid 
the capital’s development by strengthening the infrastructure of the surrounding area. 
Three projects in particular, the trans-desert telephone circuit, a bridge spanning Wadi 
Zarqa, and a desert water-boring scheme, hoped to develop the hinterland of Amman and 
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strengthen Amman’s importance and centrality. The success of each of these projects 
varied but they were all designed to strengthen the connectivity and economic position of 
the new capital. Although these early projects did improve security, each plan had a 
discrete economic purpose as well. This focus on economic development and self-
sufficiency placed these schemes outside the means and purview of standard Transjordan 
budgetary items. 
 The early CDF plans also highlighted the problem with utilizing imperial funding 
within Transjordan. The British handled the entire CDF application procedure. The 
applications originated with either the British Resident or the British Financial Adviser 
and made their way through an entirely British hierarchy. There was no Arab 
involvement in the application for imperial funds whatsoever. As a result, CDF programs 
had little local support; they had little mētis. The problem of “stickiness” became more 
acute the further a program strayed from local practices.295  The two major CDF 
infrastructural development schemes in Amman, a new telephone exchange and 
government hospital, were stymied by the twin demons of bureaucratic red tape and local 
indifference.  
 As the centrality and importance of Amman grew, its communication needs grew 
rapidly. As of the early 1930s, wireless traffic worked only sporadically in Amman and 
telecommunications were not centralized or controlled from Amman. Major John Bagot 
Glubb, the commander of the Desert Mobile Force and later the Arab Legion (also known 
as Glubb Pasha), was particularly annoyed with the system because of “this trouble of not 
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being allowed to talk to each other when we like.”296 The telephone exchange that existed 
in Amman at that point was quite antiquated and over-taxed. The system consisted of “a 
magneto exchange consisting of 2 non-multiple 100 line units coupled together 
accommodating trunks, junctions, and subscribers. The boards are of an old western 
electric pattern with non-selfrestoring drops arranged in a separate field unassociated 
with their respective jacks. Magneto clearing is used.” The calling rate was high with 
sharp peaks in calling times. With over 170 subscribers (100 official lines, 70 commercial 
lines) and no record operator, it was impossible for the operators to handle all of the trunk 
calls and dockets efficiently. This overtaxed telephone exchange needed immediate 
replacement. The CDF plan for the installation of a new Amman telephone exchange was 
hugely important. However, akin to other CDF funded installations, the completion rate 
of the project was far from ideal.297  
 With these deficiencies in mind, Chief Engineer W.K. Brasher advised the 
installation of a new CB exchange for 300/600 lines with one trunk and a combined 
record position. He estimated that the new exchange, which could be sourced from the 
Egyptians, and an expanded exchange staff, would cost approximately LP 4000.298 In the 
CDF proposal prepared by Brasher, he noted that the only thing preventing work moving 
forward on a new exchange was a lack of funds. He estimated that the scheme would take 
approximately a year to complete once funds were made available.299 Both the acting 
High Commissioner (HC) Hathorn Hall and Secretary of State (SoS) Cunliffe-Lister 
strongly endorsed the proposal. Hall noted that the “revenues of Transjordan are 
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insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of administration, and in view of the necessity 
of limiting the annual grant-in-aid of the TJ government by His Majesty’s Government, I 
cannot recommend that the capital cost of the new equipment should be met from the 
revenues of the territory.” Cunliffe-Lister advocated for the approval of the CDF scheme 
because it was crucial to update the telephone exchange in order to aid centralization of 
trade and business in Amman.300 
 Despite these strong endorsements, the CDAC had some reservations. They were 
willing to dispense funds for the project, but only as a loan with a 3.5% interest rate to be 
repaid over fifteen years. The Mandatory government eventually accepted these new 
terms, but then the problem of finding a suitable location for the new telephone and 
telegraph exchange arose.301 As a result, the exchange plan was tabled temporarily when 
plans for a new general post office in Amman moved forward. The British hoped that the 
new post office building would also be able to house the exchange. The construction of 
the new building was scheduled to begin in August of 1939 and the government hoped 
that by March or April of 1940 the exchange would be able to be installed. After the 
plans came back from consultation with the Palestine Department of Public Works, it was 
determined that the plan would be far more expensive than originally envisioned, and a 
new application to the CDF would be necessary.302 
 In a report to the Secretary of State, High Commissioner MacMichael explained 
that the delay in the exchange was due to a change in the approach for housing it. 
Initially, the plan was to lease land on which to erect the exchange. Instead, the 
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Mandatory government had decided to purchase land and construct a new government-
owned building at a rough cost of LP 10,000. It was not until late 1938 that land could be 
acquired for the building and by the time the plans had been approved by the Palestine 
Department of Posts and Telegraphs war had broken out which in turn deferred the 
project once again. In May 1940, an engineer from Palestine recommended certain 
“palliative measures” at a cost of LP 300, which would allow the present installation to 
carry on for at least twelve more months.303 The engineer’s report noted that the 
exchange was nearing the end of its useful life and that there was pressing need for more 
lines due to heavy traffic from military and civil services.  As of June 1942, the 
building’s foundations and main concrete frame had been completed and work began on 
the ground floor so that the exchange equipment could be installed. The High 
Commissioner estimated that the cost of a central battery exchange and for the 
subsequent subscribers’ equipment, cables and switchboards would cost approximately 
LP 13,600. This new project cost would require the still yet unused LP 4000 from the 
original CDF loan to be supplemented by an additional LP 9600 to either be provided by 
an increase to grant-in-aid or a new CDF grant or loan with a term of twenty years.304 
 The CDAC in conjunction with the wartime welfare and advisory committee 
decided they were “prepared to support the proposal that the loan sanctioned in 1935 
should be cancelled and that they will recommend the grant of a new loan of LP 13,600 
under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.”305As of September 1942, 
General Electric agents from Palestine oversaw the project as part of the war effort and 
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advanced with all possible haste.306 There is no record of when the new exchange was 
finally opened. This new loan finally helped to update the Amman exchange to deal with 
the drastically increased levels of traffic associated with World War II. Unfortunately, the 
delays associated with the project meant that the new exchange only aided Amman’s 
communication capabilities at the tail end of the Mandate. From its original inception, the 
new Amman telephone exchange took over a decade to be completed. These bureaucratic 
shortcomings robbed the project of any momentum that might have spurred local support. 
Throughout the Mandate period, the Mandatory government remained the largest user of 
the telephone network.307 The major impetus for replacing the telephone exchange had 
been government use, followed by commercial concerns. Similar to all imperial 
investment in Transjordan and Amman, economic improvement was always a secondary 
issue. Because the telephone exchange in Amman only had domestic ramifications, it was 
never a project of high importance for the British. Unlike the British Imperial Highway, 
which ran from Baghdad to Haifa, the Amman telephone exchange was only tangentially 
useful for the British colonial security apparatus. . The Amman exchange had no impact 
on regional security. The numerous delays in the exchange’s installation had a 
detrimental impact on the development of trade and business interests within Amman.  
 Bureaucratic inefficiency and the effects of World War II also mired attempts to 
construct a new government hospital in Amman. Early in the Mandate period Amman 
only had a single hospital in Amman run by an elderly British woman, Dr. Charlotte 
Purnell, who paid for most expenses out of pocket.308 At this early stage, health care was 
almost entirely undertaken by private non-government hospitals The one government 
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hospital in Amman paled in comparison in to the  facilities of Amman’s private hospitals. 
The Department of Public Health existed in name only, a true Potemkin ministry, until 
the passage of the Health Law of 1926. By 1927, there were four hospitals in Amman 
“staffed and equipped on modern lines [with] the Italian one being the best as the cost 
thereof amounted to something in the region of LP 12,000.”309 The demand for hospitals 
soon outstripped supply and by 1935, Dr. Maclennan, in his report on health conditions in 
Transjordan, advocated for the opening of a new government hospital in Amman. It was 
impossible to cover the expense of a new hospital from the existing grant-in-aid so an 
application was prepared for the CDF.310Additionally, the provision of curative 
individual care was beyond the scope of the Department of Public Health’s mandate. At 
no time did the Department of Public Health have the resources to provide curative 
individual care to the residents of Transjordan.  
 By the time of the application to the CDF in 1935, the CDF application stated that 
ninety-six beds were completely inadequate for a Transjordanian population of 300,000 
people.  The proposed hospital would take two years to complete and cost LP 35,000 not 
including recurrent expenditure of LP 6,624 that would be covered by the Transjordanian 
government. Once completed, the new hospital would also raise hospital revenue to LP 
2000 annually from the current income of LP 550. After High Commissioner  Wauchope 
endorsed this proposal, Secretary of State  Malcolm MacDonald returned the proposal 
stating the need for more rooms for poorer patients. MacDonald’s biggest concern was 
the low number of third-class beds in the current hospital plan. He advocated the 
reduction of the number of first-and second-class rooms to accommodate this increase. 
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MacDonald’s focus on third-class beds was likely an attempt to appeal to the non-elite 
populace of Amman. In addition, MacDonald suggested that the hospital block include a 
bedroom for the doctor on duty, a library and lecture room, an x-ray room, and an 
electro-therapy room. MacDonald also believed the hospital’s role in the training of 
nurses and midwives should be highlighted in the CDAC application to demonstrate the 
developmental aspects of the proposal. Overall, these suggestions decreased the cost per 
bed and demonstrated how the hospital would be training needed medical professionals in 
addition to treating patients.311  
 All of MacDonald’s suggestions were taken into account and the CDF application 
was revised so that the number of third-class beds increased from thirty-eight to sixty-
eight while the number of first and second-class beds remained the same at four and eight 
respectively. This increased the total beds in the hospital to eighty and included twenty 
beds for isolation, an outpatient department, and a bacteriologist lab. As well, the new 
application estimated that the hospital would be able to train six midwives a year, which 
would greatly aid infant health in Transjordan. As of 1936, there were only five certified 
midwives in the entire country. The first-year costs were estimated at LP 26,800 and  
second-year costs at LP 28,158 while recurrent costs of operation of LP 7,455 would be 
borne by the Transjordan government.312  
Despite the changes, the hospital plan was not approved by the CDAC when it 
finally was reviewed in June of 1937. The CDAC agreed that the hospital was important 
but could not fund it because the hospital was a curative facility that would not develop 
new medical techniques. The CDAC believed the hospital fell within the purview of 
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normal government function. The Transjordan government was responsible for the 
improvement of individual care in Transjordan, not the CDAC. The irony of the CDAC 
remark was the idea of a purely curative facility in Transjordan was novel, let alone a 
hospital that would advance medical practices. The Anglo-Hashemite state was not in the 
business of providing individual medical care. The medicalization of the Transjordan 
population was through preventive medicine, not individual curative care. The CDAC, in 
its concluding remarks, did not reject the idea of approval in the future but found that the 
current proposal did not fall within their parameters for development.313 
After the CDAC rejected the proposal, the only remaining option was to petition 
the British Treasury for an increase in grant-in-aid, which would in turn finance the 
hospital’s construction. Secretary of State Ormsby Gore petitioned the British Treasury 
for an increase of LP 27,000 in grant-in-aid to cover the first year of construction. In his 
petition, he noted that the CDAC refusal was on principle only and they hoped other 
means would be found to finance “this much needed medical service.” Additionally, the 
only hospital of note in Amman, the Italian hospital, was dispensing Italian anti-British 
propaganda. In comparison to the Italian hospital, the current government hospital in 
Amman looked like “little more than a hovel” and was harmful to British prestige in the 
region.314  The Imperial Treasury approved the petition, but the Treasury stipulated in a 
letter from Treasury secretary J. Phillips, that all other projects, which were not 
immediately necessary, should be put on hold during the hospital’s construction.315 
Despite the disbursement of additional grant-in-aid, the new hospital was never built 
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during the Mandate period. 316 Once Italy entered the war against the United Kingdom, 
all Italians were expelled from Transjordan and the forty-bed Italian hospital in Amman 
was confiscated, used by the Department of Public Health and run by the doctors at the 
CMS hospital in Salt.317  
Overall, infrastructural developments in Amman during the Mandate were far 
from efficient. The two major infrastructural programs undertaken through the CDF, the 
Amman telephone exchange and government hospital were marred by problems. In both 
cases, the applications had to go through numerous iterations before they were considered 
and even then, only the telephone exchange ever received CDF funding. It is hard to say 
if the Mandatory government or the imperial government was more responsible for these 
delays and shortcomings. These restrictions demonstrate the limited physical presence 
that British Mandate left in Amman. Despite the clear economic advantages to both 
projects, neither project ever really got off the ground. The lack of private local 
commercial interest in either scheme also limited their possibilities of success. Neither 
plan possessed mētis ; both schemes originated from the British with the expectation of 
local engagement. However, not all CDF programs were devoid of mētis. Government 
programs run through Amman via the CDF were not as encumbered by imperial 
bureaucracy and met with a great deal of success. These programs left a longer British 
legacy within the capital and Transjordan as a whole. These government plans, although 
they originated in a colonial space, appealed to the local populace.  
 
Government programs funded through CDF 
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 Government programs and ministerial organization financed through the CDF met 
with a great deal more success than physical infrastructural programs undertaken under 
the same imperial program. Programs and institutional reforms were more successful 
because they were not as artificially imposed as the infrastructural improvements. Each 
of these plans further developed preexisting practices or built upon already understood 
concepts. As a result, these plans built upon mētis  in the Transjordan population.  
The first of these programs took place in the outskirts of Amman in Jubaiha.318 
The Transjordanian government, on a small scale, financed the earliest agricultural 
experimental stations. In 1926 a proposal was made to set up three of these stations, and 
by 1929, nine of them were in operation. Despite the incremental growth in the number 
of stations, these stations were too small in scope and function to truly improve the 
agricultural situation in Transjordan. They amounted to little more than isolated nursery 
gardens.319 The Mandatory government believed that a larger and more focused 
agricultural experimental station would help develop a more commercial attitude towards 
the expansion of Transjordanian agriculture. 
The creation of an agricultural experimental station on a far larger scale was first 
envisioned in early 1935. The British hoped that this station of approximately 600 
dunums (one dunum is 1000 m2) in size would have both an experimental and 
demonstrative mission. “The experimental side would include testing the possibility of 
introducing new crops, fruit trees or fodder for agricultural animals on a remunerative 
basis, the improvement of existing breeds of livestock and poultry and improvement of 
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the seed of crops at present raised in this country.” These programs would then aid in the 
modernization of farming approaches throughout Transjordan. In order to introduce these 
new techniques to local farmers the demonstrative dimension of the station was 
necessary. “The demonstrative side would be devoted to showing the local farmer the 
greater benefit it is possible to obtain from existing crops, vegetables and trees by means 
of the adoption of more modern methods of cultivation include the use of fertilizers and 
up-to-date agricultural instruments and a more regular rotation of crops.” In British 
estimations the average Transjordanian farmer was “a most conservative person” and the 
only way to get him “to abandon his present archaic methods of agriculture is a practical 
demonstration.” It was estimated that the station would take eighteen months to complete 
and would include various plots for crops, a poultry house and runs, brooder/incubation 
rooms, stables, water troughs, forage store, implement shed, guard room, office and 
stores, and a manager’s house.320 High Commissioner Wauchope believed the scheme 
could be completed for LP 7500 with a recurrent expenditure of LP 1186 to be covered 
by the Transjordanian government.321 
 Secretary of State Cunliffe-Lister approved the plan and sent it for consideration 
to the CDAC only slightly changing the grant request to be LP 6740 and increasing the 
recurrent expenditure to LP 1250. The CDAC agreed to disperse a grant of LP 6740 for 
the construction of the experimental agricultural station near Amman on October 10, 
1935. The CDAC hoped that the agricultural station would help to stimulate the poultry 
industry in Transjordan, which was sadly neglected up to that point, and generally 
improve the agricultural conditions in the country. By 1938, the station had been 
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completed and had an operating surplus of LP 730. Surpluses in both 1938 and 1939 were 
spent on further improvements to the station such as additional storage, increased animal 
capacity, and paving the road to the agricultural station.322  
Overall, the agricultural experimental stations helped to develop a more 
commercial and economically profitable agricultural model for Transjordanian farmers. 
The largest of the stations, the one financed by the CDF, was particularly important for 
both the propagation of better seed stock as well as its demonstration aspects. The timing 
of the stations’ introduction was critical. Transjordan went through a prolonged drought 
and agricultural hardship in the 1930s.323 The introduction of new agricultural practices 
was far more likely to succeed under these conditions. Local farmers were eager to 
implement new techniques that could improve their faltering crops and economic 
position. This desire on behalf of the local population to participate actively in the 
program was the reason for its success. This local buy-in explained the program’s 
regional support.324 Although the agricultural experimental stations did not amount to a 
new department and did not become a far-reaching developmental program, they were 
integral to further developing Transjordanian agriculture as well as the illustrating the 
importance of state-sponsored aid for agricultural expansion.  
 The final two CDF grants affected both the infrastructure of Transjordan and the 
expansion of the government in Amman. The schemes for the Department of 
Development and for the Department of Lands and Surveys were meant to not only 
develop the agricultural industry in Transjordan but also to centralize decision making 
related to Transjordan’s agriculture in Amman. The plan to create a Department of 
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Development consisted of two distinct components. The first portion of the proposal 
called for the hiring of a British director for the envisioned Department of Development. 
This new director would then suggest necessary legislation to govern the best use of the 
subsidiary streams flowing into the Jordan Valley and the valleys southeast and 
southwest of the Dead Sea in efforts to improve irrigation in Transjordan.  He would also 
be responsible for utilizing long-term loans from the agricultural bank. The proposal to 
the CDAC specifically requested an Englishman for this post because of the patronizing 
British position that “the Arab officials cannot stand alone but under the close 
supervision and encouragement of an energetic Englishman wonders can be done.” The 
proposal also called for a loan of LP 20,000 to be issued for use over five years, where 
the first five years were interest free, to be repaid over a period of fifteen years. This loan 
would be used to carry out irrigation schemes throughout Transjordan.325 
 Mr. Shepherd, the irrigation officer of the Palestine government, examined this 
proposal. He noted that there were immense possibilities for improvement in the 
irrigation systems of Transjordan. The existing irrigation channels in Transjordan were of 
poor quality and wasted a great deal of their water. With regularized water distribution in 
Jordan Valley terraces, construction of good earth channels, and permanent regulation 
devices the agricultural position of Transjordan could be greatly improved. As well, 
Shepherd acknowledged the need for external aid because he deemed it unlikely that the 
semi-nomadic population of the Jordan Valley could rapidly transition to intensive 
cultivation, but over time, the population could be educated to the advantages of 
impermeable channels for agricultural use. Here Shepherd knew the barrier to entry of 
                                                 





such a program; there was only minimal knowledge and interest in irrigation in the 
Jordan Valley amongst the native population. The drought of the 1930s had made the 
issue of irrigation and proper water utilization far more critical than it had been in the 
preceding decade.326 Thus, with time and proper instruction, Shepherd was confident that 
the local population would see the benefits of widespread irrigation practices given the 
endemic water shortages that had become the norm in the region. Beyond proper 
implementation, nowhere in the application itself do the British discuss how they would 
prove the utility of widespread irrigation to the Transjordanian populace.  
Shepherd estimated the scheme could easily increase the gross revenue of 
Transjordan by LP 40,000. The most promising ventures, according to Shepherd, would 
be citrus and banana cultivation, which he believed “will more than justify impermeable 
canalization throughout [the Jordan Valley].”327 With these recommendations in mind, 
the Colonial Office advocated that the CDAC approve a free grant of LP 1,580 for five 
years (LP 7,900) total for recurrent expenditures in creation of the Department, the 
salaries of the director and clerk, and a loan of LP 20,000 to pursue irrigation schemes.328 
The CDAC approved the free grant in November 1935 and the British Treasury followed 
suit in December 1935. Both entities noted that the loan was conditionally approved but 
there would need to be specific loan allocation petitions for each new irrigation 
scheme.329  
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 By 1937 the Department was up and running and had a Mr. M.G. Ionides as its 
Director. The Director applied for partial allocations from the LP 20,000 loan twice in 
1937. The first loan of LP 1500 was for exploratory fieldwork for a specific irrigation 
scheme. This was approved in November of 1937 by the CDAC as “sub-scheme number 
482.”330 The second application for a loan was for LP 4000 to be provided by April of 
1938 to begin an irrigation project in either Wadi al-Arab or Wadi Ziglab. Director 
Ionides hoped that this initial irrigation project would be finished by September of 1938 
so that the winter rains would not damage half-completed works.331 There is no evidence 
of the second loan being processed because Chief Engineer K.W. Blaxter had left the 
Middle East Department and by the time his replacement had been hired the second 
scheme had been abandoned. In fact, the initial loan of LP 1500 was never properly 
utilized because the Department of Development had been side tracked by a hydrographic 
survey of Transjordan, which was approved September 16, 1937. This survey included 
the information envisioned to be part of scheme 482 and thus would have been a 
redundant project.332  
 The hydrographic survey completely redefined the focus on the Department of 
Development. The survey was funded by a grant of LP 30,000 from the Colonial Office, 
which began in 1937. The results of the hydrographic survey were published in the 1939 
report “Water Resources of Transjordan and their Development.” This report found that 
the Jordan Valley was the only area where there were “opportunities for rapid economic 
development.” Development in the Jordan Valley, according to the report, should focus 
on controlling existing streams, a new canal from the Yarmuk River, and pumping water 
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from the Jordan River and wells. A rough estimate for this large-scale project was 
projected to be around LP 120,000. In general, the report argued that government efforts 
into irrigation schemes would not drastically alter the revenue of Transjordan. Instead, 
“The government’s efforts and expenditure must be concentrated upon providing the 
stimulus to individual effort such as is already being done through land settlement and 
education. Money spent on actual works can only be a pin-prick on the map; Land 
settlement, education and agricultural services will tint the whole sheet.”333 The 
recommendations of the survey mirrored infrastructural development in Amman and 
Transjordan in general. Director Ionides knew that the best any government plan could 
hope for was to spur individual investment. Widespread water development was beyond 
the means of Transjordan’s shoestring budget. The focus of the Department of 
Development was to introduce small-scale irrigation schemes with the hope of wider 
private adoption. Without individual commercial interest, many plans and schemes could 
not and did not succeed.  
 As a result of its focus on the hydrographic survey, the Department of 
Development was largely unable to utilize the CDF developmental funds. The first CDF 
irrigation scheme for Wadi al-Arab was fully planned and able to move forward, but as of 
August 1938, work had still not begun in earnest. The second CDF irrigation scheme for 
Wadi Ziqlab was stymied by the need of a new water law, which had not been passed by 
the Legislative Council.334 On December 4, 1938, Director M.G. Ionides gave notice and 
the Department shifted its focus to water measurements and experiments. Thereafter, it 
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was determined that the best use of time would be to amplify and deepen the results of 
the hydrographic survey. 335 
As of March 1939, the Director of Lands and Survey, Mr. Thomas, had taken 
control of the Department of Development as interim director. In the words of Mr. 
Thomas, the Department of Development “ends its first two years with a regular 
constitution still far from crystallization, and its positive results are almost exclusively 
technical and preparatory nature.” Despite the somewhat murky future of the Department 
of Development the interim director did believe that “the expenditure of a few thousands 
of pounds has transformed the position of irrigation from one of obscurity in which 
anything approaching a detailed plan of development could be little more than guess-
work, into one in which the future can be foreseen with sufficient accuracy to allow a 
definite programme of capital development to be put forward, with definable possibilities 
of revenue.” This optimistic tone was measured by the need to take control of the streams 
that would be utilized in the prospective irrigation development programs. Without 
further control of these water systems the two new plans, which could utilize the LP 
20,000 loan for irrigation development from the CDF, would be impossible to 
implement.336 This loan proposal was approved by the CDAC in February of 1940 but it 
agreed with Mr. Thomas that legal control of Transjordan’s waterways was of the utmost 
importance for government irrigation schemes success.337 
Unfortunately, this legal control over the water systems in the Jordan Valley was 
not forthcoming. Numerous attempts to draft and pass a water law were rejected by the 
Legislative Council, which felt such a law would give the government too much control 
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over private water ownership. British Resident Kirkbride, who succeeded British 
Resident Cox in 1939, acknowledged that it was uneconomical for the Department of 
Development to remain its own department. The Department of Development became a 
sub-unit of the Department of Lands and Survey in 1940.338 No wide-ranging water 
legislation was ever passed during the Mandate period. Without such a water law, no 
wide-scale irrigation development took place during the Mandate. Such development did 
later take place, to varying degrees, in the post-independence period, but was largely a 
result of private enterprise. However, future private development of the Jordan Valley did 
owe a great deal to the hydrographic survey completed by the Department of 
Development during the Mandate period.339  
 While the Department of Development project did not produce immediate 
economic returns for the Transjordanian government, the registration of land and the 
changing of land tax law did have an immediate impact on the Mandatory state. The 
program proposed in 1935 to the CDF entailed the partitioning of musha‘ land. In 
essence, this was a continuation of land reform and registration that had begun nearly a 
century earlier under Ottoman rule. Up until 1851, village-owned or region-wide 
collective ownership (musha‘) land was the norm throughout what would become 
Transjordan.340 This began to change under the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, which 
required the registration of land (tatwib) and the imposition of two types of land taxes, 
virgu and ‘ushr. These two new taxes combined to a taxation rate of roughly twelve 
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percent of the annual land production.341 These reforms implemented a more European 
understanding of land ownership and allowed for individuals to acquire large swaths of 
land for the first time. According to historian Haim Gerber, these new land laws made 
large agricultural estates possible for the first time in the Ottoman Empire. The law 
allowed urban merchants and tribal sheikhs to register large swaths of unoccupied land. 
This land quickly increased in value as the agrarian rural population of the empire grew 
throughout the late nineteenth century.342 These shifts in land registration practices were 
also accompanied by a shift in how land was categorized (shift from Ottoman feddan, 
land that can be plowed by a single ox, to an Ottoman dunum, which is an actual area 
measurement of land of 1000 square meters).343  
The reforms coincided with a more direct form of Ottoman control over 
Transjordan. Towards the end of the Ottoman period, the musha‘ system became strained 
as a result of population growth. This trend in turn made people more apt to register their 
lands with the Ottoman authorities, which made taxation more manageable and 
documentable. By 1905, mafruz (private) land became the norm around al-Karak, al-
Tafila, Ma‘an and much of the south with the exception of Bani Sakhr held lands.344 
However, the northern ‘Ajlun province, the richest agricultural lands of Transjordan, 
remained largely musha‘. Despite these changes, Ottoman land definitions of miri and 
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milk were largely ignored in favor of musha‘ and mafruz and feddans remained the 
predominant land measurement.345  
 Mandatory officials quickly understood the need to stabilize land tenure, 
cultivation, and taxation within Transjordan. The Department of Land, amongst the 
earliest government ministries formed in 1921, was led by Amir Muhammad al-Shibabi, 
who was replaced by future Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda in 1926. Both men 
continued the system implemented in 1858 by the Ottomans. The Department changed to 
the Department of Lands and Surveys in 1927 under the leadership of a new British 
director A.P. Mitchell.346 Director Mitchell undertook the initial survey of Transjordan 
and demarcated boundaries of villages and tribal holdings.347 Eventually, the British felt 
that the Balqa region was being overtaxed while the ‘Ajlun and Karak regions were 
under-taxed. The British estimated that revenue should increase by 200% in ‘Ajlun and 
400% in Karak.348 The new plan envisioned by the British was meant to continue the 
Ottoman program of land settlement. The British understood, as did the Ottomans, that 
private land ownership would increase tax revenue and agricultural productivity 
throughout Transjordan. These economic incentives were appealing to the state and the 
local farmers alike.  
The Transjordanian Government did not have enough money from grant-in-aid to 
finance a wide-scale land reform and registration project. Early attempts at land 
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settlement were hampered by a lack of properly trained personnel.349 Although the land 
partition program had begun in earnest in 1933 with the passage of the new land 
settlement law, the Department of Lands and Surveys was understaffed and ill equipped 
to undertake such a large project.350 In 1935, the Transjordanian government applied to 
the CDAC for a CDF grant of LP 5000 a year for six years (LP 30,000 total) to finance 
the establishment of two new settlement parties. Each settlement party would be 
responsible for village demarcation and the division of musha‘ land into privately held 
land plots. The proposal noted that:  
The proper development and cultivation of land in TJ has been impossible in the 
past owing to the fact that the majority of the arable land in this country is held by 
the cultivators of a village or tribe on a communal basis.  This system entails an 
annual redistribution of plots to the owners of shares with the result that no 
incentive exists for an individual to improve the land which is temporarily in his 
possession and which may not fall to his lot again for many years to come.351 
 
High Commissioner Wauchope estimated that there 2,475,000 dunums of musha’ land in 
Transjordan and the Department could currently only survey and partition 200,000 
dunums per year. Additional funding would double the amount of land partitioned 
annually to 400,000 dunums. The scheme projected that there would be an increase in 
land revenue because of partition but could not advance an exact figure.352 Wauchope felt 
that the Department of Lands and Surveys was doing well with its limited resources to 
introduce the new land tax, but there needed to be a sweeping regularization of land 
tenure. Only with comprehensive land settlement could inhabitants be educated as to the 
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advantages of land registers towards development.353 The Colonial Office believed that 
land settlement and demarcation would help to spur development and increase revenue. 
With the approval of the additional settlement teams, the Department was confident that 
the project could be completed within the six-year window of the grant.354 With this in 
mind, the CDAC approved the plan that became scheme 377 in November of 1935.355  
Although the grant was approved in 1935, the time needed to train the two 
additional settlement parties meant that the settlement rate did not immediately increase 
to 400,000 dunums per year. Director Mitchell believed that because of land settlement 
new landowners were taking personal initiative to improve their lands. Such activities 
included using heavy stones to erect boundary walls and the construction of retaining 
walls to stop soil erosion. By March of 1938, 1,200,695 dunums of land had been settled. 
As a side effect of the increased quotient of settled lands, land transaction figures also 
began to rise, and with them revenue generated from transaction fees.356 High 
Commissioner MacMichael endorsed the continuation of the land settlement project and 
advised that the grant amount should not be decreased, despite the additional land 
revenue generated by increased land tax and transaction fees.357 The CDAC agreed to the 
continuation of “CDF scheme 377” in June of 1938 and noted they were very pleased 
with “the very satisfactory progress which had been made.”358 
 At the close of 1938, the land settlement program was proceeding as planned. 
The new building for the Department of Lands and Surveys in the Jabal al-Weibdeh 
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section of Amman was completed in August of 1938.359 This new building housed all of 
the tax lists and registers completed by the land settlement and land settlement court. 140 
of the 450 villages had been settled for a combined area of 1,935,000 dunums and 
7,700,000 dunums in all of Transjordan. The land settlement court had visited twenty-
three villages in 1938, holding court for a combined sixty-seven days. The court, using 
“the land settlement law provides for the settlement of all questions or differences in 
regard to any estate in land, or title thereto, or interest therein or any rights connected 
therewith. Such rights and interests are recorded in the Schedule of Rights and 
subsequently transferred to the Land Registers.” A total of 10,016 land transactions 
accounting for a sum of LP 5,894 had been completed in 1938. Most importantly, 
according to Director Mitchell, “the peasant landowner who has suffered the insecurity of 
title for so many years now realizes the importance of a clear title and no case of 
unregistered disposition has yet come to notice in ‘settled’ villages.”360  
After G.F. Walpole became the new Director in 1940, the Transjordanian 
government applied for an extension of the CDF grant of LP 5000 annually for an 
additional four years to continue the land settlement work in 1941.361 However, by 1941 
the calculus of large-scale projects had changed throughout the British Empire because of 
World War II. Any financial decision had to be measured in how it would affect the war 
effort. E.B. Boyd expressed exactly this concern in his communications with the British 
Treasury, noting he would only recommend the extension of scheme 377 if he could be 
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assured it would not require men or materials from outside of Transjordan.362 The 
Treasury understood that if the scheme were stopped it would take an additional seven 
years to complete the land settlement program, whereas if the grant were continued it 
would only take four years. In a summary report prepared by the Department of Lands 
and Surveys, it argued that the “scheme continues to be entirely successful and the annual 
addition of LP 5000 to the estimates of the department has continued to intensify the 
interest in Land Settlement throughout the country.” Additionally, the impressive amount 
of land settled by the Department from 1938 to 1940 was almost entirely funded by the 
CDF grant. This report requested that the current annual grant of LP 5000 be continued 
for an additional four years, noting that settlement would be completed by 1946.363  With 
these particulars in mind, the Treasury approved the continuation of the land settlement 
program in January of 1942 as a new CDF scheme D 61.364  
Despite the claims of the Department in its 1941 application, land settlement 
would not be completed before 1946, due to a number of factors. From 1940 to 1942, 
officials responsible for land settlement had to be temporarily attached to land registries 
in order to cope with the large number of expropriations and leases of land that became 
necessary in connection to defense works undertaken as part of the war effort. 
Additionally, the number of land transactions after 1940 had increased by sixty percent, 
requiring officials to be taken out of the field and moved to Amman to deal with the 
increased transaction volume. The independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan completed 
the land settlement program in 1952.  
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However, it remains unclear if the increases in land settlement could be correlated 
to any direct increase in agricultural development or revenue. Increasing degrees of plot 
fragmentation from the growing population of Transjordan diminished the gains of land 
settlement. Collective land holdings had prevented plot fragmentation before land 
settlement due to the impermanent nature of musha‘ land itself. Once land ownership 
became privatized, it made the division of land amongst heirs simpler, which in turn led 
to diminished average plot sizes amongst smaller landholders.365  A lack of funds further 
limited the ability of individuals to improve their land. The Agricultural Bank rarely had 
adequate funds to help cultivators in normal years, let alone during the drought years of 
the late 1930s. When the Agricultural Bank attempted to expand beyond its Amman 
branch in 1944 it was met with limited success at best.366 Most damningly, the Land Tax 
Law of 1933 and Land Registration failed to increase tax revenue throughout the 
Mandate.367 
What is certain is that land registration and settlement shifted the average 
Transjordanian’s perception of the state. The Department of Lands and Surveys 
settlement program had the grandest scope and impact of any infrastructural institution 
outside of security forces during the Mandate period. It was Department officials who 
delineated where a village began or ended, what land should be included in that village, 
and even the names of various plots (howd). These names would live on and become the 
names for districts, a phenomenon particularly evident in many parts of Amman: Jabal al-
Weibdeh, Umm Udhayna, ‘Abdun, Marj al-Hamam and al-Shmaysani. The 
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infrastructural and institutional model created by the British during the Mandate period 
was not ephemeral; it shaped both the development of the Department itself and the 
relationship between the average Jordanian and the capital of Amman.368 The land 
registration program was another example of an institutional program disciplining the 
populace of Transjordan to accept the might of the state. The central location of the new 
Department headquarters in Jabal al-Weibdeh reinforced the centrality of Amman in the 
eyes of the general populace. Similar to the tribal court of appeals in Amman, the 
Department of Lands and Surveys forced Transjordan’s inhabitants to come to Amman to 
resolve complicated land disputes. The success of the land settlement program was 
strongly connected to its Ottoman precedent. The fact that the land registration program 
continued a preexisting Ottoman policy facilitated the rate of its adoption and the 
acceptance by the populace. The Ottoman land registration program had created the local 
practice of private land which then continued by the Transjordan government.  
All three of the above-mentioned programs utilized CDF funds to shape the 
development of Transjordan during the Mandate period. Each of these programs was 
located in or around Amman and had a distinct impact upon how individuals viewed the 
fledgling capital and the state as a whole. More to the point, each of these programs was 
able to succeed only with the influx of imperially sanctioned Colonial Development 
Funds. Without the CDF and CDAC, these ambitious projects of infrastructural and 
institutional development would not have been possible during the Mandate period. All 
of these programs were successful because they were beneficial for the local populace. 
Transjordanian interest in improved agricultural practice, water usage, and land allocation 
                                                 





made the programs successful. Without this native interest, the programs could not have 
succeeded.  
 
Concession Agreements and the Electrification of Amman 
The creation of concession agreements in Transjordan during the Mandate period 
tended to be a rather one-sided affair. Each of the agreements was largely, if not 
exclusively, coordinated between private individuals and the British Mandatory officials 
with little Arab influence or interaction. Unlike the CDF, concession agreements did not 
claim to improve the situation in Transjordan for its population. Both the elite and non-
elite population of Transjordan hated concession agreements. These business agreements 
gave nothing to the Transjordanian populace and robbed them of their land’s meager 
natural resources for decades. These agreements were indicative of the colonial regime 
failing to work in the best interest of their subjects. Concession agreements were the 
embodiment of the most exploitative aspects of the Mandate arrangement. Three 
concessions of note were implemented during the Mandate period: The Dead Sea 
Minerals concession, the Iraq Petroleum Company concession, and the Palestine Electric 
Corporation concession (aka the Rutenberg concession). These concessions connected 
Transjordan to the neighboring Mandates of Iraq and Palestine. Although these business 
agreements were undertaken for personal gain, the British also had a stake in promoting 
trade between their colonial holdings. Each of these agreements theoretically provided 
the Transjordanian state with either infrastructural development or revenue, but actually 





The Transjordan government granted the Dead Seas Minerals concession to 
Moshe Novemeysky and a Major Tulloch in April of 1927. The concession was 
registered in Palestine in 1929 as the Palestine Potash Company Ltd. with an initial 
capital of LP 400,000. The agreement awarded to the Palestine Potash Company stated 
that fifty percent of all salt and mineral revenue accrued by the company would go to the 
Transjordanian and Palestinian governments.369 However, the company did not actually 
register in Transjordan until 1945. The registration of the Palestine Potash Company 
caused numerous members of the Legislative Council, including Tawfiq Abu al-Huda 
and Sa’id al-Mufti, to resign in protest against the perceived Zionist intervention into 
Transjordan.370  
The Legislative Council representatives spoke out against this concession and the 
Rutenberg concession repeatedly in the First and Second Legislative Councils (1929-
1934). The Council members feared the concession would give Zionists an opportunity to 
settle in Transjordan. 371  The representatives criticized the Executive Council (the Amir’s 
Cabinet) for blindly approving the concessions and ignoring the Zionist interests in 
Transjordan. However, it is extreme to surmise, as Maan Abu Nowar does, that these men 
were acting “as surrogates for the British Resident, Colonel Henry Cox, in the Cabinet 
and the Legislative Council.”372 These concessions may have been in the interest of 
British policy but they must have also had at least token approval of the Amir. It is highly 
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unlikely that these men would have remained part of the Executive Council for as long as 
they did if they did not faithfully represent the wishes of the Amir on most occasions.373 
In 1931, the Mandatory government awarded the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) 
concession for a period of seventy years. The concession allowed the company to lay oil 
pipelines through Transjordan in order to connect Iraq and Palestine. Transjordan 
received no royalties or customs duties from the IPC for this concession. There were no 
real tangible benefits for Transjordan from this concession whatsoever.374The IPC 
pipeline opened on New Year’s Eve 1935 allowing oil to flow through Transjordan on its 
way to Haifa.375 The lack of outcry against the IPC concession is ironic because it was 
the most damnable as a business agreement. The concession gave Transjordan nothing 
and required the Transjordan government to protect the pipeline for free. The IPC 
concession avoided the public outcry that the Dead Sea Minerals concession and the 
Rutenberg concession received because it was not a Zionist project. Although the IPC 
was mainly a British company clearly benefiting from the colonial arrangement of the 
Transjordan Mandate, it was not as damnable as the suspicious Zionist activity in the 
other two concessions. Neither the IPC nor the Dead Sea Minerals concession was ever 
popular, but they were not met with the disdain and controversy of the Rutenberg 
concession.  
The Palestine Electric Corporation (PEC) concession was part of the grand 
scheme of its creator and CEO, Pinhas Rutenberg. Rutenberg, a self-identified and 
published Zionist, felt that the only way to spur growth and expansion in Palestine was 
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through a massive hydroelectric project. This project would utilize all of the major water 
sources in the area – Litani, Dan, Hasbani, Banias, Yarmuk, and Yabok – to power 
fourteen power stations on both sides of the Jordan River down to the Dead Sea. The 
Palestine Electric Corporation developed in and around Haifa accounting for much of that 
city’s Mandate era infrastructural development.376 Furthermore, Rutenberg wanted all of 
the work completed by Jewish workers to further Zionist goals in Palestine. In particular, 
Rutenberg wanted the electrification of Palestine to motivate Jews to live in villages, as 
opposed to cities, and thus spur rural development.377 Winston Churchill, then the 
Colonial Secretary, was greatly impressed by the scope of Rutenberg’s scheme and was 
integral to its advancement. Churchill helped facilitate early negotiations between 
Rutenberg and the Palestine government and between Rutenberg and the Middle East 
Department of the Colonial Office.378 Despite early negotiations in 1921 and tacit 
agreement between Rutenberg and then High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, a full 
agreement was not ratified until 1926. The inclusion of Transjordan became the sticking 
point in this agreement.  
Rutenberg wanted to include waters on both sides of the Jordan River to make his 
electrification scheme as wide ranging as possible. His more subtle goals were to 
establish Jewish settlements near the envisioned power plants in order to expand Jewish 
settlement into Transjordan. In 1922, the British government announced that the Balfour 
Declaration, and therefore the Palestine Jewish settlement policy, did not apply to 
Transjordan. Rutenberg hoped that his concession scheme would be a way around this 
                                                 
376 Seikaly, Haifa, 61-72.  
377 Sara Reguer, “Rutenberg and the Jordan River: A Revolution in Hydro-electricity,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 31 (Oct. 1995): 692-94.  
378 Reguer, “Rutenberg and the Jordan River,” 695. This sentiment of rural improvement was in keeping 





policy change. High Commissioner Samuel and other British officials opposed inclusion 
of Transjordan in the concession due to fears that it would incite the local Arab 
population.379 Rutenberg accepted that Amir Abdullah would have to accept the terms of 
the concession if it were to apply to Transjordan; the British could not include 
Transjordan without the Amir’s approval.380 With this stipulation begrudgingly agreed to 
by Rutenberg, the concession was finalized on March 5, 1926. Transjordan agreed to the 
conditions of the concession on January 8, 1928, despite its highly disadvantageous 
terms.381 With its signing, Transjordan lost control of the waters of the Jordan River and 
its tributaries. This decision would hamper the development of infrastructure and water 
allocation development through the remainder of the Mandate. The fact that Abdullah 
had surrendered control of the waters of Transjordan to a Zionist hurt his credentials as a 
leader in the Arab world for decades.  
While the Rutenberg concession negotiations were nearing their close, Amman 
began to pursue its own electrification program. Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanima owned the first 
generator in Amman.382 He used the generator for his medical work and sold the surplus 
electricity to his neighbors.383 Dr. Ghanima bought a second generator in 1933 to supply 
electricity to the Italian hospital in 1933. Beyond the few homes and businesses powered 
by Dr. Ghanima’s generators, the majority of Amman’s inhabitants lived without 
electricity. Private initiative brought electricity slowly to Amman, but widespread 
electrification was beyond the means of unaffiliated individual efforts. The streets of 
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Amman were not electrified. Instead, forty kerosene lamps, which required constant 
refilling and relighting, illuminated the streets of downtown Amman.384 Individual refills 
of kerosene lamps for private use were quite expensive and not affordable for many 
Ammanis.385 (Appendix 1, figure 3-1 photo of kerosene lamp from Mandate period) 
The first attempts at electrification by the city took place in 1927. The 
Transjordanian Executive Council entered into negotiations with the PEC for water, 
electric, and sewage schemes for Amman. Rutenberg promised that the PEC’s 
undertaking of the water and sewage schemes had no Zionist overtones and motivations. 
This stated position should be questioned because the only reason the PEC was 
considering these two additional projects was to ensure that they were awarded the 
electricity scheme. The agreement would include the sale of an area not exceeding 6000 
dunums for a powerhouse near the junction of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers to the PEC. 
After members of the Transjordanian delegation visited the site, it was agreed that 
Rutenberg would need to pay LP 200 for the site and up to LP 1000 to the cultivators 
whose land would be affected by the project. Rutenberg recommended the formation of 
an “Amman Electric Company” which would be owned by the PEC with up to forty 
percent of the company being owned by locals. The Amman Electric Company would 
provide electricity at reduced rates to mosques, churches, government buildings, and 
hospitals.386 Problems with this plan soon arose when it became clear that neither the 
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Palestinian government nor the Transjordanian government could guarantee that the 
Amman municipality would repay the loan issued to them by the PEC for the proposed 
water works. By May of 1928, it became clear that the concession scheme with the PEC 
for the electrification of Amman would not be moving forward.387 
 The municipality attempted to implement the lighting of the city on its own in 
1930 but quickly realized that it lacked the necessary revenue. The municipality of 
Amman, like all of the municipalities and government ministries in Transjordan, was 
chronically short of funds. The municipality turned the project over to the elites of the 
city who were members of the Amman Chamber of Commerce. Around this same time, 
the Chamber of Commerce, created in 1923, began to express a greater interest in the 
commercial development of Amman.388 The membership assumed that the electrification 
of Amman would aid their individual commercial interests. Members of the chamber 
hoped to keep the project a local affair to avoid foreign interference and influence. 
Despite these hopes, their plans amounted to little progress.389 The Amman municipality 
rebuffed Arab contractors in the spring of 1931 and 1932 due to Transjordanian fears that 
they might be part of a Zionist scheme. In 1934, General Electric (GE) applied for the 
exclusive rights in Amman for “the generation, distribution and sale of electric energy for 
lighting, heating and other domestic purposes and for power.” This concession, which 
would last for a period of fifty years, would allow GE to erect overhead line poles, to lay 
underground cables and to purchase private land that would be needed for the power 
station and transformers. The proposed agreement allowed for the municipality to own up 
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to twenty percent of the electric company and set the rates for the electricity produced. 
The agreement also guaranteed the safety of the plant, buildings, and workers by the 
Transjordanian government and Amman municipality.390 The Amman municipality did 
not oppose the GE concession because it would not be associated with foreign or colonial 
control of Amman. It was solely a business venture. There was nothing inherently 
problematic with the proposed concession except that the Secretary of State Cunliffe-
Lister feared that its terms would violate the Rutenberg concession.391 
When the Judicial Adviser C.A. Hooper considered the matter of the proposed 
Amman GE concession things became more complicated. Hooper concluded that 
awarding the concession to any company other than the Palestine Electric Corporation 
would be in breach of the 1926 PEC concession. The concession must first be offered to 
the PEC on similar terms and the municipality must give the PEC six months to consider 
the concession before moving forward with other options. Finally, the adviser did not 
believe that Amir Abdullah could award such a concession unilaterally without consent 
and agreement from the High Commissioner first.392 
Rutenberg, when approached for his thoughts on the concession, noted that the 
electrification of Amman was outside of the terms of the concession, assuming the 
municipality itself would undertake it. However, the municipality could not create a 
concession for the electrification of the city unless it first offered it to the PEC. Rutenberg 
stated that before moving forward with any project the municipality of Amman needed to 
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have its borders clearly demarcated.393 The demarcation of the municipality’s border was 
no simple task as Amman continued to expand rapidly during the 1930s. The city 
expanded from 3 sq. km in the 1920s to over 10 sq. km in 1947.394 Rutenberg also 
claimed that he had not pursued a venture in Amman more thoroughly because British 
Resident Cox had insinuated that he preferred to grant the concession to a company other 
than the PEC due to its Jewish nature. Despite the lack of economic interests in the 
Amman project, Rutenberg believed that “as many Arab communities as possible should 
have the benefit of a good supply from the Rutenberg works.”395 
In response to Rutenberg’s claims of bias, the acting Chief Secretary S. Moody 
requested a more direct response from the PEC as to whether or not it opposed the 
granting of a concession to a third party in Amman.396 In 1937, Rutenberg again 
expressed his disappointment and anger at the reception he and his company were given 
within Transjordan. Rutenberg claimed that he asked the Mandatory government if the 
there was any reason he should not apply for the concession and was told no. Thereafter 
he was informed there was no way the concession would be granted to the Palestine 
Electric Corporation due to its “Jewish nature.”397 Cox completely rejected and 
repudiated the allegations made by Rutenberg. He said that at no time had he insinuated 
that the concession could not be awarded to the PEC simply because of its Jewish 
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ownership. Furthermore, Cox attested that there had been no communications with the 
PEC since October of 1936. The PEC had the plans for the concession since August of 
1935 and any further delay on its part would be quite unjustifiable. If Cox and the 
Transjordan government did not receive an answer by June 1, Cox would “hold them 
bound by the suggestion and consider that they would be justified in proceeding with the 
adjudication of other tenders.”398 Rutenberg finally returned the maps demarcating the 
Amman municipality’s borders in July of 1937 after having them for over eight 
months.399 By late 1937, there was finally an agreement on the boundaries of the 
municipality of Amman. Despite this, no agreement was feasible with the PEC for the 
concession. There also was no explicit or implicit permission given by the PEC to the 
Amman municipality that would allow it to move forward with other concession 
proposals for the electrification of the city. In essence, the dealings with the PEC had 
stymied any efforts to electrify Amman for over a decade without producing any results.  
Finally, in 1938, private enterprise, not imperial or foreign funding, electrified 
Amman. While the Rutenberg concession forbade the Amman municipality from issuing 
another concession agreement for the electrification of the city, it did not prohibit private 
entrepreneurial investment. The Amman municipality stipulated in its final proposal for 
an electrification project that the applicants had to be able to supply the city with 
electrical current for at least three years and install 400 lights in the streets.400 The long 
awaited Amman Electric Company (AEC) was finally created in 1938. Muhammad Ali 
Budair, who was originally from Damascus but had lived in Amman since 1927, led the 
project as part of a group of local investors and merchants (initially eight Syrian 
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merchants) and had their proposal approved by the municipality in 1938. 401 Initially, the 
AEC co-opted existing small generators in the city, such as those owned by Dr. Subhi 
Abu Ghanima, in exchange for shares in the company. The company initially brought in a 
seventy horsepower generator to begin producing electricity in earnest. (Appendix 1, 
figures 3-3 and 3-4 early light schematic and photo of Ras al-‘Ain plant) 
The Amman Electric Company (AEC) began construction on the Ras al-‘Ain 
power plant in 1939 where the total horsepower of all the generators was in excess of 
four hundred horsepower. The development of the AEC was different from other regional 
electric companies because it was Arab owned and Arab financed. Most electric 
companies in the Middle East were foreign ventures.402 The AEC’s local nature meant 
that it had a great degree of support within Amman. There was not any opposition to this 
company’s electrification of the city because it was not seen as a foreign or colonial 
project. It was an outgrowth of established traditional economic practice; it had local buy-
in. However, the AEC’s growth was curtailed by the austerity climate of WWII. 
Electricity in Amman did not extend far beyond the city center until the later 1940s.403 
The AEC increased its total capital to LP 50,000 in order to expand the company to meet 
growing electricity demands within the capital.404 However, only after Jordan’s 
independence would Amman and the AEC totally escape the constraints of the Rutenberg 
concession, which greatly impeded infrastructural progress throughout the Mandate 
period. The Rutenberg concession hampered the abilities of both the municipal and 
national governments to move forward in Transjordan. In the end, the electrification of 
                                                 
401 The Jordanian Electric Company, Jordanian Electric Power Company Ltd: Fifty Years of construction 
1938-1988 (Amman: Jordan Electric Company, 1988), 30.  
402 The Jordanian Electric Company, Jordanian Electric Power Company Ltd, 31.  
403 Freij, “A Merchant’s Tale Reveals Amman’s Electric Revolution.” 





Amman, similar to many other infrastructural projects in and outside the capital, relied 
upon the capital of private enterprise. Today, the Ras al-‘Ain power station building has 
been transformed into a gallery space for art exhibitions and cultural performances. The 
enduring legacy of the Amman Electric Company remains symbolic of the strength of 
private Arab action during the period of the Mandate.   
 
Conclusion 
 The need for extraordinary funding to finance infrastructural and institutional 
development in Transjordan was a symptom of the Mandate’s inherent tension. The 
government aspired to improve and control all aspects of Transjordan but did not have 
the resources to do so. The need for extraordinary finance in Transjordan is indicative of 
the failings of the Anglo-Hashemite state. However, money accrued from the CDF, 
concessions, and local entrepreneurial investment financed a number of infrastructural 
programs in and outside of Amman. The Mandate period saw the development of 
numerous roads, utilities, and ministerial programs. All of these institutional 
developments relied upon capital that came from outside the Mandatory grant-in-aid 
system. These external funds shaped how Amman interacted with the rest of Transjordan. 
Despite CDF funding, the British failed to leave a lasting impression upon the physical 
infrastructure of Amman because of bureaucratic red tape and a lack of local interest. 
Although there were numerous attempts at developing tangible infrastructure during the 
Mandate period, their success rate can be described as low at best. All of these 





The British were far more successful in the establishment of institutional 
infrastructure in the form of departmental programs, such as the land settlement 
conducted by the Department of Lands and Surveys. It is these institutional undertakings 
that left a lasting impression of British control and heritage in the city of Amman. 
Ministerial development, although overseen by the British, became a part of Arab 
Transjordan. This process of local acceptance, the inculcation of mētis, was a byproduct 
of the need for improved agricultural practices during the drought of the 1930s. The 
ability of CDF programs to build upon preexisting Ottoman precedent made the local 
population more likely to accept these programs’ innovations. Both CDF funds and 
concession agreements attempted to develop the young capital of Amman. However, 
concession agreements were foreign business interests with no concern in actually 
improving Transjordan for its population. Concessions were exploitative colonial 
agreements and rightfully hated by Transjordanians. These concessions were seen as 
foreign meddling at best and as Zionist colonial schemes at worst. The Rutenberg 
concession in particular stymied local economic advancement in numerous aspects of the 
Transjordan economy. Throughout the Mandate, private capital and investment by locals 













































































4: A Point of Order: A Battle for Autonomy in the First Legislative Council of 
Transjordan 
 
“The constitutional regime so recently introduced must be regarded as in the nature of an 
experiment, but I believe that it is an experiment on the right lines. No doubt the new 
regime will have difficulties to face and obstacles to overcome. That is inevitable and is 
no more than falls to the lot of every young state wherever situated. It can only be 
gradually that the new system takes root in the country or acquires anything like the 
smooth working attained by older constitutions elsewhere. Patience will certainly be 
required, but given patience and goodwill I do not see why the experiment should not 
prove a success.”405  
- High Commissioner J.R. Chancellor on the signing of the 1928 Anglo-
Transjordanian Treaty from comments made to the Thirteenth Session of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission  
 
This quote, from High Commissioner (HC) J.R. Chancellor alludes to the 
struggles that every young state must endure. The Transjordanian state experienced a 
number of growing pains before the central authority of the state solidified and before its 
character had been determined. These internal contestations unfolded in the first true 
political arena of the state, the Legislative Council (LC), the first elected body in 
Transjordan. In the earliest sessions of the First Legislative Council, we see battles for 
control over language, authority, prominence, and prestige. These political jousts 
reinforced Amman’s centrality as the home of politics and governmental might in 
                                                 






Transjordan. Most of all, the Council proceedings demonstrate the earliest attempts by 
the representatives to combat the gravitational pull of Amman. This artificially 
manufactured Emirate survived because it incorporated local elites into the Anglo-
Hashemite state to bolster its authority while simultaneously trumpeting the importance 
of its Sharifian Amir, Abdullah Ibn Hussein 
The history of the Legislative Council, created in 1929, is the story of negotiation 
between the central government and the elites of Transjordan. The Legislative Council 
gathered leading elites from throughout Transjordan and made them directly interact with 
the Anglo-Hashemite state (as represented by the Executive Council and the British 
Resident). Sectarian differences did not define these men. The levels of power and 
political intrigue in the Council transcended any one group or region. Instead, unlike 
neighboring Iraq, these elites only focused on the governance of Transjordan and how the 
evolving edifice of the Transjordanian state affected their lives and the lives of their 
clients. These exchanges incorporated formerly autonomous tribal sheikhs and urban 
notables into the machinery of the state. The Legislative Council forced the traditional 
elites of Transjordan to respond to a new class of civil servants and a newly centralized 
state. Although the Legislative Council’s legislative powers were diminished throughout 
the Mandate period, it remained an important collection of Transjordan’s leading elites 
who could not be ignored by the government.   
This chapter will explore the battle over the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan 
Agreement’s ratification in the Legislative Council. The opening of political space 
necessitated by the League of Nations Mandates Charter forced the Anglo-Hashemite 





1928 Agreement ratification battle transformed Amman into both the home of legislative 
authority and political opposition in Transjordan. The nascent Transjordanian state 
needed to incorporate the elites of Transjordan into the government if it hoped to survive. 
The Legislative Council became the arena in which formerly autonomous elites 
transformed into Transjordanian elites as they were incorporated into the official 
machinery of Amman. In Transjordan, the British adopted a similar model of elite 
manipulation as they had earlier enacted in neighboring Hashemite Iraq. Both states had 
early defining moments in which the local, previously autonomous, established elites 
attempted to delineate and protect their spheres of influence and privileges. Although the 
efforts of the Council representatives to safeguard their autonomy and institutional 
control were eventually defeated, these proceedings marked a clear battle over power and 
control in the new Hashemite state. 
 
Iraq and Transjordan: Two Agreements, Two Paths 
The 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement was unmistakably a document that 
originated from the British with minimal, if any, Transjordanian input.406 It is clear from 
the reaction and reception the terms of the agreement received that the inhabitants of 
Transjordan disliked it.407 This situation closely mirrors that of the constitutional process 
in Iraq. In both Iraq and Transjordan, the initial governments formed quickly without 
elections, shortly after the establishment of the Mandate. In turn, “the institutional and 
legal basis of the new Iraqi state was constructed around the twin pillars of cabinet and 
                                                 
406 The British acknowledge the Amir seeing earlier versions of the treaty but do not indicate that his 
suggestions were taken into account for treaty revisions.  
407 BNA, CO 831/1/2, BR Cox to HC JR Chancellor, “Report on the Situation in TJ for period 1/1/28-
31/3/28.” Immediately after the publication of the treaty on March 26, 1928, there were demonstrations 





King.”408 This dual foundation mirrored the Transjordanian state’s reliance on Amir 
Abdullah and his Executive Council (i.e., Executive Committee, Cabinet, or Council of 
Ministers). Both Mandates began before the existence of a clear treaty or agreement 
between the Mandatory Power (Great Britain) and the new Mandate (i.e., 
Transjordan/Iraq). Neither Iraq nor Transjordan had a constitution during this early 
period. Both states incorporated British advisers to oversee the local portions of the 
government with a chief British officer, either the British Resident in Transjordan or the 
High Commissioner in Iraq, as the ultimate embodiment of British authority in the 
Mandate.409  
In both Iraq and Transjordan, the new Mandates met early resistance. The British, 
in an effort to quell unrest, decided to standardize their relations with Iraq in the form of a 
bilateral treaty. In an effort to satisfy the spirt of the League of Nations Mandate, Britain 
stipulated that the local population must acquiesce to the Mandate’s terms in the form of 
an Agreement. In Iraq, the treaty was agreed to by the Council of Ministers in June of 
1922 with the condition that it would eventually need to be ratified by the Constituent 
Assembly (the elected legislative body) once it was formed. The ratification of the treaty 
by an elected Constituent Assembly would publicly declare the acceptance by the local 
population to the Mandatory arrangement. However, the Agreement’s publication met a 
great deal of public resistance. In Iraq, King Feisal vocally and adamantly resented the 
restrictive terms of the agreement, refused to sign it, and directly encouraged anti-treaty 
opposition. This stance brought him into direct conflict with the British. If he had not 
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suffered a timely bout of appendicitis, he might have lost his throne entirely for his 
opposition according to historian Charles Tripp. In September 1922, British High 
Commissioner of Iraq, Percy Cox, suppressed “the most radical parties and newspapers, 
banishing a number of opposition politicians and ordering the bombing of tribal 
insurgents in the mid-Euphrates. For the King and others, there could be no clearer 
expression of British determination to see the treaty and their plans for the Iraqi state 
carried through.”410 After the British made their intentions clear, the King shifted his 
support towards the treaty’s ratification, and signed the treaty in October.  
While Iraqi King Feisal strongly opposed the treaty, his brother, Amir Abdullah, 
took the opposite stance and staunchly argued for the treaty’s ratification in Transjordan. 
This brotherly difference of opinion was likely a result of Abdullah’s more tenuous 
political position in contrast to Feisal’s. The British always favored Feisal over Abdullah 
in their own estimations and Baghdad was a far more established city and government 
center than Amman. The 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement followed a similar 
course to its Iraqi cousin. The Agreement was a means to reinforce Anglo-Transjordanian 
relations and to create the legal precedent for a permanent state. In both Iraq and 
Transjordan, the British did not need to enter into an additional agreement to solidify 
their position as the Mandatory power. Instead of ruling purely through force of will, the 
Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Transjordanian Agreements respectively gave Britain the cloak of 
local acceptance and participation. This farce was indicative of Britain’s disdain for the 
Mandate system and the Permanent Mandates Commission in particular. The British 
viewed the Mandate system as a “self-imposed limitation of sovereignty” and correlated 
                                                 





the success of the Mandates to the amount of publicity given to them.411 These bilateral 
treaties were a public relations gambit on an international stage. However, unlike Iraq, 
the British took an additional six years to propose the Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement 
for ratification consideration. The cause of the delay is unknown, but likely attributed to 
Iraq’s higher geopolitical and strategic importance for the British due to its oil reserves. 
Regardless of the exact motivation for the treaty timeline discrepancies, the steps towards 
ratification remained the same.  
Although the British began working on a Transjordanian treaty shortly after 
concluding the Iraqi version, Amir Abdullah and British Resident Henry Cox did not see 
a preliminary version of the document until December 1925. However, from the tone of 
High Commissioner Field Marshall Plumer’s dispatch to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (SoS) Amery it appears that the Amir’s only revisions were that Transjordan 
should not have the same customs duties policy as neighboring Palestine. Plumer noted 
that Amir Abdullah was “prepared to accept [the treaty] and indeed anxious to bring it 
into force” as of March 1926.412 Interestingly, the original December version of the treaty 
gave the Legislative Council a higher degree of autonomy. Initially, the Executive would 
be responsible to the Legislative Council. However, in the end, the Executive Council 
(EC) became part of the Legislative Council instead as ex-officio members effectively 
reversed the earlier arrangement. High Commissioner of Palestine and Transjordan 
Herbert Samuel rationalized this change because he was “persuaded that elections in 
Transjordan would not yield persons of sufficient education and authority to be entrusted 
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with the administration of departments.”413  The Amir’s power of the prorogation of the 
Legislative Council, when coupled with the increased influence of the Executive Council 
within the Legislative Council, changed the dynamics of the Legislative Council greatly. 
The Agreement’s terms would clearly strengthen the position of the Amir in Transjordan 
legally as well as symbolically.  These changes to the 1928 Agreement meant that 
Abdullah was only answerable to the British. The Legislative Council could not check the 
authority of the Hashemite Amir. Despite the Amir’s desire to enact the treaty, it first 
needed to be properly vetted. For the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty’s ratification, the 
Transjordanian Executive Council had to approve it, mirroring the importance of “cabinet 
and king” already established in Iraq. 414  
The Executive Council first saw the agreement in June of 1927. The Cabinet 
members rebuffed the Agreement from the onset but the Amir preferred to push forward 
despite the advice of the Chief Secretary ‘Aref al-‘Aref.415 The Amir contended that it 
would be easier to amend the treaty once it had passed rather than contest its ratification. 
416 The only objection that the Amir had to the language of the treaty was over the 
principle of primogeniture. Abdullah did not want his eldest son to succeed him because 
he knew of Amir Talal’s anti-British and anti-colonial sentiments. Instead, he favored his 
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younger son, Amir Nayef, who he believed would more favorably maintain the status 
quo. Despite his efforts to persuade the Executive Council otherwise, the Council held 
firm that primogeniture remain part of the Agreement to avoid infighting amongst 
Abdullah’s descendants.417  
 It is clear from Chief Secretary ‘Aref al-‘Aref’s political diary that the British 
delivered the treaty in its final form. The Transjordanian Council of Ministers and the 
Amir were not involved in drafting the 1928 Agreement whatsoever. However, the open 
discussion and debate presented by ‘Aref in his diary challenges the position of previous 
historians, such as Naseer H. Aruri and Madi and Musa, that the Executive Council 
blindly accepted the treaty at face value.418 Although the Amir and his Cabinet approved 
the treaty, these discussions demonstrate that the individuals involved were very much 
aware of both the benefits and the deficiencies that the treaty presented. These were not 
the actions of people who were politically unaware or naïve.  
Plenipotentiaries signed the Agreement in Jerusalem on February 20, 1928, and 
published it on March 26, 1928. Even after having seen several versions of the treaty in 
1927, members of the Cabinet continued their protestations after the treaty’s signature. 
Chief Secretary ‘Aref al-‘Aref, in his Amman diary, argued with the Amir that the treaty 
was, “one sided, [with] all obligations on Jordan, all restrictions on her independence.” 
Aref referred to the treaty’s terms as a “farce” and “comic.” However, the Amir 
maintained that the treaty would be amended in time and that the Cabinet members 
needed to trust him. Aref still believed that the treaty was nothing more than “chains and 
                                                 
417 ‘Aref al-‘Aref Diary Amman 1926-1929, June 8, 1927.  
418 Naseer H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965) (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1972) 37, 74-78, and Munib Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-Urdun Fi al-Qarn al-‘Ishrin (History of 





restrictions and shackles” but the Amir had already made his intentions clear and was 
steadfastly in support of the treaty.419  
The public reaction to the treaty was swift, vocal, and overwhelmingly negative. 
The general rejection of the agreement surprised the British. High Commissioner Herbert 
Plumer had led the British Colonial Office to believe that “the Transjordan government is 
anxious to celebrate in some exceptional manner the enactment of the Organic Law of the 
territory.”420 Plumer had gone as far as having stamps printed to commemorate the event. 
Despite British efforts to popularize the treaty, British Resident Cox reported that the 
agreement was “met with a considerable amount of adverse criticism and in the Northern 
district some demonstrations were held.”421 By April, there were widespread protests 
against the treaty. A telegraph sent from northern tribal elders to the Amir proclaimed 
that they “strongly protest against the treaty and [we] inform you that the nation does not 
accept absolute treaties that are used as instruments of slavery.”422 The animosity that the 
treaty met shocked Amir Abdullah. He resented the opposition to the treaty as a personal 
attack against himself, and his legitimacy. Early on, the Amir brought “the prominent 
amongst the agitators and other influential persons” to Amman to discuss the treaty’s 
terms in person. These meetings generally dispelled fears that article ten, which dealt 
with Great Britain’s ability to raise and maintain a force in Transjordan, might mean 
conscription.423  
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In the face of this opposition, Aref tried to counsel Abdullah that now was the 
time to seek amendment of the treaty to appease the populace. The Chief Minister, 
Hassan Pasha Khalid Abu al-Huda (a naturalized Transjordanian and the son of Sultan 
Abdulhamid II’s religious adviser, he had been Chief Minister since 1926),424 argued that 
this was not possible because the Amir “is the one who insisted on the treaty to the 
British.” Hassan Pasha bluntly stated that the Amir was arrogant and never consulted 
with any of his men if he thought that seeking a treaty was in the best interests of the 
state. The Chief Minister admitted that he had no power to negotiate the terms of the 
treaty in Jerusalem. His only function was to represent the Amir in his signature.425 The 
1928 Agreement would legally install Abdullah and his family as the rulers of the 
Emirate and reinforce their place in the country. Similar to his brother Feisal, Abdullah 
knew the limitations of his office and his need to reinforce his monarchical authority if he 
was to survive in Transjordan. Both Hashemites depended on British power to become 
sovereign over states in which they had no inherent sovereignty.426  
In both the Iraqi and Transjordanian examples, the major proponents of these 
treaties were the Amirs and their respective Executive Councils. The British understood 
that the reification of the authority of the Hashemites, and the Amirs’ acquiescence, were 
essential for the stability and feasibility of both Emirates. However, as the diary of ‘Aref 
al-‘Aref demonstrates, this Executive support was far from universal or unquestioning. 
The next step for both governments was the incorporation of local elites into the fold. 
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Akin to Iraq, the agreement called for the creation of a new elected representative body. 
These new representative councils were meant to satisfy the developmental aspects of the 
Mandate itself. 427  The British hoped that this new body would create a class of clients 
who depended upon the British for their position.428 However, stipulating the need for 
local approval of the Agreement opened a political space in Transjordan in which an open 
and vocal opposition could exist.429 Because the Legislative Council’s first order of 
business once convened would be to ratify the 1928 Agreement, these representatives 
temporarily were in a position of power over the Anglo-Hashemite state. The entirety of 
the first Legislative Council became a tug of war between the representatives and the 
government over the size of the political space in which the Council would exist. In 
essence, the first thing the Legislative Council would have to do would be to define the 
terms of its involvement in the Hashemite regime.  
 
Elections and Opposition 
After their respective executives signed the agreements in Iraq and Transjordan, 
new electoral laws (1922 Iraq, 1928 Transjordan) followed them. These new laws 
dictated how the elections for the new assemblies would take place. The 1928 Electoral 
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Law started the process of the Agreement’s ratification. The new law dictated how the 
elections for the new assembly would take place. The law called for indirect elections 
where primary electors selected a secondary elector, who in turn, would vote for the 
fourteen actual members of the assembly. 430 The elections selected a set number of 
representatives from each of the three major regions of Transjordan: ‘Ajlun (4), Balqa 
(6), and Karak (4). These elections were for the settled population of Transjordan only.431  
The two Bedouin representatives were chosen in an entirely different manner. The 
government arbitrarily divided the tribes of Transjordan into a northern and southern 
group for the purpose of the Legislative Council elections. The northern tribes included 
the Bani Sakhr, Sirhan, Bani Khalid, ‘Isa and Salit while the southern tribes included the 
Huwaytat, Manna‘in and Hajaya. From these tribes the Amir then selected two ten-
member committees of sheikhs who would in turn select a Northern Bedouin and 
Southern Bedouin representative for the Legislative Council. This selection process 
acknowledged the prevailing tribal system throughout Transjordan and the technical 
difficulties in having Bedouin participate in a normal election.432 One of the 
complications of this system was that the Bedouin population saw the Legislative Council 
selection as “appointment as a paramount Sheikh of the tribe.” Furthermore, according to 
Major John Bagot Glubb, leader of the Desert Patrol Force and eventual commander of 
the Arab Legion after 1939, the elected sheikhs were “unaware what the Legislative 
Assembly is, or what it is for; much less do they realize that the sheikh is supposed to 
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represent their interests in it.”433 Because of these complications, the Bedouin elections 
caused a great deal of friction amongst the various sheikhs of a tribe because it 
sometimes appeared to acknowledge one as “superior” to the other. Despite these issues, 
the Bedouin council members joined the fourteen other elected members to form a 
Legislative Council with sixteen total representatives.  
Generally, electoral competition in Transjordan focused on the “nationality” of 
the prospective representatives and the degree to which the nominees opposed the British. 
The Transjordanian population was mainly Sunni Muslim with small minority enclaves 
of Arab Christians and Circassians making up less than 11% of the total population. The 
demographic allocations for the Legislative Council did not match the population 
distribution of Transjordan. Roughly speaking about half of the population of 
Transjordan lived in ‘Ajlun, thirty percent in Balqa, and the remaining twenty percent in 
Karak and Ma’an.434 The Council allocated nine Muslim Arab seats, three Christian Arab 
seats and two Circassian seats. This representative allocation drastically increased the 
representation of both the Christian and Circassian communities on the Legislative 
Council. It is likely that the British set this seat distribution to stack the Council with 
more pro-Government representatives. Both the Circassians and the Christians had been 
pro-Ottoman populations, and both groups understood the necessity of a centralized state. 
The Circassian population in particular remained closely associated with the Hashemite 
Monarchy, as Abdullah’s personal guard was composed solely of Circassians. Despite the 
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over-representation of Christians and Circassians on the Council, there were no sectarian 
issues whatsoever during the Mandate period. Unlike neighboring Iraq, Palestine, Syria, 
and Lebanon, Transjordan’s opposition was solely focused against the scope of British 
control during the Mandate. Confessional seats existed throughout the Mandate and 
apparently never raised any ire among its populace.  
Regardless of the Council’s composition, the elections were set to occur without 
the prospective representatives knowing the actual powers of the Legislative Council 
itself.  Beyond being an elected representative body, the degree of autonomy and 
influence the Legislative Council would possess was unclear. As a result, the potential 
representatives were running for a new position of potential power in the new state. This 
level of ambiguity would work to the advantage of the Amir and the British later on, 
because it gave them leverage in dictating the function of the Council. Despite the 
general opposition, the government promulgated the Legislative Council Electoral Law 
on August 15, 1928, and formal registration of primary electors for the elections began on 
September 1, 1928.  
The publication of the new election law spurred the resistance to the 1928 
Agreement. The clearest illustrations of the popular rejection of the 1928 Agreement 
were the formation of the National Congress and a series of petitions from Karak and 
‘Ajlun notables to the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandates Commission. The main 
opposition party, Hizb al Sha‘b (The People’s Party), organized a convention to oppose 
the 1928 Agreement.435 The National Congress, composed of roughly 150 “notables, 
sheikhs and intellectuals” convened for the first time on July 25, 1928, at the Hamdan 
                                                 





coffee house in Amman.436 The coffee house was located in the heart of downtown 
Amman (al-balad) adjacent to the central square, Feisal Square. This downtown corridor, 
which included Amman’s major mosque, Husseini Mosque, was the nexus of exchange in 
the young capital city. By 1928, Feisal Square had become the political and cultural heart 
of the state.437 The location of the opposition’s congress was critical because it 
demonstrates the open and free nature of the opposition. It would have been impossible to 
select a more public and prominent location to hold a political meeting in Transjordan in 
1928. This meetings of the National Congress in Amman from 1928-1933 demonstrate 
that Amman was the home of political opposition in Transjordan. Amman was the seat of 
the Anglo-Hashemite state but it was not a space that they controlled completely. These 
meetings were indicative of a strong free opposition, not a cowed assemblage of elite 
puppets. (Appendix 1, figure 4-1 photo of Hamdan coffee house from 1935)  
The National Congress, which elected Hussein al-Tarawnah, a notable from 
Karak, as its president, questioned the terms of the 1928 Agreement and the Organic Law 
in reference to how Transjordan should be ruled.438 The National Congress sent a letter 
composed by Tarawnah to Amir Abdullah and British Resident Cox arguing against the 
scope of power the Agreement afforded to the Amir and the Executive Council. The 
Congress believed it was unjust and contrary to the purpose of the Legislative Council to 
allow any unelected ex-officio members to sit on the Council. They argued that this 
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would be in violation to the basic law of 1923. The Legislative Council should have 
primacy over the appointed Executive Council, not vice versa.439 The National Congress 
also opposed the scope of the Amir’s power within Article 19 of the Organic Law, which 
granted the Amir near complete control over the Legislative Council. Finally, the 
opposition party believed that “the Council should be composed only of sons of the 
country. At present the Legislative Council only contains one member who may be 
regarded as so.”440 A “naturalized Transjordanian” or “sons of the country” referred to 
the Transjordan Nationality Law, which labeled individuals as Transjordanians who were 
“all Ottoman subjects who were living habitually in Jordan on August 6, 1924.” The 
definition of habitual residence was twelve months of continual residence prior to August 
6, 1924.441 The definition of citizenship in Transjordan was critical because it defined 
who could take part in the government.  Many of Transjordan’s “sons of the country” 
actually came from outside of Transjordan at the beginning of the Mandate. This loose 
definition of Transjordanian is not surprising given the fact that Transjordan did not exist 
before 1922. In general, the National Congress opposed the exact form of the agreement 
but not the need for the agreement themselves. These were demands, which in retrospect, 
hardly seem extreme.442  
British Resident Cox’s reply was far from satisfying in the eyes of the National 
Congress. Cox reasserted that Transjordan was a separate political entity from Palestine 
and the Balfour Declaration did not apply within its boundaries. Beyond this allowance, 
Cox reaffirmed that Transjordan was under the domain of His Majesty’s Government but 
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went no further in addressing the actual terms of the 1928 Agreement or the Organic 
Law. In response to the growing unpopularity of the 1928 Agreement, the Executive 
Council created a banishment law as a means to control the opposition. Amir Abdullah 
first called for the banishment of opposition figures when he learned of an assassination 
plot in October of 1928. It is unclear if the allegation was legitimate or not, but it did 
hasten the passage of the banishment law by the Executive Council on October 8, 
1928.443 The banishment law was the first attempt by the Anglo-Hashemite government 
to begin closing the political space opened by the creation of the Legislative Council.  
 Undeterred, the National Congress published the National Pact at their next 
meeting on March 11, 1929 and sent it to the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandates 
Commission. The National Pact’s language was much stronger than their initial attempts 
to appeal to Amir Abdullah and British Resident Cox. The National Pact called on the 
League of Nations to recognize Transjordan’s right to self-determination. In an eleven-
point doctrine, it stated the need for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy under 
the Amir. It also stipulated that the electoral process should be changed, to replace the 
indirect electoral system of the 1928 Electoral Law with direct elections and 
representation determined by population demographics.444 Finally, it demanded complete 
independence from Great Britain.445  
In addition to the National Pact, notables from Karak and ‘Ajlun sent their own 
petitions to the League of Nations. The Karak petition sent in November of 1928 strongly 
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opposed the “unlimited authority” held by the British financial and judicial advisers. The 
power of British officials was more alarming in contrast to the paucity of Transjordanian 
officials in the Mandatory government. The notables argued that the British forced 
Transjordan to accept British loans and to accept laws that were not compatible with the 
customs of Transjordan. The petition also criticized British control over the Hijaz 
Railway and the army. Akin to the National Pact, the Karak petition called for the 
formation of a representative constitutional monarchy free of British involvement, and 
that the terms of the Mandate should be limited to technical advisement.446 The petition 
sent from ‘Ajlun in June of 1929 was identical to the one from Karak.  
The League of Nations in its official response to the petitions stated that “the 
commission was of [the] opinion that the complaints submitted by the petitioners were 
not of such a nature as to call for any action.” As well, the League of Nations reply 
asserted that the Hijaz Railway was under an arrangement that approximated pre-war 
conditions and that Transjordanian Muslims should interact with Mandate Officials to aid 
in religious matters.447 The League of Nations based its opinion on a British report that 
stated that only five of the signers of the Karak petition were “men of standing” and the 
other complaints of the petition were erroneous.448 As well, British Resident Cox had 
already dismissed anti-agreement agitation by saying that it had died down considerably 
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and was “now only maintained by a few place hunters whose object the remainder of the 
people have now realized.”449 
British Resident Cox believed that the only reason that the opposition party was 
successful in getting people to boycott the election was by exploiting the fear that the 
registration necessary for the election was actually for conscription. Conscription 
paranoia was an outgrowth of a 1925 government effort to create a population 
registration and issue identification documents. This initiative entailed having sheikhs 
provide the Anglo-Hashemite state with lists of their people. The Transjordanian 
government stopped the registration effort within eighteen months due to widespread 
opposition. The root of this opposition likely lay in the memory of Ottoman conscription 
efforts in the nineteenth century. Because of the failure of the 1925 registration efforts, 
voter registration in 1928 became purely voluntary and left to the discretion of its 
citizens. A formal census of Jordan was not completed until 1952.450  
Despite the petitions and protests, the Legislative Council election proceeded on 
schedule but in the face of “strong opposition.”  Both the first and secondary elections 
were finished by February 18, 1929. The opposition was “a considerable body of opinion 
[which] was not satisfied with the form of Government proposed and desired that the 
government should be fully responsible to the electorate.”451 It is unclear from the British 
records the exact scope of the election boycott that actually took place, although the 
boycott was strong enough to prevent elections in the province of Ma’an. In response, 
Karak and Ma’an, with their combined population of roughly 60,000 people, were 
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counted as a single region for this election. This southern opposition was a subtle nod to 
Ottoman continuity. During the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had 
reasserted its control over the ‘Ajlun and most of the Balqa. However, Ottoman authority 
never traveled further south than the Balqa. Karak and Ma’an had no legacy of 
centralized state control.452 These southern provinces only had a population of roughly 
33,000 people in 1917. Transjordan’s total population was estimated at 200,000 at the 
time.453 Much of the opposition to the 1928 Agreement and centralized state authority 
came from these southern provinces. It is clear that the British anticipated opposition 
from the southern portion of Transjordan because of the reduced number of southern 
seats on the Legislative Council, four, opposed to ‘Ajlun or Balqa, which had a combined 
ten seats. Although these southern environs only represented one-sixth of Transjordan’s 
population, the government’s inability to control these districts exemplifies the limits of 
governmental power the further you traveled away from Amman. Despite the omission of 
Ma’an, in November 1929, the British maintained, when asked by the League of Nations 
Mandates Commission about the election, that the boycotts had not affected the validity 
or legality of the election results.454  
Regardless of the scope of the boycott, five signers of the National Pact were 
elected to the Legislative Council. The election of Sheikh Hamd Ibn Jazi (premier Sheikh 
of Huwaitat tribe, southern Bedouin representative), Sheikh Mithqal al-Fayiz (premier 
Sheikh of Bani Sakhr tribe, northern Bedouin representative), ‘Atallah al-Suhaimat 
(notable of Karak), Sa‘id al-Mufti (Circassian notable from Amman), and Shams al-Din 
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Sami (Circassian notable from Balqa) demonstrated a level of disorganization amongst 
the opposition.455 It is curious that some members of the opposition ran for council seats 
while its leader, Hussein al-Tarawnah, was not elected. The election of some members of 
the opposition demonstrates that the National Pact did not have a clear policy on the 
Legislative Council. These mixed election results are also indicative of a weak sense of 
political solidarity. The members of the opposition agreed on the need to limit the powers 
of the British and the Amir in Transjordan but it is doubtful that they agreed on much 
else. Personal interest and the protection of regional prestige remained the guiding 
influence for the elected Legislative Council representatives. Beyond the five signers of 
the National Pact, the remaining representatives did not belong to any political 
organizations. Fourteen out of the sixteen members were sheikhs or notables supported 
by large tribes or tribal federations. In general, tribal affiliation held the largest sway in 
the elections.  
What is clear is that the new members of Legislative Council were not political 
neophytes.456 They all were involved in local politics and many had held government 
positions. The ex-officio members of the Council, who represented the will of the Amir, 
would not easily sway the new representatives. In no way was it clear at the time of the 
election that the members of the Legislative Council would be subservient to the Amir. 
The Legislative Council in early 1929 was an assemblage of powerful “local” elites who 
had never been under the control of a local centralized state before.457  
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The Legislative Council members would not find any sympathetic or conflicted 
members in the Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council were 
committed to having the 1928 Agreement ratified as soon as possible. The one man who 
might have helped the Legislative Council members push for amendments to the 1928 
Agreement, ‘Aref al-‘Aref was gone. In late 1928, British Resident Cox had confronted 
the major rebellious voice of the Executive Council, ‘Aref al-‘Aref, and accused him of 
being a member of the opposition. Cox advised him to resign and leave Transjordan.458 
Aref published a denunciation of the current state of Transjordan on January 7, 1929, and 
left for Palestine in March 1929. Aref contended that only a truly representative 
government could save the young state.459 It is certain that the formation of the First 
Legislative Council failed to satisfy this requirement.  
 
Internal Regulations and the First Conflict 
 The first extraordinary session of the First Legislative Council opened without 
incident on April 2, 1929. The Council was comprised of nine Muslim Arabs, three 
Christian Arabs, two Circassians, and two Bedouin sheikhs. Five members of the 
Executive Council and Chief Minister Hassan Khalid Pasha Abu al-Huda joined the 
sixteen elected members.460 This newly formed body was comprised of the “important 
notables of Jordan” but was not yet a “powerless body” as Kamel Abu Jaber asserts.461 
The Legislative Council would have its authority and influence neutered over time but 
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that eventuality was far from a foregone conclusion at its inception. Furthermore, the 
government needed the Council to ratify the 1928 Agreement and as a result could not be 
overly aggressive with the Council’s members at the onset. 
An atmosphere of apprehension and competition almost immediately set in 
between the elected Legislative Council members and the ex-officio Executive Council 
members. “The elected members regarded the ex-officio members with strong suspicion 
in the belief that all possible steps would be taken to deprive them of those new powers 
which they had acquired.”462 It is exactly this struggle, which informed the proceedings 
of the First Legislative Council. From the beginning, members jockeyed for position and 
influence in the Council. Furthermore, these newly minted Transjordanian elites had to 
work out exactly what their new positions would afford them and how their new elected 
office would affect their formerly autonomous positions back in their home districts. In 
the first Council, the demographic allocations of the Council did not have a significant 
impact.463 The demographic rigging of the Legislative Council seats did not help the 
Anglo-Hashemite government’s efforts to have the Agreement ratified. Voices of dissent 
and opposition came from every region and population in Transjordan during the Council 
proceedings. No sectarian divisions divided the opposition of the Legislative Council. 
Although the Council’s seats were allocated to place more friendly Christian and 
Circassian voices in the Council, nearly every member spoke against the 1928 
Agreement’s ratification. The political space opened by the 1928 Agreement ratification 
debate would have to be closed by some other means. The Legislative Council did not 
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have clearly defined powers at the onset of the Council’s proceedings, and the ambiguity 
in the powers and responsibilities of the Council temporarily increased its authority and 
influence. (Appendix 1, figure 4-2 photo of original prime ministry building in downtown 
Amman) 
 The first order of business, once the Amir officially convened the Council, was to 
draft its Internal Regulations and define the powers of the Council. These regulations 
were to define the parliamentary procedures of the Council and the exact scope of the 
powers and the limitations of the Council. The early portions of the regulations, Articles 
1-18, were passed without real incident in the fourth meeting on April 10.464 Articles 1-3 
set that the Council would always convene on November 1 with a speech from the throne. 
It was then the responsibility of the Council to respond formally to the speech (mazbutta). 
Articles 4-18 called for the election of a new clerk to keep the Council minutes every six 
weeks and the establishment of the financial, legislative, and administrative 
committees.465  
The passage of Articles 19, 24, 25, and 26, which dealt with the authority to draft 
laws, became the first contest in the Legislative Council for power and influence. 
According to Article 37 of the Organic Law, and Article 19 of the proposed Internal 
Legislative Council Regulations, only the Chief Minister or the head of a department 
could introduce legislation because they were the only individuals deemed “competent” 
and “experts.” In the sixth session Shams al-Din Sami (a Circassian from the Balqa), 
member of the People’s Party and the National Pact, suggested the revision of this 
provision so that members of the Legislative Council could introduce legislation. Najib 
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Abu Sha‘r (a prominent Christian lawyer and notable of a large federation of Christian 
tribes from Husn) agreed with Shams al-Din and asserted: “We are not minors and we are 
eager to work for independence.”466 At stake for Abu Sha‘r and Shams al-Din was their 
ability to institute real change and wield real power through the Council. Without the 
ability to introduce legislation, the Council would be subject to the whims of the British 
and the Amir. The majority of the Council members agreed that the Council needed to 
have the ability to shape its own agenda. Pro-Hashemite stalwarts like ‘Audah al-Qusus 
of Karak agreed with the political dissenters such as Shams al-Din that new legislation 
was the prerogative of the representatives.467 Eventually, due to the absences of a number 
of pro-Amir members, the Council was able to pass the revised versions of Articles 24, 
25 and 26.468   
This opposition victory was short lived. The Chief Minister read the Amir’s 
Iradah (executive order) the next day, which rejected the revised versions of Articles 24, 
25, and 26 because they were in opposition to Article 37 of the Organic Law. At this 
point, the President acknowledged that “opinions are equally divided” and that the legal 
committee did not need to consider the articles further. Despite the efforts of the 
opposition, the Legislative Council passed the original versions of Articles 24, 25 and 26 
during the tenth session on April 25. In the end, the Internal Regulations were passed 
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stating only heads of departments may introduce laws, because, as the president 
maintained, the “Heads of Departments are specialists.”469 
The Internal Regulations had an enormous impact on the powers afforded to the 
Legislative Council. The members of the Transjordanian representative assembly now 
held far less sway than their Iraqi counterparts. In Iraq, “any deputy could propose 
legislation, provided he had the support of ten others and provided that the legislation did 
not concern financial matters, which were still reserved to British control under the terms 
of the treaty.”470The Iraqi assembly was far from all-powerful, but its ability to introduce 
its own legislation gave the members a far higher degree of autonomy than their 
Transjordanian brethren. The British substantiated this discrepancy by emphasizing that 
the substance of the agreements was “not comparable” due to the “rapid progress” being 
made in Iraq.471 As a result, the representatives could only vote up or down on legislation 
without the ability to amend existing legislation or introduce new legislation. The 
Council could not dictate an agenda. The government now controlled the terms of the 
engagement; all the Council could do was react. The representatives had lost the ability to 
shape the trajectory of Transjordan independently. These abridged responsibilities were 
the first true curtailment of the influence of the elites who sat on the Legislative Council. 
The shift away from the historic power structure of autonomous tribal elites had begun. 
The political space in which the Legislative Council existed and operated had begun to 
close. The limitations set forth in the Internal Regulations would handicap the abilities of 
the representatives throughout the history of the Mandate. 
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1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Ratification Battle 
 After the conclusion of the opening bout, the real fight over the ratification of the 
1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement could begin. The halls of the Legislative Council 
became a battleground. The terms of the 1928 Agreement and the nature of Transjordan’s 
future relationship with the British hung in the balance. Beyond the five signers of the 
National Pact, the majority of the remaining eleven unaffiliated representatives also 
vocally opposed the language of the 1928 Agreement.472 The major source of opposition 
to the treaty was the fact that the British created the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian 
Agreement without Transjordanian input. The demands and rhetorical flourishes of the 
members differed widely, but they were united in their opposition to a treaty that was 
foreign to them. Only one elected representative advocated the ratification of the 1928 
Agreement in tandem with the ex-officio members of the Executive Council: a Christian 
from Karak named ‘Audah al-Qusus.  
 Analogous to the debate over the Internal Regulations of the Council, the 
members of the Legislative Council were also united on the issue of immunity during 
Council sessions. This request, first articulated during the debate over the Council’s 
Internal Regulations, reemerged with discussion of the 1928 Agreement’s ratification. 
Najib Abu Sha‘r (Christian from Husn) demanded that each member have his freedom of 
speech guaranteed and that members would not be silenced like children in al-kuttab 
(elementary school). Shams al-Din agreed and again stressed the need for immunity to 
guarantee freedom of speech. He contended the issue was of the utmost importance 
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because the eyes of Syria, Palestine, and Iraq were all upon them.473. Shams al-Din, Najib 
Abu Sha‘r, and Najib al-Shraidah (Muslim representative from Madaba) all expressed 
how reluctant they were to move forward with any Agreement negotiations before their 
immunity was established. For Abu Sha‘r, the “pillars” of the Council rested on the need 
for security via immunity. Ex-officio members Secretary General Tawfiq Abu al-Huda 
and fellow Executive Council member Treasurer Ibrahim Hashim maintained that the 
issue of immunity was irrelevant because without the 1928 Agreement the Legislative 
Council was not legal in the first place. 474  
The arguments of the Executive Council did not sway the representatives. The 
Council members wanted to ensure, above everything else, that they would be able to 
oppose and protest legislation from a position of legal safety. Immunity rights were 
directly tied to the ability of the Council representatives to act freely. Debates over 
immunity were another facet of the same debate over representative authority and 
autonomy. Amir Abdullah eventually announced amendments to the Organic Law on 
June 9, 1929, “whereby the members of the Council should have complete freedom of 
speech within the limits of the Standing Orders during the deliberations of the 
Council.”475 It is important to note that institution of guaranteed immunity only took 
place after the passage of the 1928 Agreement on June 4, 1929. The Amir’s proclamation 
unsettled the British. The Permanent Mandates Commission determined during its 
fifteenth session that the Amir did not have the right to amend the Organic Law without 
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the approval of “His Britannic Majesty.”476 Despite British anger, the Amir’s order stood, 
guaranteeing immunity during future Legislative Council sessions.  
 With the issue of representative immunity settled, the Legislative Council began 
its debate of the 1928 Agreement in earnest. Representatives used a number of tactics to 
attack the British and the Agreement but all of the opposition boiled down to a single 
position: just because the British drafted the Agreement without Transjordanians did not 
mean they had to accept it. Najib Abu Sha‘r (Christian from Ajlun) argued “this 
agreement is not a verse from heaven and difficult to amend. There is no justification for 
obliging us to ratify it, simply because it was signed.” In these comments Najib Abu 
Sha‘r never questioned the good intentions of the British. Instead, he reinforced the 
benevolent nature and intentions of the British by asking the question: “What is the 
meaning of the Mandate except to train for self-government not colonialism or slavery? 
We are not asking for anything contrary to the main British interest and its international 
obligations in our country.” These comments further reinforced that the members of the 
Legislative Council were well versed in political and diplomatic negotiations. Abu Sha‘r 
knew what principles and ideals the British lauded, and only asked that they be consistent 
in their treatment of Transjordan.477 
 Despite their reservations, most members of the Council understood the need for 
some form of treaty. Mohammed Bey al-Unsi (Muslim from Balqa, former chief of the 
Royal Diwan) and ‘Ala’ al-Din Tuqan (Muslim notable of Salt, originally from Nablus) 
acknowledged that the future of the nation depended on the ratification of a treaty to give 
the country legality. However, such a treaty would only be acceptable if three conditions 
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were satisfied: the ability to send ambassadors and consuls to other countries, the ability 
to raise an army and declare war, and the right to negotiate and conclude treaties 
independently. They cited Articles 10 and 11 and argued “[t]hat the army is the true 
appearance of independence” and the only way to protect the dignity of the nation. Al-
Unsi was adamant that this was a reasonable request. If these three limitations were left 
unresolved, it amounted to a near complete loss of sovereignty to the British. 
Furthermore, the representatives saw the 1928 Agreement stipulations as particularly 
egregious because they were not applied to Palestine, Iraq, or Syria. 478 However, despite 
these limitations, neither al-Unsi nor Tuqan advocated the outright rejection of the 
treaty.479 
 Only Shams al-Din Sami (Christian from Balqa) rejected the idea that 
Transjordan needed the agreement at all. “The acceptance of this agreement won’t 
change any current position of us. Of course, it is said to us that acceptance of this 
agreement would render our temporary constitutional government a permanent one, but 
where is that constitutional government and, what is the meaning of constitution if we 
accepted this agreement that would otherwise dispossess us of the right of life.”480 Shams 
al-Din completely dismissed the idea that the Transjordanian government needed the 
1928 Agreement to validate, legalize, or perpetuate its existence. He saw the Agreement 
as nothing more there a litany of abuses against the Transjordanian people.  
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‘Audah al-Qusus (Christian from Karak) was the only elected member of the 
Legislative Council who advocated for the 1928 Agreement’s ratification. Representative 
al-Qusus understood the goal of independence in broader terms. He, like the ex-officio 
members of the Executive Council, argued that the Agreement was necessary to establish 
the Council as a legal administrative body.481 “Either we take in our hands the right of 
free action in our resources or otherwise surrender to the mandated government to 
enforce the mandate act literally and then no one of us will be able to raise his head and 
ask about what is going on.”482  In essence, al-Qusus reminded the Council that 
Transjordan could not afford the risk of rejecting the 1928 Agreement.  
The opposition covered a wide spectrum of opinions from minimal changes to 
complete rejection. None of the representatives blindly followed a singular ideology. 
Council members were informed individuals who advocated for themselves 
pragmatically to ensure that their rights and authority would be preserved. These men 
needed to protect their own authority in their patrimonial networks in their home regions. 
These varied approaches reject the binary competition described by historian Maan Abu 
Nowar as “the opposition” against “the government” which acted out British interests 
indiscriminately.483 It becomes clearer that the competition for lasting influence and 
power within Transjordan was not only a competition between foreign and national 
interests, but of diverging local interests of domestic actors. These sessions represent 
competition amongst Arabs and Circassians, between northern and southern tribesmen, 
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between native Transjordanians and Arab Palestinians. This was no simple rhetorical 
clash.   
 Finally, during the eighteenth session of the first Legislative Council, the 
representatives took action. Najib al-Shraidah (Christian from Madaba) presented a 
motion signed by fourteen members of the Legislative Council 484 that demanded the 
amendment of Articles 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14 and 16. Every member of the Council 
except for the two Bedouin representatives signed the motion. It is odd that the Bedouin 
members, both of whom signed the National Pact, did not sign the motion for 
amendment. Perhaps, since the Amir played a more direct role in the selection of the 
Bedouin representatives, Mithqal al-Fayiz and Hamd ibn Jazi were afraid to vocally and 
openly oppose the will of Abdullah.485 In the following session Tawfiq Abu al-Huda read 
both a letter he had written to British Resident Cox and Cox’s reply. In the letter to Cox, 
Tawfiq Abu al-Huda had sent a copy of the petition signed by the fourteen members of 
the Council and had asked for a date to negotiate the 1928 Agreement’s terms. Cox 
replied stating that the Legislative Council has had sufficient time to study the Agreement 
and that it was now necessary for the representatives to “take their decision without 
delay.” After reading the British Resident’s reply Tawfiq Abu al-Huda warned the 
representatives that this response was dangerous and that inaction would weaken the 
Council. Sa’id al-Mufti (Circassian from Amman, signer of the National Pact) referred to 
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British Resident Cox’s veiled threat as if a “bomb [were] thrown into the council” and 
demanded the representatives have time to consider their options.486  
The next day opened with the Speaker reading a motion signed by fifteen 
members, including the five ex-officio members, where they decided to ratify the 1928 
Agreement. Sa‘id al-Mufti (Circassian from Amman), Shams al-Din Sami (Christian 
from Balqa), Najib Abu Sha‘r (Christian from Husn in ‘Ajlun), Bakhit al-Ibrahim 
(Christian from Salt who lived in Amman), Najib al-Shraidah (Muslim from Madaba in 
‘Ajlun), and Mithqal al-Fayiz (Sheikh of the Bani Sakhr, northern Bedouin 
representative) did not sign the petition. Although Cox’s letter never concretely 
threatened to dissolve the Council, the members understood his message. Rather than risk 
the stability and the integrity of the Council itself, the representatives had decided to pass 
the Agreement. In essence, they decided to live to fight another day.487 The Amir 
formally ratified the Agreement on June 29, 1929, and then closed the first sessions of the 
First Legislative Council the next day.488  
 
Ratification Aftermath: Questions of Status and the Coalescence of State 
In the end, the 1928 Agreement ratification in Transjordan unfolded in a very 
similar fashion to the passage and ratification of the 1922 Agreement in Iraq. The Iraqi 
Constituent Assembly began its session in March 1924, and immediately began to 
criticize the treaty. Similar to British Resident Cox in Transjordan, the High 
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Commissioner of Iraq Sir Henry Dobbs issued an ultimatum stating that if the treaty was 
not ratified by June that the British would seek alternative means to fulfill its Mandate in 
Iraq. The Constituent Assembly caved and the treaty narrowly passed.489 In both cases, 
domestic elites on the constituent assemblies unsuccessfully attempted to assert their own 
authority. The British humbled the elected representatives in both instances. In many 
ways, Great Britain followed the same model for the creation of Transjordan’s state 
machinery as it did for Iraq, just at a slower pace. 490  In both Iraq and Transjordan, the 
British worked to close the political space opened by the Anglo-Hashemite Agreement 
ratification proceedings. For elites in Iraq and Transjordan, the issue of status and the 
protection of status was tightly interwoven with political standing and authority.  
Evidence of the importance of status lies in the Legislative Council minutes 
themselves. The representatives’ focus on both the language of the Internal Regulation 
and the issue of immunity were in essence both arguments over status. These debates 
involved all members of the Council and superseded any political beliefs or doctrine. For 
members of the Council, protecting their position was of the utmost importance. The 
consideration of a new sanitation law, oddly enough, is a perfect encapsulation of the 
values and rights at stake in the 1928 Agreement debate. At its core, the treaty 
consideration and the sanitation law boiled down to the same things: elite privilege, 
control, and status; simply put, questions of who exercised true sovereignty in 
Transjordan.  
The source of the contention in the sanitation law was a communiqué issued to 
speed up the prosecution of health violations in Transjordan. The Department of Public 
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Health issued a general appeal to clarify the issue of public health violations. The 
sanitation law stated that individuals were responsible for the removal of “dirt, waste, and 
health risks” from their property within a specified period. If he/she failed to remove the 
waste, an action would be filed against the offender. The general appeal attached to the 
law maintained that it was unnecessary for magistrate judges to independently investigate 
these claims and that they should “rely on the testimony of health inspectors unless they 
have reason to believe otherwise.” Further investigation by the magistrate judge was 
superfluous because they could only determine if the dirt was removed, not if it was 
removed within the specific period required by the sanitation law.491   
On its surface, the law seemed straightforward: if you do not clean up your waste, 
you will be prosecuted. The aspect of the law that drew the ire of many of the Legislative 
Council members was who would determine the violations and scope of the punishment. 
A municipal employee, generally a health inspector, would bring the charges. ‘Audah al-
Qusus, the lone Council representative who argued in favor of the 1928 Agreement’s 
ratification, was horrified by this because “in this case the municipal employee is an 
individual, and I may say ‘minor’ individual, their discretion will not be sufficient to the 
Court, he/she (the violator) may be from the elite and this is not commensurate with 
justice and is not compatible with the soul of law.” In essence, it is unthinkable to have a 
“minor” individual determine punishments for a member of the elite. For al-Qusus, “to 
leave the matter for the discretion of a minor employee like this, so that his testimony is 
considered sufficient to suit people and insult some of them is not commensurate with 
                                                 





justice and is not compatible with the soul of law.”492 Here it is clear that the problem 
with the law is not the concept of proper sanitation practices, but who exercised authority. 
The idea that a mere civil servant’s authority might trump that of a member of the 
established elite was unconscionable. The Council’s fear about this minor sanitation law 
was the personification of their fear over being replaceable. Mohammad Bey al-Unsi 
(Muslim from Balqa) was similarly concerned and believed that a doctor, not a municipal 
official, should determine the culpability of the accused. Both al-Qusus and al-Unsi were 
threatened by the idea that a new municipal official could hold sway over a member of 
the established elite. British Resident Cox shared this low opinion of municipal officials 
and wrote in the 1929 first quarter report that “[i]n general administrative officers are 
weak and careless in the management of Municipal affairs and the councils themselves 
are dishonest.”493   
This spat over a seemingly minor sanitation law during the 1928 Agreement 
ratification debate illustrates how threatened the established elites were by the creation of 
new government elites. Municipal officials, amongst others, were the personification of a 
clear threat to the established elites’ monopoly over authority and privilege. Although the 
1928 Agreement debate was not framed as a competition between new and old elites, this 
theme was clearly present in the proceedings. It is telling that the debate over the 
sanitation law included members of both the opposition and the pro-ratification camps. 
This fight over authority and respect was by no means limited to the pro-agreement 
camp. Instead, these perceived rights were critical to everyone on the Legislative Council 
because they were all established elites. The sanitation law debate was analogous to the 
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devil’s bargain evident in the 1928 Agreement ratification. The ratification of the 
Agreement or acquiescence to the sanitation law would simultaneously solidify elite 
position while diminishing its influence and independence. This sanitation law 
symbolizes the threat to their autonomy and influence. The conclusion of the 1928 
Agreement deliberations represented the efforts of the opposition to safeguard their place 
in the Mandate’s social and political infrastructure.  
 The formal ratification of the 1928 Agreement by His British Majesty (H.B.M.) 
took place on October 4, 1929, and it was exchanged with the Amir on October 31, 1929. 
It should be noted that the opposition did not immediately disappear in the wake of the 
Agreement’s ratification. On the contrary, the president of the National Congress Hussein 
al-Tarawnah wrote a personal letter to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates 
Commission asserting that the 1928 Agreement amounted to “the nightmare of arbitrary 
colonization and military occupation of our weak country.”494 Nineteen inhabitants of 
Karak petitioned the Mandatory government about the leadership of Transjordan. The 
Karak inhabitants criticized the government about lack of Transjordanians by birth in 
government positions, “The national element is thus entirely excluded from the direction 
of these departments [in reference to Departments of finance, justice, chief minister, 
British Resident].” 495 This petition attacked both British control and foreign Arab control 
of the Transjordanian government. 
Although there was never a large number of British officials in Transjordan 
during the Mandate, their strong hold on the true positions of power and influence such as 
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British Resident, Financial Adviser, Judicial Adviser, and Commander of the Arab 
Legion, angered the local population because it deprived them of these esteemed 
positions of influence as new elites. Patrimonial networks and allegiances do not work in 
a system filled with outsiders. This criticism also demonstrated a shift in the goals of the 
opposition. It was critical that Transjordanian elites hold positions in the Anglo-
Hashemite government to protect their status in Transjordan. After the ratification of the 
1928 Agreement, it became more important to be a part of the Anglo-Hashemite state, 
rather than simply disparage it from the outside. In time, the number of British and Arab 
Palestinian government officials would decrease and more Transjordanians became 
government bureaucrats.496  
 Shortly after the conclusion of the 1928 Agreement ratification battle, the Wailing 
Wall riots broke out in Palestine. The British expected a great deal of related unrest to 
occur in Transjordan, but little actual protest occurred. The British explained this 
“surprising moderation” as being the result of the “proper attitude taken up by His 
Highness the Amir and the TJ government, all possible influence both personal and 
official being exerted to prevent any participation by Trans-Jordanians in the disorders… 
any disloyalty would have resulted in serious embarrassment to the British authorities is a 
justification of the large degree of Self government given to the country.”497 This 
moderation of Transjordanian officials was indicative of the approach that the Amir and 
the Executive Council took during the ratification process. It was better, in their eyes, to 
work within the system than to challenge it and possibly lose their positions of influence 
and power. However, the opposition seized this opportunity to further frustrate British 
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designs in both Palestine and Transjordan. “It is worthy of note that the leaders of that 
party which opposed the conclusion of the Agreement … were loudest in their demands 
that active support should be given to the Arabs in the recent disorders in Palestine and 
now declare that it is wrong to discriminate [against] Arabs from whatever country they 
come.”498 Again, the opposition did not simply fade away. However, they did have to 
change their tactics.  
 The opposition continued their resistance towards the 1928 Agreement and the 
new political status quo in Transjordan. The British blamed these “propagandists” for 
circulating falsehoods and fomenting unrest. “In a place like Transjordan where the mass 
of people are exceedingly ignorant that propagandists have practically full liberty of 
action in this respect; and amongst the tales they told were a number calculated to 
evaporate the people’s confidence in the English.” The propagandists included former 
members of the government including “a number of notables who had lost their power in 
proportion as law and order were established.”499 Even after the completion of the 1928 
Agreement ratification, opposition figures still struggled to protect a degree of their 
former autonomy and authority. These notables had lost power in proportion to the 
centralization efforts of the new government in Amman.500 This push and pull, the 
competing efforts of consolidation and decentralization, would define the events of the 
first Legislative Council.  
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By 1929, Amman had become both the seat of the Anglo-Hashemite state and the 
center of all political intrigue in Transjordan. British Resident Cox described Amman as 
“the centre of all politics, in close touch with Palestine and Syria. The feeling against the 
Zionists is very bitter. There would scarcely be any serious trouble in Transjordan, which 
was not organized, and ordered from Amman.” Cox listed Legislative Council member 
Shams al-Din Sami as one of the individuals most interested in “fomenting political 
trouble.” Najib Abu Sha’r and Taher al-Joqqa both presented their cases against the 1928 
Agreement’s terms to Captain Gordon Canning and argued for the need of Arab unity. 
Calls for Arab unity and solidary with Palestine would reappear frequently in future 
Legislative Council critiques of the government and the Amir.501  (Appendix 1, figure 4-3 
photo of opening of first regular session of First Legislative Council in 1929) 
 
Conclusion 
 The 1928 Agreement ratification battle illustrates the nuanced power dynamics of 
Transjordan in the late 1920s. The levels of power and political intrigue transcended any 
one group or region. At the onset, there was internal commotion in Abdullah’s Cabinet 
with the Amir pushing for the Agreement’s acceptance while others, most notably ‘Aref 
al-‘Aref, advised caution and reconsideration. The publication of the Agreement 
warranted opposition from the National Congress and other regional elites. Eventually, 
numerous opposition figures were elected to the first Legislative Council. However, the 
proceedings of the Legislative Council show that the political clash was far more than 
simply “us” vs. “them.” It was a competition for power, influence, and authority between 
                                                 





the new and old elites of Transjordan. Every member of the Legislative Council 
attempted to protect his own privileged status in Transjordan. The 1928 Agreement’s 
ratification marked a shift away from tribal hegemony in favor of centralized state 
control. This contest was particularly acute because of Amman’s recent reestablishment 
and its growing political gravity in Transjordan.  The characteristics of Transjordanian 
and Iraqi political development mirrored one another, demonstrating clear similarities in 
British approaches across their Hashemite Mandates. The usage of elite coercion and 
military repression shaped the early stages of both Mandates.   
Despite the defeat of the Council in the ratification debate, the opposition would 
continue to hamstring the efforts of the Amir and the British for years to come. The 
shadow of the opposition was even felt during the formal celebration of the Agreement’s 
ratification on November 5, 1929, when “some 200 riff raff and children paraded the 
town with flags and shouts against the Balfour Declaration.”502 These demonstrations 
were indicative of the continuing efforts of the opposition, and of notables whose 
authority and influence were being trivialized, to continue fighting. The opposition 
existed in the political space opened by the British when they stipulated that the 
Legislative Council must ratify the 1928 Agreement. For the remainder of the Mandate, 
the Anglo-Hashemite government attempted to close this political space while the 
opposition struggled to keep it open. The efforts of the opposition would be sustained 
through the first ordinary session of the Legislative Council until they reached a breaking 
point in the budgetary battle of 1931.  This political tug-of-war continued throughout the 
Mandate, with the Council members giving up more ground with every passing year and 
                                                 





every subsequent Council. Despite their diminished stature, the representatives of the 
Legislative Council continued to protect their own personal interests. Over time, the 











5: Elite Manipulation in the Legislative Council: The Creation of a 
Hashemite Versailles 
 
“The existence of an assembly forms a useful safety valve for public opinion. The fact 
that bills must be debated in public before becoming law, causes the government to study 
public opinion before drawing up new legislation. Finally, membership of the Legislative 
Assembly has educative value, enabling a number of leading citizens to see something of 
[the] working of the government.”  
–Commander of the Arab Legion Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb in 
1943503 
 
By the end of 1929, Transjordan had been under British control for nearly a 
decade. Although this decade of centralized state control did not completely replace the 
existing tribalized elite structure of Transjordan, it had begun to minimize its impact. The 
days of the “chieftaincy” as Yoav Alon refers to it, were numbered.504 The passage of the 
Internal Regulations of the Legislative Council and the subsequent ratification of the 
1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement had curtailed the authority of the Legislative 
Council. However, the newly created Legislative Council was still a largely unknown 
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quantity. The Council fought and lost the right to amend the 1928 Agreement, but the 
Mandatory government did not know how they would respond to future legislation. The 
Executive Council and British Resident Cox had dictated the terms of the Agreement and 
seen to its ratification. The forced ratification of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian 
Agreement was a step towards the closing of the political space that had been opened 
with the election of the first Council and the treaty deliberations. Over the subsequent 
years of the Mandate, the Mandatory government continued efforts to close this political 
space while the members of the Legislative Council struggled to keep it open. Despite 
their collective defeat in the Legislative Council, the members of the opposition had not 
given up. Throughout the duration of the First Legislative Council, the representatives 
continued to strive for more autonomy by criticizing the British and the government. This 
competition for political influence and authority reached a boiling point during the 1930-
1931 budget hearings in the winter of 1931.  
In the wake of the dismissal of the First Legislative Council in February 1931, the 
powers of the Council waned. The Second Legislative Council had a vastly different 
membership and relationship with the government. The looming threat of dissolution 
curtailed the extent to which the Council could openly oppose any piece of legislation. 
Instead, the strategy of non-cooperation became the weapon of the representatives. The 
Council’s reluctant passage of the 1932 Land Tax Law only occurred because of the 
extreme pressure put on the representatives by the Executive Council and the British. The 
Legislative Council did not immediately become a rubber stamp for any Government 






However, with each subsequent Council, the sway and combativeness of the 
Legislative Council diminished. The Council did manage to block some legislation, such 
as the Water Rights Acts in the late 1930s, but over time, the focus on the government 
and the representatives of the Legislative Council changed. As the power of the central 
government became more tangible the strength and visibility of opposition forces faded. 
The political space that was created in 1928 for the ratification of the Agreement was 
rapidly closing. With the amendment of the 1928 Agreement in 1934, additional dissident 
voices disappeared. The centralizing infrastructure of Amman began to condition and 
discipline the elites of the Council. Through various punishments and edicts, the number 
of viable political options for the elites of Transjordan dwindled. The lure of prestige, 
government positions, and financial incentives slowly muted the strength of oppositional 
voices. The city of Amman functioned as a complete “Versailles” were elites negotiated 
with a central government entity to ensure their continued importance. The importance of 
patrimonial networks and securing positions for themselves and their clients trumped 
fleeting disagreements over legislative procedure.  Consequently, it became more 
important for Transjordanian elites to be a part of the Council than vocally oppose the 
government. The prize became the Council seats themselves, as opposed to any actual 
legislative authority exercised by the elected representatives. By the end of the Mandate, 
the political machinery of the centralized Transjordanian state absorbed formerly 
autonomous elites. Largely through the Legislative Council, Amman had been 
transformed into a Hashemite Versailles. The political space of the capital reinforced the 
necessity of compromise on both the side of the government and Transjordan’s elites. 





conditioned the elites of Transjordan to accept its existence. Elite status and visibility had 
completely replaced any functional ability to legislate. By the end of the Mandate, 
Amman’s gilded cage both constrained and supported the elites within. The cage of 
Amman simultaneously limited elite influence and power, while protecting and reifying 
their muted authority as Transjordanian officials. The physical space of Amman became 
the stage upon which this performance of prestige and power continually repeated itself 
while constantly incorporating new actors.  
 
Fracturing Opposition and non-Transjordanians in Government 
In the wake of the 1928 Agreement’s ratification, the representatives of the 
Legislative Council became more fixated on government administration. In particular, 
there was an increased aversion to non-Transjordanians taking government positions. 
Transjordanian identity during the Mandate was a legal definition. The Transjordan 
Nationality Law classified anyone who had “lived habitually” for a period of twelve 
months in Transjordan prior to August 6, 1924 as “sons of the country.” This definition 
applied to all sectarian and demographic groups of the Mandate. A Muslim Arab 
Transjordanian did not possess more authority or legitimacy than his Circassian or Arab 
Christian compatriots did.505 The ratification of the 1928 Agreement cemented the rules 
of the game by which the Council members had to abide. After the game’s codification, 
the Legislative Council members did not want the deck stacked against them. British 
officials and Arab Palestinians, over whom the representatives held no sway, occupied 
numerous positions in the Mandate during this period. At the time, British officials held 
                                                 





the posts of: Financial Adviser, Judicial Adviser, Director of Customs, Director of Lands 
and Surveys, Inspector of Surveys, Commandant of Arab Legion, second-in-command of 
Arab legion, Inspector of Motor Vehicles, Inspector of Antiquities, government 
bacteriologist, and Chief Accountant of Arab legion. The majority of the British officials 
were officials from the Palestinian Mandate who had been “seconded” to the 
Transjordanian government. Arab Palestinians held the posts of Director of health, 
Director of Public Works, Chief Accountant, stores officer, Postmaster of Amman, and 
sanitary sub-inspector. The government claimed that non-Transjordanians held these 
posts due to a lack of trained Transjordanian personnel. Members of the Council rejected 
this response and agitated to increase the Transjordanian presence in government 
positions.  
The first target of the Legislative Council was the Executive Council because it 
included two non-Transjordanians, Palestinian officials Husam Jar Allah and Halim Abu 
Rahmah. Technically, it was illegal, according to the Organic Law, for non-
Transjordanians to hold Executive Council or Legislative Council positions. According to 
Maan Abu Nowar, “it was the ambition of every educated sheikh or notable to take part 
in the government of his country” and their membership robbed Transjordanians of this 
possibility.506 This statement overplays the amount of patriotic sentiment that any of the 
members of the government held while minimizing the importance of the salary and 
prestige that accompanied these government posts. Bowing to Legislative Council 
agitation, Abdullah restructured the Cabinet in October of 1929, replacing half of its 
membership with three elected representatives. ‘Audah al-Qusus (an Arab Christian from 
                                                 





Karak) and Sa’id al-Mufti (a Circassian from Amman) replaced the Palestinian officials 
(Husam Jar Allah and Halim Abu Rahmah). Representative ‘Ala’ al-Din Tuqan (an Arab 
Muslim from the Balqa) resigned from the Council so that he could become the new 
Minister of Antiquities. A special election to replace ‘Ala’ al-Din Tuqan on October 17, 
1929, elected Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi, a naturalized Transjordanian of Palestinian origin and 
a member of the opposition (Free Moderate Party).507 Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda and 
Tawfiq Abu al-Huda retained their posts, while Ibrahim Hashim (formerly Treasurer) 
became the Minister of Justice.   
The creation of the new government was the first step towards the mollification of 
the opposition through the manipulation of elite loyalty. This change in the Cabinet 
simultaneously accomplished a number of desirable outcomes for the British and the 
Amir. One, because the two new officials did not yet have ministerial posts, they were 
cheaper than their predecessors had been.508 Second, the opposition could no longer 
criticize the Executive Council for excluding “sons of the country” from its membership. 
Third, the British were able to tighten their financial control over Transjordan by not 
appointing a treasurer to the Executive Council. This temporally gave the British more 
direct financial oversight but it did not give British Resident Cox unilateral control of 
salaries of the ministers as Abu Nowar asserts.509 The financial adviser and chief revenue 
officer absorbed the duties of the Treasurer because of a lack of suitable candidates 
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according to High Commissioner J.R. Chancellor.510 Finally, this shift in membership 
transformed three of the most outspoken members of the Legislative Council into loyal 
government officials. All three men suddenly found themselves part of the Anglo-
Hashemite state machinery they had previously opposed. Sa‘id al-Mufti had been part of 
the opposition (Hizb al-Sha‘b) while ‘Ala’ al-Din Tuqan and ‘Audah al-Qusus had 
always spoken their minds in the Council, especially in regards to the Internal 
Regulations and the importance of Council immunity. The salary, prestige, and security 
associated with these government posts overcame any lingering misgivings about the 
Mandatory government’s dealings with the Amir and the British. The Executive Council 
met in Abdullah’s Raghadan Palace further reinforcing his direct authority over these 
men. The physical space of the palace was used to awe members of the Transjordanian 
elite throughout the Mandate period. Although the Amir’s explicit powers were 
somewhat subdued by the British colonial presence, Abdullah continued to use to royal 
pomp and circumstance to reinforce his authority. All of these techniques helped the 
government recycle formerly troublesome elites. This rebranding of Transjordanian elites 
remained a popular technique utilized by the Mandatory government to silence critics for 
years to come.   
However, this shuffling of the Cabinet did not address the systemic problem of 
Transjordanians being under-represented in their own government. The Mandatory 
government finally responded to the law for the dismissal of non-Transjordanian 
employees in December 1930. The law had been passed nearly a year earlier in 
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December 1929. 511 Tawfiq Abu al-Huda announced that the committee organized to deal 
with this matter had invited the employees to Amman to meet with them individually. 
After meeting with the employees it was determined, that out of the forty considered, 
nine of them had proven their Transjordanian nationality. The directors of the 
departments deemed an additional ten employees vital to the function of the government 
due to a lack of suitable Transjordanian applicants. Council member Refifan al-Majali 
(Muslim from Karak, the al-Majalis was the leading family of Karak) questioned the 
purported dearth of qualified Transjordanians and asserted instead that the directors of the 
departments did not want to hire Transjordanians. Both he and Shams al-Din Sami 
(Circassian from the Balqa) concluded that the law did not actually benefit 
Transjordanians because the directors would not hire them either way.  Although both 
Najib Abu Sha‘r (Christian from ‘Ajlun) and Shams al-Din believed Arab unity was 
important, they could not vouch for a system that favored nepotism and favoritism over 
competency. Najib al-Shraidah (Muslim from Madaba in ‘Ajlun) continued the attack, 
stating that the intransigence of department heads to employ only non-Transjordanians 
advocated a variety of “Arabness [which] is damnable.” 512  By the end of the session 
representatives Najib al-Shraideh, Refifan al-Majali, Shams al-Din, Najib Abu Sha‘r, 
Attallah al-Suhaimat (Muslim from Karak), and Bakhit al-Ibrahim (Christian from Salt 
who lived in Amman) had all strongly condemned the government for its negligible 
hiring of Transjordanians.  
This debate surrounding non-Transjordanian preference for government posts was 
an example of the First Legislative Council acting independently and in opposition to the 
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general will of the Mandatory government. However, the continued focus on promoting 
“sons of the country” for employment had more to do with self-interest than any fledgling 
sense of nationalism or patriotism. 513  Instead, it is another sign of the Council’s fixation 
on status and prestige. Advocating for Transjordanians to hold government posts was a 
symptom of Council members wanting to obtain employment and position for their 
family members and tribesmen more than it was a nationalist antagonism against 
outsiders. Securing more government posts for Transjordanians increased the likelihood 
that the Council representatives would be able to protect their positions of power and 
autonomy in Transjordan through regional and tribal networks. Patronage networks do 
not work with strangers. Future Legislative Council sessions returned to the issue of non-
Transjordanian employment repeatedly, and, over time, the government did employ more 
native Transjordanians.  
The reshuffling of the Cabinet hardly appeased the wide-ranging demands of the 
opposition. By late 1929, the National Congress Party had become the dominant party of 
the opposition. The People’s Party (Hizb al-Sha’b), which had been the dominant 
opposition party, ceased to exist independently by 1930, since most of its members had 
joined the National Congress Party. The National Congress met a third time in Irbid on 
May 25, 1930. The third meeting of the National Congress Party signaled a shift in the 
Congress’ support of the Anglo-Hashemite state. It began to criticize the legality of the 
Legislative Council itself. The party was convinced that the Council was no longer an 
independent body and called for the formation of a true constitutional representative 
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government.514 The forced ratification of the 1928 Agreement had diminished the appeal 
of the Legislative Council for the opposition as a viable vehicle from which to change the 
Transjordan government. The conference also advocated the abolishment of extradition 
and expulsion laws, which the Amir and the government had begun to use to penalize the 
opposition and other individuals whom they deemed troublemakers.  
However, by 1930, the National Congress was not the only opposition party. The 
opposition had begun to splinter into competing parties largely due to personal 
competition. The fracturing of the opposition along lines of personal allegiance 
diminished its collective voice. After the ratification of the 1928 Agreement in 1929, 
individual rivalries curtailed the opposition’s ability to affect Government policy. Sheikh 
Refifan al-Majali of Karak, a rival of Karak native Husain al-Tarawnah, formed a new 
party, the Free Moderate Party (Hizb al-Hur al-Muatadil) on June 24, 1930. In addition 
to al-Majali, the new Free Moderate Party also included three other Legislative Council 
members: Sa‘id al-Mufti (Circassian from Amman), Mohammad al-Unsi (Muslim from 
the Balqa), and Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi (Muslim from the Balqa who replaced ‘Ala’ al-Din 
Tuqan when he became Minister of Antiquities). The party’s goals were vague and 
mundane. It failed to develop a clear party organization or propose a definitive list of 
programs or platforms.515 The Free Moderate Party, as well as other subsequent political 
parties, opposed the current government’s trajectory without truly offering a viable 
alternative. The party’s principles included remaining loyal to the Amir, loyal to the 
nation, and “[t]he spreading of the principles of nationalism, social and health, and 
educating the people on civil democratic politics.” The party quickly lost political 
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viability and popularity when Said al-Mufti left the party on June 25, 1930. Although 
diminished in stature, Refifan al-Majali, Mohammad al-Unsi, and Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi 
would remain vocal opponents of the government throughout the duration of the First 
Legislative Council.516 The National Congress Party remained the only opposition party 
that articulated a clear plan for the future of Transjordan and as a result was the most 
problematic for the Mandatory government. 
 
The 1930/31 Budget and the End of the First Legislative Council 
The problem of revising the 1930-31 budget dominated the remaining tenure of 
the First Legislative Council. The issue of the budget had become particularly acute as 
the economy of Transjordan floundered in the wake of the worldwide economic 
depression. A string of drought years, natural disasters, and regional political instability 
further compounded economic hardships. These factors hampered population and 
economic development from 1929-1936 in Transjordan.517 The depressed economy 
particularly hurt the nomadic population, which was experiencing severe famine in the 
early 1930s.518 A gradual reduction in grant-in-aid during this period further compounded 
the budgetary hardships of Transjordan.519 This budget economy was a result of the 
diminished financial capabilities of the British government, which was also coping with 
the worldwide economic depression. The Colonial Office, not the British Resident, 
determined the reduction in aid. Although British Resident Cox did exert some control 
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over the budget, he did so at the behest of the High Commissioner and His Majesty’s 
Government. He was not a rogue officer unilaterally impoverishing the Transjordanian 
people as Maan Abu Nowar repeatedly asserts in his “Gratuitous Interference” chapter of 
The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939. This economic backdrop informed the 
heated debate over the 1930-31 budget throughout the winter of 1930-31. 
The government introduced the original 1930-31 budget into the Legislative 
Council on March 9, 1930. Although there was a fair amount of debate over the budget, it 
passed with some Council revisions on April 27, 1930. The introduction of a special 
temporary budget law for 1930-31 during the eleventh meeting of the Council on 
November 29, 1930 sent the Council into a fury. The new budget proposal changed a 
number of budget lines and added LP 4,700 for the creation of Glubb’s Desert Patrol 
Force.520 The substantial budget allocations towards the armed forces were exceedingly 
unpopular in the Legislative Council.521 Glubb Pasha maintained that the only way to 
improve the financial standing of the nomadic population was to curtail raiding by the 
Saudi Ikhwan in the south.522 The revised budget acted as symbol for the Council 
representatives. Its actual revised provisions were immaterial. The Legislative Council 
was never as vocal or as unified in its opposition to the government as it was in the 
discussion of the 1930-31 budget revisions.523 
Council members drew a line in the sand over the budget issue. This was the 
moment to stand united against the will of the Mandatory government. The forced 
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ratification of the 1928 Agreement may have weakened the powers of the Legislative 
Council but it had not silenced it. Vocal opposition leader Shams al-Din saw the approval 
of the revised budget as unacceptable. Its passage would “degrade the dignity of the 
nation.” He did not oppose the right of His Majesty’s Government to express an opinion 
on the budget “but this does not mean that it is necessary to act as he (HBM) pleases.” 
Furthermore, he questioned the value of local government, or the Legislative Council, if 
the British were going to intervene so constantly into Transjordanian affairs. Despite the 
British subsidy, the Council could not have its job confined “to the signing and 
ratification of everything it (HMG) displays.” Overall, Shams al-Din saw the 1930-31 
budget as a historic moment in the Council’s history. They could either violate the nation 
by accepting the treaty or “prove themselves’ heroes and refuse to consider the budget… 
[We] must stick to the decision of the previous council.”524 The gauntlet had been thrown 
down to his fellow representatives. They must stand up for themselves and their right to 
legal and administrative autonomy or become subservient to the whims of the British. 
New Legislative Council member Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi agreed with Shams al-Din 
that the Council could not tolerate the interference of the British in the regular 
administration of Transjordan. Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi invoked the gravity of the situation, 
reminding his fellow representatives that their “children and grandchildren” will 
remember this moment and that their actions “will go down in history.” He criticized the 
Colonial Office for its interference in Transjordanian budget affairs,525 which violated the 
natural rights granted in the 1928 Agreement. Thereafter Council order eroded as the 
session became a shouting match between two Muslim representatives from the ‘Ajlun, 
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Najib Abu Sha‘r and Najib al-Shraidah, who refused to acknowledge the rights of the 
others to speak or have an opinion. This bedlam forced the Council president, Hassan 
Khalid Abu al-Huda, to suspend the Council until the next session.526   
Given the lack of order that characterized the last session, the Prime Minister 
opened the thirty-first session of the First Legislative Council, imploring the 
representatives to think with not only their emotions and assuring everyone that all 
opinions would be heard. However, the Council was not placated. Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi 
spoke for the Council as a whole when he said that they would rather sacrifice their seats 
than relinquish their right to make up the budget to the Colonial Office even “if it leads to 
the dissolution of the Assembly.” After such a declaration, Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda 
could do nothing. He begrudgingly acknowledged that the Council agreed with the 
proposal to oppose any change to the 1930-31 budget and thereafter dismissed the 
Council.527 This final act of defiance by the Legislative Council members was a 
challenge to the Mandatory state. It was not clear if the government could afford to 
dismiss the representatives without destabilizing Transjordan. In response, the Amir 
issued an official Iradah (executive order) dissolving the First Legislative Council on 
February 9, 1931, citing a lack of cooperation between the two branches of the 
government.528 
The formal disbanding of the First Legislative Council ended the most vocal and 
outspoken period for the opposition, and the Legislative Council in general. The Amir 
had called the Council’s bluff. The dismissal of the First Legislative Council coincided 
with the mitigation of the opposition outside the Council. Leading members of the 
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National Congress Party left the opposition and were incorporated into the government. 
For example, Hashem Khayr, the one-time vice president of the party, resigned and 
helped form the pro-government Moderate Liberal Party in June 1930. Taher al-Joqqa, 
who was the General Secretary of the National Congress Party, was appointed Mayor of 
Amman in June 1931.529 Both men had appeared on a list of troublemakers drafted by 
British Resident Cox in November 1929.530 Once again, the government had transformed 
former opponents into allies. This game of privileged musical chairs proved that 
members of the opposition began to understand their true political position. Council 
members were expendable. Many men chose to protect their own personal position at the 
expense of a unified oppositional stance towards the Anglo-Hashemite government. 
 However, the First Legislative Council’s dissolution did not completely silence 
criticism of the government or the British. Similar to the opposition’s defeat with the 
ratification of the 1928 Agreement, the opposition had to regroup, and again change its 
explicit focus. Despite these changes, at its core, the opposition always fought for more 
autonomy and a greater degree of administrative and legal control. A degree of political 
influence was the only means by which the Council members had to protect their own 
personal interests and patrimonial standings. Status, and the protection of personal rights, 
remained of the utmost importance. Without a sense of independence from the 
government, the representatives became less significant and more disposable. Although 
the budget would remain a thorny issue for years to come, it was never opposed as it was 
in 1931. The looming threat of dismissal checked the aggressiveness of future Legislative 
Councils. The Anglo-Hashemite government had called the representatives’ bluff. The 
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rules of political participation in Transjordan changed once again and the members of the 
Legislative Council continued to cede power, autonomy, and authority to the centralizing 
Mandatory government. Future Councils now had one fewer card to play if they hoped to 
stay in the game.  
 
A New Legislative Council and the Land Tax Law 
In the wake of the Council’s dismissal, Prime Minister Hassan Khalid Abu al-
Huda resigned and was replaced on February 21, 1931, with Sheikh Abdullah Saraj.531 
New elections took place for the Legislative Council on June 1, 1931. Despite the 
dissolution of the first Legislative Council, Council seats were strongly contested in the 
1931 elections. For example, in Karak, there were numerous petitions from Abdullah al-
Akashah arguing that he should have been elected instead of Mitri al-Zereikat for Karak’s 
Christian seat. In each district, representative seats were allocated along sectarian and 
ethnic lines for Arab Muslims, Arab Christians, and Circassians. Abdullah al-Akashah 
contended that there were ripped up ballots that had his name on them that would have 
secured him the Council seat in the round of secondary elections. Akashah’s chief 
complaint was that secondary electors had written down too many Muslim candidates on 
their Council ballots. There was secondary elector confusion when some electors wrote 
four Muslims as their top four choices for Legislative Council membership instead of the 
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prescribed three Muslims and one Christian seats allocated to Karak.532 Although the 
High Commissioner saw no reason to intervene, he did acknowledge that voting 
regulations should be clarified so that no ballot could have more than the maximum 
number of Muslim or Christian representatives listed for their respective districts.533 This 
anecdote illustrates the two simultaneous paradoxical trends in the Legislative Council. 
With each subsequent election, the Council seats became more coveted and desirable. 
The meaning and status imbued from being an elected member of the Legislative Council 
continued to increase as the actual legislative might of the Council progressively waned 
throughout the Mandate. This does not mean that the Second Council was completely 
powerless. However, the importance of status began to trump political efficacy. The 
personal prestige and power afforded from a Council seat became more important than 
any actual ability to dictate widespread change. Securing a Council seat reinforced the 
authority, privilege, and status of both the individual elected and his patrimonial network. 
These political and social benefits were more important than the actual salary paid to the 
Council members, which did not increase during the Mandate period. The gradual 
reduction in political authority and autonomy made the Second Legislative Council less 
outwardly hostile to the Mandatory government than its predecessors.  
The membership of the Legislative Council changed dramatically from the 
previous Council. Only four members of the Legislative Council were reelected 
(Circassian Sa‘id al-Mufti from Amman, two Muslims Sheikhs from Karak, Refifan al-
Majali and Salih al-Auran, and the southern Bedouin representative Hamd ibn Jazi,). No 
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members of the opposition who had directly opposed the 1928 Agreement’s ratification 
were reelected.534 Although some of these individuals, most notably Shams al-Din Sami, 
would remain outspoken government opponents, inciting opposition against the British 
and the Amir both inside and outside of Transjordan, they never regained a position of 
prominence in the Mandate period.535 This is not to say that there were no dissident 
voices in the second Legislative Council. The National Congress Party did not boycott 
the elections as it had the first time in 1929. Three National Congress members were 
elected: Hussein al-Tarawnah (the leader of the National Congress and an Arab Muslim 
from Karak), Qasim al-Hindawi (Arab Muslim from ‘Ajlun), and Adil al-Azmah (Arab 
Muslim from Balqa). The Second Legislative Council would remain a semi-autonomous 
body throughout its tenure (1931-1934). Although it lacked the flash and outward 
bravado of the First Council, the members of the Second Legislative Council still actively 
contested Government policies. The Council was not “docile.” They were not mere 
pushovers as Betty Anderson and Naseer Aruri both have argued.536 
Although the Second Legislative Council was not as directly adversarial as their 
predecessors were, that does not mean that its members simply acquiesced to every whim 
of the government. On the contrary, the newest tactic adopted by the opposition forces 
within the Legislative Council was one of delay and non-cooperation. The Second 
Legislative Council would remain a substantive group throughout its duration. Despite 
the fact that recognized members of the opposition only held three seats, the Council as a 
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whole continued to question the directives and initiatives of the government and the 
British.537  
For example, the 1932-33 budget deliberations were more productive for the 
Legislative Council than the 1930-31 rendition. The government wanted to avoid 
previous levels of Council intransigence in relation to budget appropriations. These 
discussions took place against the backdrop of the worsening economic situation in 
Transjordan. Sa‘id al-Mufti, who had been a member of the previous Executive Council 
and Legislative Council, submitted a proposal for agrarian aid, signed by eleven other 
representatives, to alleviate the economic situation in Transjordan.538 The government 
responded with emergency loans from the Agricultural Bank and tax exemptions. 
Thereafter, there was some debate of the 1932-33 budget but it passed with little cajoling 
on September 17, 1932. The government’s administration of emergency agricultural 
loans was a win for the Council members. They managed to change government financial 
and agricultural policy. However, these loans were not solely the result of Council 
agitation. The British were acutely aware of the worsening economic situation, which 
was well documented in their records. 539  
Unlike previous Legislative Council sessions, the Second Legislative Council’s 
biggest issue was not the budget or treaty negotiations. Instead, the issue of land taxation 
and land reform became the central disputes of the day. The implementation of land 
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registration and land reform were central to making Transjordan self-sufficient in the 
eyes of the British. The British believed that a bundle of laws with efficient revenue-
generating potential (a land tax law, income tax law, trade licenses law, and death duties 
law) would balance the Transjordan budget.540 Regularized and increased taxation figures 
would decrease the need for the British subsidy and allow the country to develop utilizing 
only domestic funds. Land registration took place from 1929 to 1952. The majority of 
Land Settlement funding came through Colonial Development Fund (CDF) grants as 
discussed in chapter three.  
However, land registration would be irrelevant without a revised taxation system. 
The new system would replace the Ottoman system (which combined virgu and ‘ushr 
taxes at roughly twelve percent of annual land production) to a flat rate of six percent of 
annual gross yield of the land for each hawd (subunit of land within a village).541 British 
Resident Cox estimated that the new land tax would increase tax revenue in 1932 by an 
estimated LP 12,000 to LP 15,000.542 Representatives were not nearly as understanding 
about the new proposed legislation as British Resident Cox had hoped. The new tax code 
would change their personal tax liabilities. The new taxation system would affect 
Transjordan unevenly due to shifts in agricultural production since the Ottoman period.  
The redistribution of tax liabilities made interest and opposition to the new Land 
Tax law a regionally organized issue. Although there was a universal rate, preexisting tax 
law meant the effect of the new law was highly uneven. Irbid, for example, would receive 
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a tax reduction with the new law.  The ‘Ajlun, which included Irbid, was the largest 
agricultural producer and most densely populated region of Transjordan. This region had 
incurred a heavy tax burden because of its agricultural prosperity under the Ottomans. On 
the other hand, other regions of Transjordan including Karak, Jarash, and the Bani Hasan 
tribe’s sections of ‘Ajlun province would all see substantial tax increases because of the 
new land tax laws (as much as 400% in the case of Bani Hasan). These areas were less 
cultivated in Ottoman times and had a larger proportion of Bedouin, making it more 
difficult to collect taxes. Not surprisingly, Hussein al-Tarawnah and Refifan al-Majali, 
the leading representatives from Karak, were adamantly against the new tax law because 
of its dire personal economic impact. Although Karak was a traditional opponent of 
central authority, Tarawnah and Majali’s opposition was rooted in personal interests, not 
a general regional antipathy towards the Anglo-Hashemite state. Both representatives 
needed to protect their own financial interests as well as the interests of their clients in 
Karak if they hoped to retain their elite standing in the region. Because of personal 
economic interests, the Land Tax Law did not pass in 1931. In fact, the law never even 
made it out of committee.  
Inaction was not an acceptable answer for the British. As noted, this new taxation 
system was vital for the success of their Transjordan Mandate. The British determined 
that the revision of the tax code was a crucial component of Transjordan’s treaty 
obligations according to the 1928 Agreement.  Judicial Adviser C.A. Hooper determined 
that “not only may it be passed but it must be passed, we have a clear mandatory 
obligation to pass the Land Tax Law.” The British decided to determine their legal 





the government.  The main problem, as Hooper saw it, was that the British had never 
imagined an eventuality when the Legislative Council could hamper the Amir’s ability to 
fulfill treaty obligations. This issue harked back to the initial formation of the Council.  
The British had never foreseen the emergence of an adversarial Legislative 
Council when they called for its formation to ratify the 1928 Agreement. The British 
lawyers who concocted the Organic Law never thought that the representatives “might 
prove recalcitrant or obstructive, and consequently no express stipulation was inserted to 
deal with such a contingency as that which has now arisen, mainly, the refusal of the 
Legislative Council to pass laws which, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, are 
essential to fulfillment of their mandatory obligations.” Judicial Adviser Hooper 
determined that, because the Land Tax Law was critical to the fulfillment of 
Transjordan’s treaty obligations, the Amir could dissolve the Council through an Iradah. 
Thereafter the Amir could pass the law as an ordinance according to Article 41 of the 
Organic Law. However, Hooper cautioned against the immediate dissolution of the 
Council. He believed that “with men of the type of which the Legislative Council is 
composed, the possibility of loss of pay and of playing an ostentatious role and possibly 
also the definite knowledge that His Britannic Majesty’s Government insisted on the 
passage of a particular measure as being part of the Amir’s treaty obligations, might have 
considerable weight.”543 In other words, the threat of a loss of station and salary would be 
powerful enough to force the hand of the representatives. The fact that no opposition 
figures had been reelected to the Legislative Council after the first Council’s dissolution 
heightened the impact of this threat. Dismissal likely meant the loss of political or social 
                                                 





capital for the current representatives. Once again, the matter of status and financial 
security would become the ultimate arbiter of Council action.  
The British decided not to push the Amir to dissolve the Legislative Council. 
Instead, they chose to play the representatives against one another. To this end, the 
Mandatory government pressured the Council into passing a partial law only applying the 
new land tax regulations to Karak and the Bani Hasan sections of the ‘Ajlun province on 
June 21, 1932. The partial law passed because it did not affect the majority of the 
Council.544 Its passage greatly angered the two leading representatives from Karak, 
Hussein al-Tarawnah and Refifan al-Majali. Thereafter it was decided, upon the 
recommendation of the Treasurer Shukri Shash‘ah, that the Land Tax Law should not be 
introduced into the Legislative Council until February 1933. 545 Shukri Pasha made this 
suggestion because he was unable to convince the other members of the finance 
committee to accept the law in December 1932. The Executive Council hoped to use the 
Ramadan holiday to convince other representatives to support the legislation.546  
By February 1933, the British were growing impatient. Both British Resident Cox 
and Judicial Adviser Hooper noted that there must be a decision about the Land Tax 
Law’s viability immediately. It was common knowledge, according to Cox, that the Amir 
wanted to dissolve the Legislative Council.547 However, the British feared the precedent 
that might be set from frequent Council dismissals. Instead, Hooper advocated that the 
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Cabinet increase the pressure on the representatives by “buttonholing” the members that 
they had particular influence over. Hooper spoke privately with Refifan al-Majali and six 
other prominent landowners in Amman in hopes of convincing them to support the 
law.548 The British tactic of pursuing landowners in Amman to support the bill is 
evidence that the majority of the representatives had residences in Amman as well as 
their home districts. In essence, the Council’s membership required forced inhabitance in 
Amman, adjacent to the Mandatory government. This proximity alone was a weapon of 
the state. The government’s supervision of the Legislative Council robbed them of some 
of their autonomy simply as a byproduct of where they now lived. Amman’s growing 
authority began to convince the representatives of the utility of cooperating with the 
government. The calculus of Transjordanian statecraft was changing. Similar to the 
French nobility during the reign of Louis XIV, the autonomous tribal sheikhs and urban 
notables of Transjordan began to understand the importance of becoming part of the state. 
It was better to be a part of Versailles than to be expelled from the halls of power.549  
Members of the Executive Council were particularly motivated to pursue the 
law’s passage to protect their own positions. If the law failed to pass, the current 
government would be dissolved. The constant fear for any member of the Legislative or 
Executive Council was that once they lost their seat, there was no way back. The elites of 
Transjordan were expendable. Losing your seat was not only a blow to that individual, 
but a loss of position and influence for their entire patronage network. With the threat of 
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dissolution and significant pressure from the Cabinet, the Legislative Council finally 
passed the Land Tax Law on March 9, 1933. The British claimed that the final law passed 
because the representatives from Karak, most notably Hussein al-Tarawnah and Refifan 
al-Majali, supported the general application of the law to spite the other members of the 
Council. As an added incentive, a provision placed into the ninth and final version of the 
law guaranteed the gradual increase of tax rates for any landowners who would see a fifty 
percent or higher increase to their tax burden.550  
The 1933 Land Tax Law was the first new tax law of any kind enacted throughout 
Transjordan during the Mandate. Hypothetically, the Land Tax Law coupled with the 
Income Tax Law and Trade Licenses Laws, also passed in early 1933, would help 
balance the Transjordan budget. However, as historian Michael Fischbach points out, the 
law was not nearly as successful as the British had hoped. Its rollout was slow because 
large segments of Transjordan had not yet gone through land registration. In the end, the 
law failed to increase tax revenue throughout the Emirate.551 Although the Land Tax Law 
itself was not as successful as initially envisioned, it did speak to the Council members’ 
approach towards dealing with the government. Intra-Council rivalry and animosity 
overcame any sense of collective unity for the Legislative Council’s policy of non-
cooperation. Personal animus motivated the leader of the opposition, Hussein al-
Tarawnah, to push for the acceptance of the 1933 Land Tax Law in spite of its financial 
ramifications for the rest of the country. These personal squabbles in the Council 
hastened the closing of political space in Amman. Council representatives living in 
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Amman gradually acknowledged the necessity of acquiescing to the will of the Anglo-
Hashemite state. Personal privilege and status trumped higher aspirations of Council 
solidarity in respect to the 1933 Land Tax law. The cumulative effect of the dwindling 
political options for Transjordanian elites led to the fragmentation and eventual death of 
political opposition during the Mandate period.  
 
Political Parties and the Slow Death of the Opposition 
The passage of the Land Tax Law did not occur in a vacuum. Political agitation 
continued to take place outside of the rather subdued halls of the Legislative Council in 
1932 and 1933. The fourth meeting of the National Congress took place in Amman on 
March 15, 1932. The meeting produced the standard list of resolutions including demands 
for revision of the 1928 Agreement, formation of a constitutional government, a 
reduction in taxation, and abrogation of emergency laws.552 By 1933, Hussein al-
Tarawnah and Refifan al-Majali were once again at odds and split their support into two 
parties. Refifan al-Majali and Mithqal al-Fayiz (of the Bani Sakhr) announced the 
formation of their new party, The Jordanian Solidarity Party (Hizb al-Tadmon al-
Urdoni), on March 24, 1933. 553 Many of these individuals had been members of the 
National Congress Party but had moved away from Tarawnah as he moved closer to the 
Istiqlal party.554 The new party adopted the unprovocative platform of advocating for a 
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remission of taxes for cultivators as part of drought relief. The new party also wanted the 
government to encourage foreign investment to improve the dire economic situation in 
Transjordan. In general, the Solidarity Party was intended to weaken Tarawnah’s political 
position while supporting the Amir’s political goals in Transjordan.  
Hussein al-Tarawnah convened the fifth and final meeting of the National 
Congress on June 7, 1933.555 The motivation of the National Congress was largely 
preventative in nature in that its focus was condemning the formation of the Jordanian 
Solidarity Party. The Jordanian Solidarity Party eventually had its own congress on July 
1, 1933. However, only fifty to sixty people attended and the party quickly fell apart. In 
response to the poor attendance of the Jordanian Solidarity Party’s Conference, the Amir 
planned to hold another Congress of notables “to produce sensible proposals for political 
and economic reform and to affirm the complete trust of all the leaders of the native born 
Transjordanians in the person of the Amir.”556 The Amir hoped to create his own political 
party, which would allow him to control the Legislative Council and the Executive 
Council simultaneously. Previously, the Amir had a contingent of representatives who 
were loyal but never a majority. Opposition figures and independents held sway in 
previous Legislative Councils and had only selectively sided with the Amir. An 
organized political party would allow the Amir to criticize British policy indirectly.  
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The Amir’s new conference convened on August 6, 1933. The Congress of the 
People of Transjordan was well attended and thirty people were elected to its Executive 
Committee with Naji al-Azzam as president and Sa‘id al-Mufti (both on the Legislative 
Council) and Najib al-Shraidah (former Legislative Council member) as the Congress’s 
secretaries.  The People’s Congress led to the creation of the People’s Party (Hizb al-
Sha’b). This new party did not produce any resolutions that were distinguishable from 
other Congresses held in Amman. The formation of the new party was indicative of the 
Hashemite state’s policy of courting former opponents and turning them into allies. Each 
time a member of the Legislative Council or tribal sheikh participated in the Amir’s 
political machinations they allowed their political identities to change. Men who had 
been autonomous regional and tribal elites were slowly becoming Transjordanian elites. 
The main purpose of the new People’s Party (the original People’s Party dissolved in 
1930) was to combat the influence of the National Congress and the members of the 
Istiqlal party. Members of the Istiqlal party, Adil al-Azmeh and Dr. Subhi Abu 
Ghanimeh, attacked the People’s Party in a new newspaper in which they accused the 
new party’s founders of a number of scurrilous abuses. 
 In order to check the strength of Istiqlal and other opposition forces the 
government chose to revise the Ottoman Press Law so that any new paper or journal must 
first receive the government’s approval to be published.557 The National Congress 
planned to hold another meeting on September 15, 1933 in Karak to oppose the People’s 
Party. Before this could happen, the government passed an ordinance banning all 
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unapproved public meetings.558 The revival of the Ottoman Press Law and the ban on 
unapproved public meetings signaled the Mandatory government’s growing proclivity for 
censorship. These two pieces of legislation drastically curtailed the visibility of any 
opposition forces in Transjordan. In tandem with the waning strength of the opposition, 
the government began to increase their powers of control over Transjordanian populace. 
The political space originally opened by the formation of the Legislative Council had 
been synched one notch tighter. The Mandatory government increased its disciplinary 
actions in an effort to make the general population more pliable. The National Congress 
never met again after 1933.559 There was no other unified opposition force in Transjordan 
during the Mandate period. Only the National Congress had ever articulated a clear 
platform and party agenda.   
The opposition had lost much of its steam in its attempts to fight off the Land Tax 
Law of 1933. By November 1933, fourteen of the sixteen members of the Legislative 
Council were now members of the Amir’s Hizb al-Sha’b. The only holdouts were 
Hussein al-Tarawnah (president of the National Congress) and Adil al-Azmeh (member 
of Istiqlal). Even former member of the National Congress Party Qasim al-Hindawi had 
joined Hizb al-Sha’b.  The Council became the personal political tool of Amir Abdullah. 
What had once been a proud defiant representative chamber was now an instrument to be 
used at Abdullah’s whim against the wishes of the British. Through the Legislative 
Council, the Amir was able to differentiate his views from those of the Mandatory state. 
After British Resident Cox’s 1924 ultimatum, Abdullah had lost much of his ability to 
vocally and publicly oppose the will of the British. Through his new political party, the 
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Amir was able to indirectly challenge the British agenda. The power of Raghadan Palace 
increased now that Abdullah could directly orchestrate the affairs of the Legislative 
Council. The Amir decided to use the strength of his new political party to bring about a 
change in the Executive Council. Prime Minister Saraj had fallen out of favor with the 
Amir over the course of 1933 but the British Resident had cautioned the Amir not to 
change the Cabinet until the end of the current Legislative Council. In order to bring 
about a change in the Cabinet, the representatives, instructed by Abdullah, increased their 
policy of non-cooperation with the reconvening of the regular council in November 1933. 
The elected Legislative Council members excluded the ex-officio Cabinet members from 
every committees of the Council. In addition, the representatives prevented the passage of 
legislation through deliberate absences, which denied the Council quorum.  
In response to the legislative standstill, Amir Abdullah was able to dismiss his 
ineffective Chief Minister Saraj and appoint Ibrahim Hashim as the new Prime Minister. 
Hashim formed a new Government on November 18, 1933. Sa‘id al Mufti returned to the 
Executive Council replacing Tawfiq Abu al-Huda as Administrative Inspector. Tawfiq 
Abu al-Huda became the Director of the Agricultural Bank after his removal from the 
Cabinet. Hashim Kheit became Director of Antiquities and Qassim al-Hindawi, former 
member of the National Congress, became the sixth member of the Executive Council 
without a specific post. The appointment of Qassim al-Hindawi to the Cabinet continued 





posts.560 Once the Cabinet had been reconstituted, the Legislative Council ceased to be an 
impediment to the government.  
The end of the Prime Minister Saraj’s government and the end of the Second 
Legislative Council’s tenure reinforced new truths in Transjordan. Prominent government 
officials realized how tenuous their positions in the government had become.561 Any shift 
in government could easily correspond to a shift in personnel. In response, the Legislative 
Council had ceased to be a source of any organized opposition. Future Councils 
sporadically opposed legislation, but they did so to protect their own personal interests. 
Any group solidarity that had once existed in the halls of the Legislative Council died by 
the end of the Second Council’s tenure. Similarly, Amman ceased to be the home of 
organized opposition to the Mandatory government. After 1933 there were periodic 
protests against government action and policy but after the National Congress, there was 
never again unified oppositional activity in Transjordan during the Mandate. Amman 
remained the home of politics in Transjordan, but it was a home increasingly furnished 
by the Anglo-Hashemite state. Instead of opposing the will and trajectory of the 
government, it became far more important to protect one’s post on the Council. After 
1933, few challenges would be directed at the Transjordan government directly. Political 
parties continued to function, but their attention was increasingly focused on regional 
issues, such as Palestine and Arab nationalism, instead of domestic ones. It was no longer 
viable to question the will of Amman.  
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Amendment of the 1928 Agreement and 1934 Elections 
Since its publication in 1928, numerous parties inside and outside of Transjordan 
had called for revision of the 1928 Agreement. The signing of the 1934 supplementary 
agreement to the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement in Jerusalem on June 22, 1934, 
finally answered these calls for revision. The need for amendments was a frequent topic 
of discussion in both the First and Second Legislative Councils and had been a common 
demand of every political party in Transjordan. Despite the fact that revision of the 1928 
Agreement was a near universal demand, the actual supplemental agreement signed in 
1934 hardly addressed the deficiencies of the 1928 Agreement.  The most common 
requests of the Transjordan government dealt with financial and diplomatic 
considerations. First, the government wanted the ability to have consular representation 
in London and the surrounding Arab countries. Consular representation would signify 
that Transjordan was a true political entity and not merely the puppet of the British 
crown. In addition, the Transjordan government wanted to have its financial obligations 
diminished by having the British Resident and his staff’s salaries removed from the 
Transjordan budget. The Transjordanians also asked that custom variation between 
Transjordan and Palestine not need approval from HMG and that Transjordan Frontier 
Force (TJFF) and Arab Legion always be paid by grant (not loan).562 These Agreement 
revision requests did not address the ultimate goal of the National Congress Party and 
others for the implementation of a constitutional government but ostensibly could be seen 
as a step in the right direction. 
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The official 1934 Agreement addressed most of the requests listed above but 
curtailed the scope of their immediate impact. Transjordan was granted the right to have 
consular representation in Arab states (not London) but with the caveat that it must be 
paid for in full by the Transjordan government. The depressed economic situation in 1934 
made the appointment and financing of consular representation impossible until the 
general economic situation improved.  The 1934 Agreement also formally acknowledged 
that there should be no customs barrier between Palestine and Transjordan. However, the 
British maintained strict control of the Transjordanian budget, refusing the Amir’s 
request to end the practice of itemized budget review or to be more generous in the grant-
in-aid allocations to Transjordan.563  
The 1934 Agreement amendment paid lip service to the idea of greater financial 
freedom for Transjordan without actually increasing Transjordan’s financial autonomy. 
Overall, the 1934 Agreement had little substantive impact in the short term but it did 
increase the Amir’s legitimacy. Although there were many issues not addressed by the 
1934 Agreement, it was still viewed as progress towards eventual independence.  The 
1934 Agreement did not placate the opposition entirely, but it did remove one of their 
strongest criticisms of the Amir and his government. It reinforced the claims of Amir 
Abdullah that Transjordan was progressing and that the relationship with Great Britain 
was not static. More importantly, the 1934 Agreement was now a weapon to be used by 
the Anglo-Hashemite state against its detractors. Although the terms of the Agreement 
gave Transjordan very little, its mere existence was enough to silence many government 
critics. By 1934, the strength and vitality of the opposition were at their lowest point. No 
                                                 





political party had enough clout to criticize the 1934 Agreement’s passage in 
Transjordan.  
The subdued nature of the opposition in 1934 was evident in the election results 
for the Third Legislative Council. In the 1934 elections, completed in October 1934, 
opposition leaders Hussein al-Tarawnah and Adil al-Azmah were not reelected. It is 
likely that Tarawnah’s arrest on September 4, 1934, in Karak blocked his reelection. 
Refifan al-Majali, Tarawnah’s Karak rival and fellow member of the Legislative Council, 
likely instigated the arrest for holding a political meeting in the city without the proper 
permit. Tarawnah was released within 48 hours after posting bail. When news of 
Tarawnah’s arrest reached Amman, the government decided to extend the elections in 
Karak by two weeks to try to alleviate the situation.564 Regardless of whether or not the 
arrest was orchestrated by the Hashemite state to block Tarawnah’s candidacy, he was 
not reelected to the Legislative Council in 1934. With the removal of Tarawnah and 
Azmah from office, the opposition was formally shut out of the Third Legislative 
Council.  The only former member of the National Congress still on the Council was 
Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi (Arab Muslim from the Balqa), who had left the Moderate Liberal 
Party to help form the People’s Party in 1933.  
Shortly after the completion of the elections in 1934, rumors began to spread 
about “electoral irregularities.” The Syrian paper L’Orient, originally reported this charge 
on October 14, 1934. However, the paper’s accusations did not draw the attention of the 
League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) until June 1935.565 The 
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commission instructed the British to look into these allegations and to report to the 
Commission. The British quickly discovered a number of problems with the election. 
Although British Resident Cox reported in September 1934 that the election of secondary 
electors proceeded without “undue excitement,” he also noted: “The government is 
confident that only those whom it wishes to be elected shall become members of the 
Legislative Council.”566  The possibility of government tampering was there in the 
September report but Cox’s October report removed any level of plausible deniability: 
The Legislative Council elections were completed about the 20th and all the 
successful candidates are those who enjoyed government support. Many of those 
who hoped but failed to gain a seat have joined forces against the government 
whom they accuse of rigging the elections in an entirely unscrupulous manner. To 
what degree this is true I am not in a position to say, but there is no doubt that the 
government exercised its influence having persons acceptable to it elected. The 
whole business is corrupt and votes are bought and sold quite openly. A number 
of disappointed persons referred to above have come to Amman to discuss their 
line of action and will probably be sent off to their homes in a few days.567 
 
It was clear without any doubt that there had been government tampering in the 
1934 Legislative Council elections (which may have included Tarawnah’s September 
arrest). The exact scope or nature of this meddling was unclear, but the British could not 
ignore its existence. Most damning was Cox’s direct acknowledgment of the corruption. 
Somehow, in response to these allegations the High Commissioner J.A. Wauchope still 
chose not to launch an enquiry because he believed it “would serve no useful purpose.”568  
There is a clear level of panic in the British records themselves about the elections. 
Some reply must be given to the Permanent Mandates Commission’s enquiry and 
the question is what! We cannot pass on any of the account in the political 
summary, even in a bowdlerized form, without admitting that the whole election 
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was corrupt, and we shall be open to the perfectly just criticism that we knew all 
about it and took no steps until we were found out. It is not easy to see how we 
can get out of this.569  
 
In the end, it is unclear if the British ever actually did anything about the 1934 elections. 
Regardless of any internal hand wringing, the representatives elected in the original 
election in October 1934 served out their term until 1937. It does not appear that the 
League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission ever penalized or rebuked the 
British in response to the 1934 elections. The fact that the Anglo-Hashemite state was 
able to rig the 1934 elections without widespread condemnation in Transjordan is further 
proof of the diminished strength of the opposition. By 1934, no one was left to effectively 
oppose the government. Furthermore, even if local non-government elites had wanted to 
protest the 1934 election results the government had denied them the means to do so.  
  In retrospect, it is clear that late 1934 and 1935 were a period where the 
Transjordan government tightened its control over political discourse in Transjordan. In 
June 1934, shortly before leaving Transjordan on a trip to Iraq and the United Kingdom, 
Amir Abdullah was said to have given “strict instructions that energetic steps should be 
taken to suppress any opposition,” according to L’Orient. A new bill published on 
December 25, 1934, granted the Amir the power “to censor postal packets, to have 
suspected persons arrested and deported, and to exercise control over the Gulf of Aqaba 
and over the aerodromes.” This bill, which became the Transjordan Defense Law of 
1935, was to come into effect when the Amir declared a state of emergency or in cases 
where the armed forces of His Majesty’s Government (HMG) or Transjordan were 
threatened. When discussion of the Defense Law was raised in the Permanent Mandates 
                                                 






Commission Mr. Moody determined that the Transjordan Mandate was of increasing 
importance every year and that such a law needed to exist, and had already been in effect 
in Palestine for fourteen years.570 Mr. Moody claimed that the law was not published in 
1935 due to any change in the Transjordan’s domestic political climate. Despite the 
assertions of Mr. Moody, it is clear that the increased censorship activities in Transjordan 
were a blatant attempt by the government to silence oppositional voices. The law’s 
passage in 1935 was not mere serendipity..  
 After the close of the Second Legislative Council’s term, no further organized 
political opposition would come from its halls. The Council became a tool of the Amir to 
use against the British on measures that “he and his government could not resist 
openly.”571 The government continued to remove avenues for agitation and opposition to 
the government’s programs. The 1935 Defense Law, when combined with the 1928 
banishment law, 1932 law against unlawful public meetings, and the revival of the 
Ottoman Press Law, functionally destroyed the feasibility of an organized opposition 
existing within Transjordan. With increased levels of censure and media control, the 
opposition lost its ability to foment trouble for the government domestically. These 
censorship laws, when combined with the infrastructural and institutional centrality of the 
Anglo-Hashemite state in Amman, removed the last available avenues for public political 
dissension. In the face of growing government censure, the elites of Transjordan had the 
choice to work from within the government with minimal real power or to oppose the 
government and have their local and regional support stripped away from them. The rise 
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of civil servants in the Transjordanian government further limited the feasibility of 
remaining an autonomous tribal sheikh or urban notable outside of the government 
system. These elites knew that if they chose to opt out of the government that someone 
else would take their place. By 1934, there was no such thing as an independent elite or 
notable in Transjordan. Elites either worked with the government and had a voice or 
existed outside the government where they were ostracized and powerless. In the face of 
increased Hashemite control and censure, the majority of challenges to Transjordan’s 
government now dealt with its regional opposed to domestic policies and most of the 
criticism came from outside of Transjordan. Finally, in the mid-1930s, the government 
began to use Amman itself as a weapon against political dissidents. As the gravity of the 
capital increased, domestic exile away from the capital became a constant threat and 
weapon for neutering any remaining disgruntled elites. Amman functioned as both a 
place of discipline and of reward.    
 
The Creation of a Hashemite Versailles 
 The rise of a new class of young civil servants illustrates the shift in the 
Transjordan political atmosphere. The Transjordanian elites raised in the Mandate system 
and educated during the Mandate period operated within the framework they knew. 
Historian Betty Anderson described their development as being crucial to the later 
emergence of nationalism in Jordan. “In a situation like Jordan’s where the state was so 
very new and the focus of loyalty so fluid, schools provide a powerful means for 





highlight the need for obedience to the new state structure.”572 Throughout the late 1930s 
and early 1940s, these new civil servants did not rebel against the government. Instead, 
they worked within the confines of the state’s structure as teachers, bureaucrats, and 
young professionals to lobby for gradual change.573 These young civil servants (efendis) 
had no choice but to work within the government’s tightly controlled framework. Open 
avenues for opposition had been systematically closed one by one in the years following 
the formation of the Legislative Council in 1928. The open political space that briefly 
existed in 1929 had been slammed shut by the late 1930s. The rules of engagement had 
changed in Transjordan. The political machinery housed in Amman was now only 
employed in the service of the Mandatory state. Amman became synonymous with the 
will of the government. Battles for change in the government no longer pitted an 
independent opposition movement against the will of the Anglo-Hashemite state. In its 
place, members of the Mandatory government now instigated change from the inside.574 
They had no other choice.  
 As the 1930s progressed, opportunities for political opposition continued to 
narrow. Public meetings and political conferences in particular, held without prior 
approval, had been outlawed. The 1935 Transjordan Defense Law limited the circulation 
and feasibility of opposition periodicals within Transjordan. The ban on public meetings 
even applied to former government officials. Taher al-Joqqa, the former mayor of 
Amman, attempted to convene a Congress in Amman on January 28, 1936, but was 
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turned down by the Chief Minister.575 When members of the opposition threatened to 
stage disturbances in Amman on April 23, 1936, the Amir moved a large force of the 
Arab Legion and a half squadron of the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) to the Amman 
railway station to ensure that no problems arose.576 In 1937, the government continued to 
curtail public meetings when it outlawed the meeting of societies and clubs that did not 
have explicit government permission.577  
 In response to the government’s new tactics, criticism of the Transjordan 
government increasingly came from outside of Transjordan. Syrian papers (Alef Ba, 
Ayyam, Lewa) and Palestinian papers (Filastin and al-Di’fa) were used to criticize 
government regional policies. Domestic papers could not criticize the state because of the 
threat of immediate censure and punishment. Most frequently, the government and the 
Amir were attacked for their policies on Palestine and rumors of the Amir and other 
Transjordanian elites selling or leasing land to Zionists in Transjordan.578 Both issues 
increased in importance during the Palestine Revolt from 1936 to 1939. These attacks 
frequently came from Transjordanians in self-imposed exile such as Dr. Subhi Abu 
Ghanima.579 The government undertook further measures to minimize the impact of 
external opposition pamphlets, including confiscating them at Post Offices to prevent 
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their circulation.580 Additionally, the government paid off paper editors to stop publishing 
damaging stories about the Amir.581 Political parties attempted to form outside of 
Transjordan in an effort to influence the state while outside of its reach. The First General 
Conference of Transjordanian Students met in Damascus on May 15, 1937, to discuss the 
danger to Transjordan from Zionists and the need for closer Arab unity.582 This particular 
conference never amounted to anything, but it was indicative of the depleted options 
available to a drastically weakened opposition.  
 The few who attempted to fight against the increased levels of censorship and 
government control in Transjordan were punished. However, in a small country such as 
Transjordan, the government could not afford to simply exile problematic elites. These 
individuals frequently filled needed government posts. The low levels of educated 
officials meant they were hard to replace, especially in the early periods of the Mandate. 
For example, as early as 1928, the Mutasarrif  (Ottoman term for regional administrator) 
of ‘Ajlun Ahmad Ramzi, invoked the powers of the Crime Prevention Law of September 
7, 1927, to place Mustafa Wahbi al-Tell (also known as the poet ‘Arar) under house 
arrest in Amman for six months for disturbing the peace. As part of his punishment, he 
was unable to leave Amman without written permission and had to remain indoors at 
night.583  
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 Over time, the approach to house arrest changed in Transjordan. It was no longer 
a punishment to be in Amman. Where once being Amman was a penalty because it 
forced inhabitants to interact with the new centralized state infrastructure, by the mid-
1930s the converse was true. Being in Amman had become an advantageous position. 
This shift was analogous to the change in the general perception of Amman, and the 
Anglo-Hashemite state more generally. The court culture of the Anglo-Hashemite state 
now demanded proximity to ensure political position. A myriad of elites, regardless of 
their individual motivations, needed to be in Amman to curry favor with the Amir.584 The 
symbolic weight and importance of Amman grew proportionally with the authority of the 
Mandatory government. Amman was simultaneously a place of privilege and discipline. 
As a result, the sentence du jour became exile away from the capital. This form of 
domestic exile was a common technique employed by the Ottomans when they would 
send viziers and other elites who had fallen out of favor away from Istanbul. 585  The 
simple rationale was that being removed from the locus of power; a person becomes less 
significant and less powerful. 586  
 A Transjordanian example of this practice was Mohammad al-Hussein (the 
former head of His Highness’ Diwan, out of office and in opposition by the mid-1930s) 
who attempted to “foment anti-government agitation in the ‘Ajlun district.” Al-Hussein’s 
punishment ordered by the Chief Minister was to return to his native town, Tafileh, and 
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“to remain there in enforced residence until further notice.”587 Initially, al-Hussein fled to 
Syria, but upon his return, he was placed in enforced residence in Tafileh.588 In another 
example, Mohammad Hejazi, a “troublesome politician of Amman,” insulted the Chief 
Minister and “nearly caused a fight between the Nablusi and Damascene elements of 
Amman who support[ed] the government and a number of Mohammad Hejazi’s rowdy 
associates.” In response to this disturbance, the government arrested Hejazi and placed 
him in enforced residence at Aqaba “for being a menace to the peace of Amman.”589  
 For “sons of the country,” domestic exile away from Amman fulfilled two 
simultaneous government goals. It removed troublemakers from the halls of power and 
reinforced the symbolic and functional importance of the new capital of Amman. These 
examples illustrate how proximity to the capital, and the power and influence it 
represented, had become desirable and practically necessary for the elites of Transjordan. 
The political necessity of the capital forced sheikhs and urban notables throughout 
Transjordan to come frequently to Amman. The physical act of coming into Amman by 
itself reified Amman’s growing central importance in the young Emirate. The process of 
political pilgrimage into Amman simultaneously stripped elites of their autonomy and 
strengthened the power of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Being sent away from Amman was 
the ultimate punishment for political dissidents. Similar to its Ottoman antecedents, this 
domestic exile was rarely permanent. Instead, these terms of house arrest in the country 
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were a means to rehabilitate problematic elites and to convert them to the government’s 
position.  
 Inside the government, the centralization of power and authority also continued. 
The Third Legislative Council caused the government few issues. It rarely spoke out 
against the Amir and generally followed Government instruction. Unlike previous 
Councils, budgets generally passed without amendment.590 The Council did periodically 
pursue arguments for independence or admission into the League of Nations, as they did 
in April 1937, but these were hardly revolutionary sentiments. The Council criticized 
British actions in Palestine and advocated for Arab unity to little effect. In general, 
Council members parroted the wishes of the Amir and were regarded as harmless by the 
British.  
 Despite their limited and dwindling legislative role, elections for the Legislative 
Council were still quite contentious. In fact, each subsequent Council election was more 
hotly contested than its predecessor. Estimates stipulated that contending parties spent at 
least LP 1000 in the Ma’an province race alone, despite the fact that the annual salary for 
a member of the Legislative Council was only LP 108. The competition in the ‘Ajlun 
“elections are being contested with considerable intensity and the tendency to exaggerate 
the number of secondary electors had to be checked particularly in the Jerash sub-district. 
The Mutasarrif of the district went through the lists of the primary electors of this sub-
district and on inspection reduced the number by nearly fifty percent.” In Karak, there 
were attempts to block the Tafileh and Ma’an elites from being elected at all. The Karak 
representatives wanted to garner enough votes to ensure that all four seats for the 
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Karak/Tafileh/Ma’an district would be awarded to Karak. The Amir noted that such an 
outcome was undesirable and “[g]overnment supporters are endeavoring to ensure that 
the wishes of the authorities are met .”591  
 After the commotion and problems that surrounded the 1934 elections, the British 
were keen to ensure that the Mandatory government refrained from interference. Upon 
the conclusion of the elections on October 16, 1937, the British Resident was happy to 
report: “[t]hough they were much more keenly contested than on any previous occasion, 
[the elections] were carried through without any breach of the peace. The government, 
except in the case of one official who was acting under the influence of the Amir, 
remained neutral in the elections but a good deal of money changed hands in the purchase 
of votes of the secondary electors.”592 The Fourth Legislative Council’s elections were 
the most contested on record. Although the victorious elites fought hard for their Council 
seats, the Council was the most pliable yet. The political and social currency of the 
Council’s representatives had become the seats themselves, not any actual legislative 
authority that they exercised. Possession of a Council seat not only reinforced the 
authority of the Council member, but also advanced the standing of his entire patronage 
network. For this reason, as the Council diminished in functional importance the status of 
the Council representatives continued to increase. By the fourth Council, the opposition 
had been quashed and elites who wanted to remain relevant needed a Council seat to 
reaffirm their regional influence and importance. The tenure of the Fourth Council was 
extended in 1940 in response to the outbreak of WWII. The extended term was a means 
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to limit political disruption during wartime as the Council term increased from three to 
five years.593 The Fourth Legislative Council only stubbornly refused one piece of 
legislation, the Water Settlement Laws.  
 The Water Settlement Laws were an attempt by the government to regulate water 
resources in Transjordan. The government hoped that the law would already be in place 
as new water development programs, notably irrigation schemes, arose. It would give the 
government near total control of all water resources in Transjordan including well water, 
surface water, and irrigation projects. British Resident Cox feared early on that there 
would be difficulty in getting the law passed by the Legislative Council without more 
details about how the law would be implemented.594 As of October 1939, the Council had 
still not passed the Water Law. “The draft water law was withdrawn from the last session 
of the Legislative Council when it became apparent that the elected members were not 
willing to vote its passage in its present form because they considered the rights which it 
would give the government over water supplies which were now in private ownership to 
be too wide.”595 The delays caused by the representatives made it impossible to begin any 
of the irrigation schemes created by the Department of Development.596  
 A revised Water Law reduced the powers granted to the government for the 
distribution of water but to no avail. The Water Law languished in the Legislative 
Council in various forms for years. In 1945, Council representative Majid al-Adwan (an 
Arab Muslim from the Balqa who had served on every Legislative Council since 1931) 
opposed the law because it would force him to give land shares to his brother and 
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sisters.597 The stubborn refusal of a few Legislative Council members blocked the 
passage of a Water Rights law during the Mandate. This act of political independence by 
the representatives had everything to do with personal interests. This was not a 
cooperative act of defiance by a united opposition. This was not a stance against the 
encroachment of government authority on the lives of normal Transjordanians. Instead, 
opposition to this law was firmly rooted in individual interest and fear that the law would 
adversely economically affect the representatives and their familial and patrimonial 
network. The opposition to the Water Law, regardless of the delegates’ motivations, 
demonstrated that the representatives still had a shred of autonomy as late as the Fourth 
Legislative Council. 
 The subtle remnants of independence and opposition washed away with the 
election of the Fifth Legislative Council in October 1942. The Fifth Council was the 
Legislative Council’s most docile incarnation. “They approved 32 laws in two weeks 
without recording even one dissenting vote and without a single debate.”598 Even the 
election of the old opposition leader, Hussein al-Tarawnah, could not alter the ethos of 
the Fifth Council. By the 1940s, Council seats had become an understood component of 
elite life in Transjordan. Council seats remained in families. In some cases, seats were 
even inherited with the death of the father. For example, Refifan al-Majali’s son Ma’arik 
took over his seat in 1945 and Majid al-Adwan’s son Abdullah took over for him in 
1946.599   
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 The transformation of the Legislative Council was complete. What had started as 
an autonomous bastion of the opposition had become the rubber stamp of the Mandatory 
government. The Anglo-Hashemite state had transformed the Legislative Council into an 
assemblage of cooperative Transjordanian elites. Through elite manipulation in the 
legislature, Amman was able to incorporate formerly autonomous elites into the 
machinery of the Jordanian state. Membership to the Legislative Council operated as a 
commodity of status. No legislative authority remained in the seats whatsoever.  Amman 
had become a Hashemite Versailles. Similar to the Palace of Versailles in early modern 
France, Amman became a place where possibly rebellious elites were concentrated and 
observed in a single discrete space. Once in Amman, the Mandatory government 
reconditioned the elites of Transjordan into accepting its existence. The mere act of 
residing in Amman forced Council representatives to acknowledge the political centrality 
of Amman. The Anglo-Hashemite state conditioned formerly autonomous elites into 
accepting, and even embracing, the control of the central government. One by one, the 
Mandatory government eliminated the available avenues for dissent. There was no legal 
way to oppose the will of the government by the late 1930s. For the few member of the 
opposition who insisted on continuing their opposition into the late 1930s, domestic exile 
away from Amman robbed these individuals of any political clout or influence.  
 By the end of the Mandate, Amman’s gilded cage both constrained and supported 
the elites within. The cage of Amman simultaneously limited elite influence and power, 
while protecting and reifying their muted authority as Transjordanian officials. The 
Legislative Council had gathered elites unconditioned to understanding centralized 





prestige trumped frustrated desires to legislate. Amman had gathered formerly 
independent elites of a tribalized society and made them respect and acknowledge a 
dominant centralized state. The shadow of Amman, and the dominant state infrastructure 
it represented, now fell over all of Transjordan. 
  
Conclusion 
 The 1930s saw a drastic change in the function of the Transjordanian state and the 
importance of Amman. In 1930, the Legislative Council was still smarting from the 
forced ratification of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement and Organic Law. The First 
Legislative Council did not become a cowed group. Instead, it chose to fight the will of 
the government and the British by refusing to pass an amended version of the 1930-31 
budget. This choice led to the ultimate dissolution of the First Council. Thereafter, each 
subsequent Council gradually changed their tactics and relationship with the government. 
The autonomy and legislative might of each successive Council diminished bit by bit. 
The Council’s opposition to the Land Tax Law and the Water Rights Law demonstrate 
the final shreds of independence that the Council held. The shift in the Council’s outlook 
and makeup was completed in the Fifth Legislative Council. The prestige and 
consolidated position that the representatives of the Council enjoyed trumped any desire 
for dissenting action. The need to protect the authority and status derived from a 
Legislative Council seat superseded ideological differences. The elite of Transjordan 
could no longer risk antagonizing the government. Continuing prominence and position 





 The dominance of the central government in Amman solidified in this period. The 
government was able to centralize its supremacy over political, military, and economic 
spheres of life. In concert with the evolution of the Legislative Council, the government 
began a gradual process of limiting the avenues of possible opposition. The passage of 
the 1935 Transjordan Defense Law along with other censoring activities drastically 
curtailed the number of viable outlets that dissenting individuals had to voice their 
opposition. The increase in censorship coincided with the government’s initiative to 
rehabilitate opposition figures. Numerous members of the opposition were placated with 
government posts that turned former opponents into government allies. The practice of 
domestic exile away from Amman highlighted the importance of the capital and 
mitigated the influence of those individuals who refused to curtail their criticism of the 
government. Taken together, Amman had transformed formerly autonomous elites into 
























































6: Public Celebration and Government Control: The Development of 






“In the center of town, where the two roads meet, is a fountain near which the mosque is 
being built, here, morning and evening, a crowd assembled. There would be men on 
horseback or riding mules or camels, shepherds with their flocks, boys in charge of goats, 
all talking at the top of their voices. A car comes along and the crowd, that has spread all 
over the roadway, divides to let it pass, swarming all over the road again directly after it 
has passed. The crowd is always interesting; perhaps it is more gaudy than usual owing to 
the presence of the King and the Emir.”600  
– Beatrice Erskine on the state of Amman during Sharif Hussein’s visit in 1924 
 
 As early as 1924, it was clear that Amman was the center of life in Transjordan. 
Beatrice Erskine remarked during her visit that Amman was already a vibrant place. She 
remembered the constant commotion and buzz of activity that characterized life in the 
center of Amman.  Despite Erskine’s early assessment of Amman, academics for years 
have rejected the city of Amman as being an inauthentic and insignificant city. This 
blanket dismissal resulted from Amman’s atypical urban characteristics. Amman did not 
fit into the “stereotypical models of what an ‘Islamic’ or ‘Arab’ city should look like.”601 
Amman is not surrounded by a set of ancient walls, and its recent resettlement makes the 
city feel inherently modern. Amman’s late nineteenth century heritage did not make it 
easily adaptable to models devised for “Traditional cities” such as Damascus, Cairo, or 
Jerusalem.  
However, the dismissal of Amman as being a bastardized modern city is 
misplaced. The urban makeup of Amman is very much in keeping with the norms of 
other Levantine cities of the period, and British colonial cities more generally. Amman’s 
urban development straddled Western conceptions of modernity while still operating in a 
clearly pre-modern context. Amman never had a comprehensive urban plan developed or 
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employed during the Mandate period.602 Amman did not have its first urban plan until 
1955. This lack of urban planning allowed the city to develop without government 
interference. This approach is quite different from the intense urban planning that took 
place in neighboring Palestine. Tel Aviv, Haifa, and to a lesser extent Jerusalem, grew 
dramatically under the British Mandate.603 In Palestine, the increased level of planning 
was mainly at the behest of the Zionists.604 The British only took a nominal interest in 
urban planning in Palestine in an effort not to anger the local populace.605  British 
indifference towards urban planning in Amman was in stark contrast to the strong 
colonial oversight that the government employed throughout Transjordan to maintain 
security. What British concerns existed about Amman had more to do with the symbol of 
the Anglo-Hashemite state it presented than any specific planning or security concerns.  
It was this symbolic Amman that the poet Mustafa Wahabi al-Tell (i.e., ‘Arar) 
rejected. ‘Arar was both a part of the city, living there for a number of years while 
working for the Hashemite government, and inherently removed from its inner workings 
and evolving social character.606 It is this isolated individual perspective that makes ‘Arar 
a flâneur par excellence. This dual identity allowed ‘Arar to comment on and frequently 
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critique the burgeoning young capital from the unique vantage point of a flâneur.607 ‘Arar 
personified the schizophrenia of the elites of Transjordan. He was part of the government, 
yet bristled at the implications of his governmental involvement. ‘Arar claimed to speak 
on behalf of an unblemished land of Transjordan but did so as a member of Transjordan’s 
growing class of civil servants. It was this disconnect that disgusted ‘Arar most of all. 
The beacon of this hypocrisy and schizophrenic world-view was Amman. Amman was a 
vapid cancerous contagion, in ‘Arar’s eyes. The city threatened to infect all of 
Transjordan. For ‘Arar, Transjordan was a natural entity with its own discrete ethos that 
must be protected from the tainted new elite of Amman.  
The cultural and architectural realities of the city were quite different from ‘Arar’s 
manufactured grand caricature. The city of Amman was not a grand or resplendent urban 
space. It was a city left to develop on its own, with minimal government intervention and 
few monumental buildings. This ironic juxtaposition to the government’s controlling 
aspirations demonstrates the limitations of the Mandatory state. The Anglo-Hashemite 
government may have wished to develop a discrete urban plan for Amman but they 
simply could not afford to do so. The British viewed the actual city of Amman, beyond 
its security-oriented infrastructure as largely inconsequential. This benign neglect 
allowed for an open urban fabric that reflected the various cultural heritages of the 
Mandate: Ottoman, Arab, and British. The varied architecture of the city highlights a 
clear Ottoman continuity while allowing for both Western and local influences. This 
amalgam of architectural styles resulted in numerous hybridized residential architectural 
styles in Amman. These new residential architectural forms helped to designate the first 
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elite enclave of Amman, Jabal Amman al-Jadid (New Jabal Amman, hereafter simply 
Jabal Amman). This elite community established on one of the hills to the west of 
Amman’s downtown corridor became one of the first neighborhoods outside of the city 
center with its own discrete character and function within Amman. Unlike other 
neighborhoods outside of downtown, Jabal Amman only began its development during 
the British Mandate, particularly after the earthquake in 1927. Jabal Amman’s 
development along modern and Western lines led Amman to become a “dual city.” This 
bifurcated identity remains one of the most lasting legacies of the colonial period in 
modern Amman. 
Regardless of socio-political class or standing, all of Amman congregated in the 
same central space. Amman’s urban development naturally coalesced itself around the 
central corridor of the city, al-balad (literally “the country,” “the city,” or “the town”). 
Within this central valley along the Seil River developed the natural center of the capital. 
This corridor, in particular Feisal Square, functioned as the beating heart of Amman. The 
government and normal Ammanis alike used Feisal Square as a natural meeting place and 
as a space for celebration and commemoration. The cultural gravity of Feisal Square pre-
dated the Anglo-Hashemite government. Although the streets that made up Feisal Square 
existed before the Mandate, it was not until Husseini Mosque was constructed in 1924 
that the square became the preeminent cultural, religious, and political space in Amman. 
Husseini Mosque gave the space cultural gravity. The government usurped this space 
through a wide variety of public functions held in Feisal Square. These celebrations were 
an inexpensive expression of political and cultural control, which underscored the might 





Hashemite Versailles was solidified in the performances and celebrations held in Feisal 
Square. Abdullah’s claiming of Feisal Square as a political space differentiated his 
authority from that of the British colonial authority.  
Despite the government’s use of Feisal Square, it remained the venue of choice 
for religious celebrations and political opposition for normal Ammanis throughout the 
Mandate period as well. This dual function was analogous to how the entire city of 
Amman functioned within the workings of the Transjordan Mandate. Although Amman 
was the seat of the Mandatory government, it still functioned as a real city with 
inhabitants operating outside the sphere of strict government control. The government did 
not own Amman, therefore, the reality of Amman’s architecture and urban layout 
personify the limitations and tensions of the Mandatory state. It wanted to control all of 
Transjordan but could not even control its own capital. 
 
‘Arar and the City 
Thus far, this study has explored how infrastructural centralization and elite 
manipulation heightened Amman’s structural, political, and symbolic importance. The 
actions of the Anglo-Hashemite state transformed Amman into the personification of 
government authority and Hashemite legitimacy in the young Emirate. Amman’s 
physical development was far less important than the evolution of its symbolic meaning 
throughout Transjordan. The government records of the period give a clear depiction of 
how the Mandate looked from the vantage point of Amman. To invert this perspective 





someone who was a part of the capital and distinctly removed from it. In order to 
understand this dimension of Amman’s history, we must turn to the poetry of ‘Arar.  
Mustafa Wahbi al-Tell, better known as ‘Arar, was the preeminent cultural and 
political critic of the British Mandate of Transjordan. Today, ‘Arar is frequently referred 
to as the “uncrowned poet laureate of Jordan – spokesman for Jordanian ideals and 
aspirations.”608 ‘Arar has been interwoven into the story of the Jordanian nation, his 
poetry playing a critical role in its formation. However, this memory is not indicative of 
‘Arar’s complicated history with the Transjordan State. In the words of historian Betty 
Anderson, ‘Arar “was in tune with the national narratives already resonating in Jordan, 
irrespective of the actions of the Hashemites themselves.”609 The Greater Municipality of 
Amman (GAM) perpetuated this distorted memory of ‘Arar in 1999 with the publication 
of Arar: The Poet and Lover of Jordan in honor of his 100th birthday. Nowhere does the 
volume mention his harsh critique of Amman or the Transjordan Government. In fact, the 
introduction explicitly states that the volume will not refer to specifics from Arar’s daily 
life. Instead, the volume alludes to a number of general categories that drew ‘Arar’s 
focus, such as foreign control of Jordanian resources, Zionist incursions, and a general 
stand for social justice.610 This revision rebrands ‘Arar as an honored son of Amman, a 
patriot, and a keen supporter of the Jordanian state. This vision ignores the criticism and 
satire at the heart of much of ‘Arar’s poetry.  
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Although other scholars have commented on ‘Arar’s role as part of the political 
opposition,611 they have ignored his role as a cultural and urban critic. ‘Arar operated in a 
discrete liminal space. He was an outcast and a heavy drinker. ‘Arar’s personal 
familiarity with the city and the government gave his criticism a distinctive voice and 
unique venomous quality.  It is this isolated individual perspective that makes ‘Arar a 
flâneur par excellence.  Walter Benjamin’s flâneur is the bourgeois male observer of the 
patterns and rhythms of the city. The flâneur exists in a period of urban transition. He 
acknowledges the city as the nexus of modern life, but feels a sense of loss in this new 
modernity. In the example of Baudelaire’s Paris, the flâneur inhabits the arcades of the 
city as his home. “The street becomes the dwelling for the flâneur; he is as much at home 
among the facades of houses as a citizen is in his four walls.”612 This public urban space 
allows him to stroll freely, to be aloof and involved simultaneously in the flows of the 
city.  
In Mandate era Amman, ‘Arar strolls through al-balad.613 This central corridor 
operates in much the same manner as Paris’ arcades. In particular, the suqs and cafes of 
al-balad allow for the juxtaposition of the different social classes present in Amman. The 
alleyways and corridors of the suq protected ‘Arar’s ability to stroll without fear of 
oncoming cars.614 Akin to the Parisian arcades, the pedestrian nature of al-balad would 
be short lived. Amman developed with the car and as a result, the centralization of life in 
al-balad would dissipate over time as the city modernized. From his perch in a café 
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(frequently Hamdan coffee house), bar, or pub, ‘Arar was able to be both part of the 
movement of the city and be protected from the unpredictable undulations of the 
crowd.615  The flâneur never becomes part of the masses; he “demanded elbow room and 
was unwilling to forego the life of a gentleman of leisure.”616 As historian Gregory Shaya 
points out, the flâneur “was a figure of the modern artist-poet, a figure keenly aware of 
the bustle of modern life, an amateur detective of the city, but also a sign of the alienation 
of the city and of capitalism.”617 For ‘Arar, this leisure was generally found in the bottom 
of a glass of cognac.618 In ‘Arar’s own words “[i]t is as if Amman knew no brother of joy 
who habitually frequents pubs and makes pilgrimages to taverns.”619 ‘Arar both 
acknowledges his participation in normal Ammani life while simultaneously feeling 
alienated from the ethos of the city.  
‘Arar was not an inconspicuous part of Ammani society. The famous novelist 
Abd al-Rahman Munif620 recalls in his memoir that “[t]he name ‘Arar was mentioned by 
many, because that poet’s life was linked to politics, gypsies and poetry that had to be 
secretly read, either because it was too explicit or because it had been banned. One of the 
main places where he was to be seen was the Kawar Tavern.” Students would come by 
and recite his poetry to try to engage and entice a response from the poet. Munif recalled 
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that on occasion ‘Arar would stand up, clap, and say, “‘you see you ignoramuses, how 
important poetry is? Even the schoolboys have memorized it!’”621 ‘Arar’s poetry was 
meant to engage the masses both inside of Amman and throughout Transjordan. Poetry 
was the major medium of intellectual exchange of the period. According to Taylor, 
“poetry fulfilled the function of history text, newspaper and political speech. It was, in 
short, the major vehicle for formulating cultural identity in response to historical 
events.”622 Despite the primacy of poetry, and his personal renown, ‘Arar remained a 
controversial figure removed from mainstream Ammani society of the Mandate. In this 
way, ‘Arar remains the disconnected flâneur whose gaze was inherently directed at the 
city which he will never truly be a part of.623   
‘Arar’s personal history with the young Transjordan government was intimately 
connected to his divergent views on Transjordan’s development, and its capital of 
Amman. Born in Irbid in 1899 and educated in Damascus and Aleppo, ‘Arar’s poetry 
bridged the gap from the last gasps of the Ottoman period through the Mandate into the 
early years of Jordanian independence until his death in 1949.624 The lyrical style of 
‘Arar’s poetry itself acknowledges the transitional period in which he lived. ‘Arar’s 
poetry frequently invoked classical phrases and allusions while imbuing his language 
with a new modernity by using colloquial phrases. ‘Arar is credited as one of the 
innovators of the modern renovation of the Arabic qasidah, transforming it “from being 
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an imitation and emulation of its predecessors into a qasidah with its own distinctive 
qualities, experience and discourse.”625 His poetry helped transform Arabic poetry into a 
modern medium. 
Throughout his life, ‘Arar held numerous teaching posts and government 
positions. His career as a civil servant from the late 1920s through 1942 oscillated 
between official government posts and periods of imprisonment and exile.626 At various 
times, he was the Governor of Wadi Seer, Zerka, Shobak, and Salt. He also spent 
significant time in Amman first as a teacher and later as the Executive Officer of the 
Amman Court, Chief Clerk of the Amman Court, Inspector for the Ministry of Education, 
and finally as the Chief of Ceremony for the Royal Palace in 1941-1942. These 
appointments also reflect the unique relationship that ‘Arar had with Amir Abdullah. 
They were the two preeminent poets of their time and exchanged barbs with one another 
in verse on more than one occasion. This special relationship helps explain why despite 
his frequent open criticism ‘Arar always found his way back into the good graces of the 
government.627 This varied work history makes ‘Arar’s criticism and mocking of Amman 
and the government all the more personal and jarring. ‘Arar frequently found himself part 
of the very system and institutions that he lambasted in his poetry.  
This schizophrenic relationship with the Anglo-Hashemite state was indicative of 
the realities of the educated classes during the Mandate period. The government needed 
to employ the small class of educated men as civil servants and teachers. The Mandatory 
government could not simply afford to expel these men due to the limited numbers of 
qualified individuals. This explains why the state frequently chose to imprison and exile 
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members of the political opposition only to quickly reintegrate them back into the 
government after their terms had expired.628 “The small cadre of educated men like ‘Arar 
thus became intertwined with the state, even as many like ‘Arar, spent periods of time in 
opposition to it. The Hashemite state could import clerks and politicians from the 
surrounding areas, but to gain a foothold in the country, it needed to rely upon indigenous 
skills.”629 The Mandatory state needed the population to accept its rule. It had to inculcate 
mētis. Without local acceptance, the Anglo-Hashemite state would never develop lasting 
authority, and perhaps more importantly, authenticity. This uneasy detente informed the 
dual nature of ‘Arar’s professional life. This duality is evident in the prime target for 
‘Arar’s angst and displeasure with changing social and cultural norms of Transjordan: the 
city of Amman. 
For ‘Arar, Amman symbolized all that had gone awry in his beloved land. 
Amman was a proxy for the Mandate government, which had twisted and tainted 
Transjordan. The imposition of centralized control emanating from Amman over the land 
of Transjordan was unnatural; it marked the destruction and pollution of the natural 
beauty of Jordan by a bevy of foreigners (both the British and the Hashemites). ‘Arar 
considered Transjordan to be a natural entity. He clearly differentiated Transjordan from 
neighboring Palestine. ‘Arar has been frequently praised as a Jordanian patriot because he 
was among the first to champion the natural existence of a discrete Jordanian state, 
separated from Palestine. ‘Arar’s separation of the Transjordan government and the land 
of Transjordan was inherently paradoxical. No one had ever considered the land “east of 
the Jordan” a single discrete unit until the formation of the Transjordan Mandate in 1922.  
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‘Arar’s weapon against the government was his sardonic wit and mockery of all 
semblances of official life in Amman. This included using public inebriation at any 
formal or state occasion as his form of non-vocal opposition. He contrasted his literal 
drunkenness with the figurative inebriation of the entire city of Amman. “Let Amman be 
drunk with shameless hypocrisy and lies.”630  ‘Arar frequently contrasted Amman to 
unspoiled landscapes/places outside of the city such as Madaba, Wadi Seer, and Salt. The 
highest ideal of virtue, justice and equality ‘Arar reserved for the gypsies. The gypsies 
were the personification of the outsider in Mandate era Transjordan. ‘Arar imbued the 
gypsy with many of the noble characteristics that others have attributed to the noble and 
savage Bedouin.631 His idolization of the gypsies was meant as a “mirror to mock his 
contemporaries.”632  
Despite its shortcomings, ‘Arar frequently yearned for his homeland while away. 
However, he always knew that the inhabitants of Amman and “the deity of Raghadan 
[would] be pleased” if he had fallen into ruin.633 ‘Arar beseeched his countrymen in “No 
One Criticizes Your Poetry” to not fall prey to the allure of Amman: 
Don’t be deceived by Amman’s palaces. Their honor and their exquisite carvings 
are no greater than a boudoir woven by a caterpillar /  
Nothing emerges from them but harm; all their hullabaloo is mere sandman’s 
sand. / 
Don’t be impressed by glorious titles; Not every word means what it says. /  
If inhabitants of Amman were really my fellow countrymen they would not put up 
with whatever they confront.634 
 
For ‘Arar, the pomp and circumstance of Amman were empty. The titles given out by its 
illegitimate government meant nothing. If the inhabitants of Amman were true 
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Transjordanians, they would fight the growth of the new government. The injustices 
meted out by the Mandatory government could not and should not be accepted according 
to ‘Arar. “Establish your house away from Amman: Darkness never leaves Amman, but 
elsewhere the sun always shines… I knew in Raghadan noble free men, who, upon going 
forth to defend the Right, took up arms without wasting words. What became of them? 
May God preserve them. If you tried to force them to speak they would remain silent. Is 
it not true that the splendor of Raghadan outshines the night of Amman?”635 The 
influence of the palace in Amman, Raghadan, corrupted all who encountered it. Noble 
men have entered Abdullah’s palace but none has returned. ‘Arar sarcastically mocked 
the splendor of the palace saying that it outshone the city of Amman. For ‘Arar, the city 
of Amman was nothing more than the hollow seat of the Hashemite state. This grand 
depiction of Raghadan Palace and Amman was quite removed from the realities of the 
Mandate era capital. The level of splendor that existed in Amman, even the pomp 
attributed directly to the Amir, was quite minimal. There simply were not the finances to 
afford anything more grand or lavish. What ‘Arar described was the grotesque symbol of 
the Anglo-Hashemite state. This caricature of Amman was more dangerous for ‘Arar than 
the real conditions of the capital. Although its reality may not have been extravagant, it 
was still highly corrupt and vapid compared to the pure countryside that ‘Arar 
champions.  
 ‘Arar laments and mourns what Amman and the land of Transjordan once were. 
Here, once again, there was an inherent paradox in ‘Arar’s memory of Amman and its 
reality. ‘Arar bemoans the spoiled nature of modern Amman, but in the late Ottoman 
                                                 





period Amman was little more than a small village. His nostalgia for an earlier time is for 
one in which no territory known as “Transjordan” existed. Instead of longing for the 
actual reality of the Ottoman past, ‘Arar essentially yearned for a period without a strong 
centralized state. His perception of “natural” is a land untouched by modern government. 
His wistful remembrance of a purer past is keeping with Benjamin’s nostalgic flâneur. He 
remembers Amman as a village but notes that it was “too easily influenced – a 
corruptible soul.”  ‘Arar sees no redeeming characters in Mandate Era Amman: “You 
were not yesterday’s future, nor are you tomorrow’s hope. The qualifications of a decent 
town are unity of opinion and dearth of backbiting. But you, O Amman, have no opinions 
except those of the British Resident.”636  
British Mandatory officials housed in Amman were ‘Arar’s favorite target for his 
venomous rhetoric. Although ‘Arar frequently indicts Amir Abdullah, in ‘Arar’s eyes the 
chief offenders were British Resident Cox, Arab Legion Commander Peake, and Judicial 
Adviser Hooper. These three men had infected his beloved land and warped its 
government. ‘Arar’s opinion of Abdullah seems to vacillate over time. His demonization 
of Ragahdan Palace is an indictment against the entire Mandatory government, not only 
Amir Abdullah. ‘Arar yearns to “renew the day of Sheehan,” by which he means the days 
in which the inhabitants of Karak rebelled against the Ottomans in 1909.637 He longs for 
the days in Transjordan before the coming of Abdullah and the British, before the onset 
of modernity.  
Beyond government officials, ‘Arar frequently criticized the shallow and 
seemingly vacuous people of Amman. ‘Arar lambasted Amman as being “full of 
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demagogues who imagine themselves high in the stars, while they are trussed up in 
chains.”638 The demagogues and elite, which ‘Arar disdainfully referred to, had turned 
their back on the true beauty of Jordan. The “ladies of Amman” acted as “the social 
arbiters of their glittering new world, always ready to outdo their competitors in adopting 
foreign ways and fashions.”639 ‘Arar viewed these women, and the larger elite social 
class to which they belonged, to be alien from the true essence of Transjordan.640  
The sense of dislocation that ‘Arar alludes to was symptomatic of the growing 
divide developing in Amman. The city’s population began to self-segregate during the 
Mandate period. The establishment of the neighborhood of Jabal Amman, and later Jabal 
al-Weibdeh, was indicative of the growing schism in Amman between a westernized elite 
enclave and a traditional impoverished quarter. Jabal Amman, which was the only new 
neighborhood developed during the Mandate period, became the home of Amman’s new 
notables. It embodied the creation of a new elite class in Amman and centralized public 
and cultural life away from al-balad for the first time. Again, ‘Arar’s scorn is not so 
much directed at the actual individuals who comprised this new elite class but what they 
symbolized. The new elite in Amman dragged Transjordan further away from ‘Arar’s 
unspoiled natural ideal. ‘Arar’s misanthropy was derived from a sense of self-loathing as 
he was occasionally part of this toxic class that he so despised. ‘Arar hated what the 
Mandatory government, and Amman by extension, symbolized, but that did not stop him 
from collecting his pay as part of the same government infrastructure.  
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Always contrarian, ‘Arar seemed to revel in the consternation and irritation he 
caused the government. He frequently admits in his poetry that he may be going too far. 
“I have gone too far. Here (Amman) ignorance resembles learning. My salary prevents 
speech as if I had water in my mouth.”641 ‘Arar notes the inherent hypocrisy of working 
for the same government he detests. On a number of occasions, ‘Arar speaks of quitting 
but does not appear to have ever actually done so. In “Remains of Merry Tunes and Sad 
Memories”, he acknowledges that:  
The authorities in Amman disapprove of my frankness, and they have judged me 
to be unpardonable. / 
They say the authorities in Amman are tired of my way of life, in which I accept 
invitations to join revelers, / 
and that people bitterly disapprove of my running freely to the tents with my 
drinking companions. / 
Their attitude would have been valid if Amman had ever known a single 
respectable person.642 
 
‘Arar in three lines dismissed every person who has ever lived in Amman. ‘Arar saw no 
problem in this blanket rejection of Amman’s inhabitants, including himself, because he 
never claimed to be respectable. Despite his apparent lack of respectability, ‘Arar 
remained a prominent figure in the cultural sphere of Transjordan after he was finally 
ousted from government posts with his final arrest in 1942. Although he died in 1949, he 
remains a literary and cultural pillar in the construction of Jordanian identity today. His 
perverse and twisted relationship with Amman and the Hashemite state remains as odd 
and convoluted today as it was in the interwar period.  
 ‘Arar’s systematic attack on the symbol of Amman was quite different from the 
city’s reality. Although ‘Arar depicted Amman as an extravagant capital, corrupted by the 
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Hashemite government, Amman’s actual architectural façade and urban fabric were 
something quite different. The slow growth of Amman throughout the Mandate period 
had more in common with the growth of a young town than the creation of a modern 
capital. Amman’s urban landscape was almost entirely devoid of monumental 
architecture. Instead, the inhabitants of Amman built on the few Ottoman urban structures 
left in place and focused on residential development to create a new Ammani urban 
fabric.  
 
Limited Monumentality in Ammani Architecture 
 Despite ‘Arar’s claims to the contrary, Amman’s development was largely a 
byproduct of its geography, not the evil machinations of Raghadan Palace. Today, 
Amman is a city of countless hills and steps, but Amman’s earliest incarnation was little 
more than a village that hugged the banks of the Seil River. Although Amman’s identity 
as the “City of Water” is now hidden below concrete and asphalt, Amman’s formation 
and growth had everything to do with the river and springs that run through its core. The 
waters began at the Ras al-‘Ain spring. Water from the spring, pumped to the various 
water towers in the city, supplied all of Amman with water during the Mandate period. 
The waters of the spring flowed into a stream that eventually became the Seil River. The 
Seil ran from West to East through Amman and eventually terminated in the Zarqa River. 
 The city’s central river defined the boundaries of Amman during the early parts 
of the British Mandate. In the words of Abd al-Rahman Munif, “[t]he city of Amman 





east, except for a few scattered houses further east.”643 The population of the city kept 
close to this central corridor during the early years of Amman. The river’s role was 
crucial for Amman, but its tendency to flood in the winter also threatened Amman’s 
inhabitants. “The journey through Amman from the river’s origin to its mouth was short, 
but the importance of a river [is] not always determined by its length. Rivers are like 
human beings – not all of the same nature or disposition. The river looked and behaved in 
a more or less similar way during three seasons: spring, summer and autumn. But in 
winter, it was a different matter.”644 There were particularly devastating floods in 1935, 
1938, and 1943 when “the square stretching from al-Husseini Mosque, beyond the 
vegetable market, had turned into a lake.”645  
Amman, despite its atypical topography, was not a “unique” or “abnormal” city 
for the Levant. The city shares many common characteristics with the neighboring 
capitals in the region. Like Cairo and Baghdad, Amman developed around its central 
river. What at first glance appears unique about Amman is that it developed in the Ras al-
‘Ain Wadi (a valley surrounded by hills with a river cutting through it) and consequently 
has a very hilly topography. However, even this abnormal topography has urban Ottoman 
counterparts. The Ottoman provincial capital of Salt developed in the same manner with 
the haras (residential neighborhoods) on the hillside and the suq in the central valley.646 
Similarly, in Beirut urban expansion had begun to climb the “steepest terrain, neglected 
in the first phase of urbanization” in the late Ottoman period.647 Amman’s hills are 
perhaps more pronounced and dominant in its urban fabric than in other cities, Mandate 
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Amman spanned seven hills, but this does not disqualify it from being a traditional 
“Middle Eastern city.” Amman’s development, akin to many other cities in region, 
coalesced around the availability of water, division of spaces between residential and 
commercial life, and the necessity of a central mosque.648 
Although Amman can satisfy the arbitrary classifications of the “Middle Eastern 
city,” a simple division between residential and commercial areas does not summarize its 
characteristics. Furthermore, the trope of the “Islamic/Arab/Middle East city” has been 
thoroughly refuted as reductionist by a number of scholars including Janet Abu Lughod, 
Jens Hanssen, Marc Levine, and Stefan Weber amongst others. Instead of discussing 
Amman in sweeping stereotypes, it is more productive to focus on the urban fabric of the 
young capital. Amman is largely a modern city, but this does not negate its Ottoman 
heritage. Ottoman Amman did contain most of the architectural components of other late 
Ottoman settlements. Amman had three major focal points that delineated the space and 
were important to the residents of Amman. All three landmarks, the ‘Umari Mosque 
(replaced by the Husseini Mosque in 1924), the Roman theater, and the Amman 
municipality building, predated the start of the Transjordan Mandate. The ‘Umari 
Mosque and the Roman theater played crucial cultural, social, and religious roles in 
Amman long before the arrival of Abdullah and the British. These buildings remained 
central to day-to-day Ammani life during the Mandate period.  
The Amman municipality building was one of the few buildings erected by the 
Ottoman authorities. Though there is no specific date available for its construction, it 
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appears on an aerial map from 1918. The municipality added a second story to the 
building and a balcony during the 1920s.649 While there was no official governmental 
residence during the Ottoman Period, it was found in neighboring Salt, the municipality 
building essentially fulfilled the same role. The village of Amman also contained an 
Ottoman army barracks and communications complex. The British renovated both 
buildings for the use of the Mandatory government. The army barracks, which were 
attached to the train station, became the headquarters for the Arab Legion at the 
beginning of the Mandate.650 As well, Amman’s first school government school, Dar al-
Najah, was established behind the mosque in 1916. This school, also referred to as the 
“war school,” taught classes in Turkish with the exception of religion, which was taught 
in Arabic.651 All of these buildings and institutions mirrored the common characteristics 
indicative of a late Ottoman city but in a much smaller scale.  
Amman’s three monumental buildings each spoke to a different part of the 
Mandate regime. The Husseini Mosque represented the Islamic character of the state and 
the local populace. Raghadan Palace personified Hashemite legitimacy and the British 
Residence stood for the clear colonial oversight that existed in nearly all parts of the 
Mandate. The limited number of monumental buildings in Amman during the Mandate 
was not abnormal for Middle Eastern cities of the nineteenth century. Amman’s urban 
development followed many of the same trajectories that other “traditional cities” had a 
century earlier. It included a central mosque, governmental residences, an army barracks, 
and even a small clock tower. The small clock tower, which barely reached one story, 
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was constructed in Feisal Square at some point during the Mandate period, but it hardly 
evoked a sense of grandeur.652 From this perspective, Amman’s urban layout was  
“traditional.” The three monumental buildings constructed during the Mandate period 
(Husseini Mosque, the British Residence, and Raghadan Palace) superseded the three 
monumental buildings of late Ottoman Amman (the ‘Umari Mosque, the Amman 
municipality building, and the Roman theater). The focal points of Mandate Amman were 
its royal palaces and the grand mosque. However, in colonial Amman there were two 
“palaces” representing the two poles of political power.653 (Appendix 1, 6-1 for 
procession showing clock tower in 1939) 
Similar to other “traditional” cities, Amman’s mosque was the center of the city 
(medina). Construction on the Husseini Mosque began in 1923.654 The mosque was built 
on the ruins of a Byzantine basilica and an old Umayyad era mosque (the original ‘Umari 
mosque). Chief British Representative Philby was greatly angered by Abdullah’s decision 
to tear down these old buildings. Philby, it seems, focused more on the protection of 
Western ideas of cultural heritage, than promoting the religious or political credentials of 
the Amir.655  Abdullah responded to Philby’s rage by writing to High Commissioner 
Herbert Samuel. Abdullah argued that Philby’s actions were an intrusion into the 
religious affairs of the Emirate. Historian Irene Maffi believes that “Abdullah voluntarily 
abandoned the idiom of cultural heritage and adopted the religious one, pretending not to 
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understand Philby’s arguments. Abdullah’s refusal to consider the Basilica Affair to be a 
matter of cultural heritage was also the expression of his resistance to a practice typical of 
the colonial power.”656  
Abdullah’s choice to replace the Umayyad Mosque with a new Hashemite 
Mosque represented the new religious focus of the Emirate. The Amir derived a lot of his 
authority and legitimacy from his religious status as a Sharif. His decision to destroy the 
preexisting mosque can simultaneously be understood as providing the city with a new, 
renovated, and enlarged religious space, while also erasing the damaged Islamic past of 
Amman. A run down mosque was not going to be the religious beacon that Abdullah 
used to appeal to his subjects. In spite of the cultural and political angst caused by its 
construction, the Husseini Mosque quickly became the focal point of Amman. The 
utilization of the preexisting basilica/mosque location for the new Husseini Mosque, in 
addition to being a political and cultural decision, was also a geographic choice. The old 
mosque sat at the epicenter of downtown Amman in Feisal Square. The centrality and 
inherent significance of this location was undeniable. Husseini Mosque became the nexus 
for all of Mandate era Amman because of this centrality. The entire city radiated out from 
its new mosque. 
The mosque itself was of simple construction, in keeping with the modest means 
of the Mandate government. It was composed of a prayer hall forming a simple 
rectangular block, with a courtyard in front of it, which was surrounded by arcades on 
three sides.657 Originally, the mosque had a single minaret, consistent with Ottoman 
tradition. However, a second minaret was added after the first one was damaged in the 
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1927 earthquake. The Husseini Mosque originally had a drinking fountain placed in front 
of it as well. The Ottomans likely built this fountain, the Hamidiyye Sabeel, since it 
already existed in 1924 when Beatrice Erskine mentioned it in her travel memoir 
Transjordan.658 By the 1930s, the government removed the fountain. The fountains 
removal was in line with the British practice to remove architectural markers of the 
Ottoman period.659 (Appendix 1, figure 6-2 and 6-3, image of the construction of 
Husseini Mosque in 1925 and image of the Ottoman fountains in front of Husseini 
Mosque)  
Overall, the Husseini Mosque fulfilled two roles central to the function of the 
Anglo-Hashemite government. First, the new mosque reinforced the religious appeal of 
the Sharifian Amir. Abdullah constantly presented himself as a devout Muslim and made 
a show of his weekly processions to the mosque for Friday prayer.660 These weekly 
processions from Raghadan Palace to Husseini Mosque for Friday prayers highlighted the 
dual poles of Hashemite authority: their Sharifian lineage and their political might.661 
Secondly, the mosque generated a new sense of cultural, religious, and social gravity for 
downtown Amman. The mosque became the clear meeting place and focal point of the 
city. Orientating the city around its new Hashemite mosque subtly reinforced the 
necessity of the Hashemite monarchy to orient and ground the state.  
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The second symbol of Hashemite authority in Amman was the royal palace. Amir 
Abdullah’s palace, Raghadan Palace, was built between 1924 and 1927 in the outskirts of 
Amman. The palace was built on a hilltop, near the train station, so that it could overlook 
the entire city. Its lofted position was indicative of the Amir’s power and oversight over 
all of Amman, and by extension, all of Transjordan. The dual poles of Hashemite might 
further reinforced the role of the Amir. Abdullah’s religious clout gave his authority 
bearing, emanating from the core of Amman, while his political mantle allowed him to 
oversee all of Amman, from his elevated perch. The palace was built by Sa’ad al-Din 
Shatila (al-Dimashqi), who had also overseen part of the Hijaz railways construction 
between Kiswe and Ma’an. It is unclear who designed the palace.  
Raghadan Palace, which consisted of a single building, was modest and 
constructed of sandstone. Over time, other buildings were added to turn it into a royal 
complex. The original building had a tripartite construction, but was too grand and ornate 
to truly fall within the three-bay home classification.662 The main entrance had a large 
“imperial” staircase leading entrants directly to the throne room on the second floor. On 
the first floor, there was a library, small reception parlor, and an official dining room. On 
the second floor, there was the large throne room, where Abdullah held his weekly salami 
(men’s reception) on Friday mornings. The Amir used this space to meet with his 
Cabinet.663 The palace as a whole kept to the triple-bay style while including Western 
elements, such as the imperial staircase. Its hybrid style was an apt reflection of the 
Amir’s position within the Mandate. He was a Sharifian Amir, who had been tempered 
                                                 
662 Shawash, “Architecture in Amman during the Emirate Period,”58-61.  





by Western experience, and beholden to a colonial state apparatus. (Appendix 1, figure 6-
4, photo of Raghadan Palace in 1940) 
The palace was flanked by the seat of colonial power during the Mandate, the 
Chief British Representative’s Residence. The British Residence in Amman stands out 
from other Mandatory architecture because it was the only building planned by the 
colonial apparatus of the state. The placement of the British Residence was key. This new 
building was built next to Raghadan Palace, on the road to the mahatta (train station). 
This placement, in the words of historian Eugene Rogan gave the “notion of power 
behind the power” which was the “spatial parallel to the prince’s relation to the 
British.”664 It is clear that the site of the new Residence was not accidental. This was 
architectural colonial dominance. This paternalistic approach both guarded the Mandate 
and Amman by extension, while reserving the authority to intervene into local affairs 
when necessary. This dichotomy between paternalism, interventionism, and a respect of 
the regions natural environment was evident in the construction of the British Residence. 
The British Residence was the colonial building par excellence in Amman.  
The chief architect of the Palestine Department of Public Works, Austen St Barbe 
Harrison, designed the British Residence. Prior to the construction of the purpose built 
British Residence in 1926, the Chief British Representative had been using a leased 
building in al-balad. Both Philby and Cox complained of the unsanitary conditions of the 
building, saying it was “infested with vermin.” Consideration of building a new residence 
had begun as early as 1922, but no progress occurred until the arrival of High 
Commissioner Lord Plumer in 1925. The actual construction of the new residence began 
                                                 





in 1926.665 Perhaps it is telling that both the Amir’s palace, and the British Residence, 
were constructed simultaneously. Their construction was the architectural personification 
of the constant jockeying between the opposing poles of the Transjordanian government. 
The new building was composed of three parts: a forecourt accessed through a wide 
portal and surrounded by service rooms, the living quarters of the British Resident, which 
included a drawing room, study, dining room, and a salon on the ground floor with 
bedrooms on the upper floor, and finally a walled in garden. 666 (Appendix 1, figure 6-5 
architectural plans of the British Residence)  
A respect for local urban environment and architectural styles was common 
throughout the British Empire in the interwar period. The colonial administration of New 
Delhi and Haifa generally only focused on infrastructural improvement and the 
construction of necessary administrative buildings. The only difference between the 
British approach in New Delhi and Amman was the grand scale the British adopted in 
India.667 Harrison believed both in the idealist theories of the Beaux Arts Movement as 
well as a respect for the local environment. He thought that a building must fit its local 
surroundings and make use of local materials.668 Harrison’s plan developed along two 
main axes, with every element of the design having a balanced symmetrical counterpart. 
669This approach was in keeping with British colonial architecture in New Delhi that 
rejected modernism in favor of “consider[ing] the interests of ‘civilization’ at large, 
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which were not necessarily identical to those of the country’s inhabitants.”670 According 
to Fuchs and Gilbert, the Residence paid homage to the Islamic model and was a “central 
residential block [which] bears striking resemblance to the Çinili Kiosk, the 15th Century 
Ottoman imperial pavilion at the Topkapisaray, Istanbul.” In addition to being in line 
with Ottoman precedent, the Residence also had a plain white washed exterior, which 
was in keeping with both Palestinian village homes and Circassian homes common in 
Mandate era Amman.671 This combination of symmetry and local architectural 
conventions was a convenient shorthand for the British approach to their rule in 
Transjordan.  
The British controlled much of Transjordan’s financial minutiae, but left the 
actual fulfillment of their meticulous plans to the local inhabitants of Transjordan. It is 
important to note that although the British Residence was outside of the city center, the 
Resident’s offices remained in al-balad, despite the frequent protests that the building 
was in a flood plain and unsuitable.672 Similar to the two manifestations of Hashemite 
authority, the mosque and the palace, the office of the British Resident also had two 
architectural symbols in Amman. The British Residence, which overlooked all of 
Amman, denoted a clear paternalistic approach of total oversight. This all-encompassing 
oversight was balanced by the actual humble offices of the British Resident in al-balad. 
The British Residence may have been perched on a hill outside of the city proper, but the 
actual day-to-day function of the British Resident took place in the heart of the city. 
(Appendix 1, figure 6-6 completed British Residence 1928) 
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Although there were only three monumental buildings built during the British 
Mandate period, they each played a critical role to the function of the city and the state. 
Both Raghadan Palace and the British Residence were critical in the day-to-day function 
of the government housed in Amman. However, only a small elite cadre of Transjordan’s 
population ever set foot in either building. Both buildings were far outside the city center, 
and were thus disconnected from the daily life of the city. Although Amman’s 
monumental architecture played an important role in the development of the capital, it 
only had a minimal impact on Amman’s urban fabric. The expansion of Amman and the 
creation of a discrete Ammani urban landscape were extensions of Amman’s residential 
architecture. It is in Amman’s residential architecture where the diverse heritage of 
Amman was most evident.  
 
The Residential Architecture of Amman 
Amman’s urban fabric developed without government oversight throughout the 
Mandate period. The lack of an urban plan scheme allowed the city’s expansion to be 
gradual. This growth did not have to conform to a new colonial architectural style. 
Ironically, the government had worked to transform Amman into a Hashemite Versailles 
but they did so without focusing any of their energy on the actual space of Amman. 
Instead, Amman became an unruly contested urban space.  Amman’s architecture 
evolved as a natural outgrowth of its own hybridized Ottoman past. Although the 
Ottomans built many of Amman’s earliest buildings, it is hard to pin down a discrete list 
of Ottoman urban characteristics or attributes to analyze Amman’s architecture. This 





development. The Ottoman Empire ruled over the Middle East for over four hundred 
years. Over this long period, architectural styles changed to suit the needs of the times. 
According to the architect Rami Daher, “The Ottoman architectural and urban heritage in 
the Middle East is characterized by a harmonious unity, while managing to accommodate 
regional diversity. Ottoman architectural works vary greatly, in both quality and quantity, 
between the various provinces, and can be seen as a testimony to the Ottomans’ attention 
to and incorporation of contextual spatial and historic specificities.”673 Despite their 
common Ottoman origin, these buildings do not correspond to a universal Ottoman 
architectural style or category. Ottoman buildings were similar in their functionality, not 
necessarily their appearance. 
Taking into account the limitations of an Ottoman category, it is more productive 
to discuss the four distinct residential building styles found in Mandate era Amman, and 
highlights the various Ottoman influences found within each style. There was very little 
non-residential construction in Amman during the Mandate. Two notable exceptions 
were the Church Missionary Society School for girls and the Bishop’s School, both 
located in the neighborhood of Jabal Amman.674 The vast majority of the city’s growth 
during the Mandate period was private residential construction. The four dominant 
residential architectural styles of the period were the Circassian house, the Arab rural or 
village house, the Bilad al-Sham townhouse, and the three-bay or central hall house. The 
first two building styles, the Circassian house and the Arab rural house, both appeared in 
Amman during the Ottoman period and the earliest days of the Mandate. The latter two 
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styles, the Bilad al-Sham townhouse and the three-bay house, only started to appear in 
Amman in the late 1920s.  
The earliest dwellings used in Amman were the caves and ruins found amongst 
the Roman theatre. This recycling of ancient materials by the early Circassian population 
greatly upset British Resident Philby. “All the ancient buildings now standing are 
occupied by modern houses, and every day it seems some parts of the old walls are … 
broken up and carried away.”675 The Circassian population of Amman quickly moved on 
to a housing style that was distinct in its architectural features and its building materials. 
In Amman, many of these early homes used the stones taken from the surrounding 
archaeological remains. The Circassians used these stones to build homes with a simple 
façade and a flat roof. When old stones became scarce, the Circassians moved on to a 
second building model made of mud brick. These homes incorporated wooden porches 
and used wooden posts to hold up the roofs. The porch was central to these homes 
because the rooms did not connect to one another; instead, they all opened onto the 
porch.676  
The second iteration of the Circassian home was remarkable for its woodwork. 
These homes employed a post and lintel construction made of huge timbers. This 
contrasted strongly with the stonework that comprised all other houses found in Amman. 
Most Circassian homes were oriented to the North, limiting the amount of sunlight 
entering the homes.677  They were constructed with mud bricks tempered with straw and 
a roof of cane arranged on oak beams. These houses were constantly white washed to 
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keep them clean.678 Although the Circassian homes utilized local materials, little 
evidence of Ottoman influence was visible in these homes. The Circassian house style 
existed largely unchanged, regardless of where the Circassians settled throughout Bilad 
al-Sham. This housing style developed in the Caucasus and then was simply deployed in 
a new locale. A few of these homes exist in Amman today, but their construction fell off 
markedly as Amman ceased to be a Circassian village, and became an Arab Muslim city 
in the early years of the Mandate. (Appendix 1, Figure 6-7 is an image of second type of 
Circassian style home in Jabal al-Qal’a (citadel hill) in Amman, figure 6-8 photo of Jabal 
al-Qal’a in 1920s showing numerous Circassian homes) 
The majority of the Circassian homes were clustered in neighborhoods that 
corresponded to the different waves of Circassian immigration. The four Circassian 
quarters in Amman were the Shapsug, the Abzakh, the Kabartey, and the Muhacirin.679 
Each distinct derived its name from a different dialect group except the Muhacirin, which 
were a later immigrant group from 1906-1907, belonging to the Kabartey dialect group. It 
is from this Circassian group that the Muhajirin Bridge derived its name. The Circassians 
during this period largely formed a middle-class urban community, many holding 
government positions. 680 The most prominent member of the Circassian community was 
Sa’id al-Mufti, who was a member of the First Legislative Council, a Mayor of Amman, 
and became Prime Minister four times during the 1950s. The al-Mufti family home was 
frequently used for government functions and to house foreign dignitaries visiting 
Amman. (Appendix 1, figure 6-9 photo of al-Mufti home)  
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Similar to the Circassian house, the Arab rural house or Arab village house 
predated the Mandate period. These homes consisted of an all-purpose single rectangular 
room. This single room housed all daily activities, sleeping quarters for the extended 
family, and for the livestock. The space was divided into a lower spoiled space (qa‘ al-
bayt or simply qa‘) near the entrance and an elevated sleeping and living space 
(mastaba).681 These homes belonged to the Arab peasants (fellah) and were usually 
located close to grazing pastures for their livestock.  The Arab rural home appeared as 
early as the seventeenth century in Palestine. There was a wide variety of Arab rural 
homes in Palestine. Each sub-type incorporated varying degrees of elaboration. In 
Transjordan, these homes tended to be much simpler, with the most common version 
consisting of a repeated parallel arch structure inside the home. The exterior of these 
homes were wooden beams faced with mud, and hay, and eventually cement. These outer 
layers were patched and updated annually.682  
These homes existed on the outskirts of the Amman, primarily near the Amman 
train station (mahatta). This old style of home was widespread in the Ottoman Levant, 
but relatively short lived in Amman. Newer hybridized architectural styles replaced the 
Arab rural house in Amman by the mid-1930s. Both the Arab rural home, and the 
Circassian home, were symptomatic of a long-lived architectural styles found in the 
Levant catering to extended family units.683 The newer architectural styles found in the 
Mandate era mark a discrete break with these earlier styles in that they were meant for 
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nuclear family units. This subtle shift denoted a more modern building ethos.684 This 
style of home was indicative of the transition of Amman from a small village to a city. 
The Arab rural home was part of a pre-modern Amman that slowly faded away as 
Amman developed into the modern capital of Transjordan. (Appendix 1, figure 6-10 Arab 
rural home on outskirts of Amman) 
The Bilad al-Sham townhouse and the three-bay house did not begin to appear in 
Amman until after the start of the Mandate. All the religious and ethnic segments of 
Amman’s population used these homes. Both house styles relied on stone and concrete 
construction. The municipality endorsed this style of construction after the 1927 
earthquake because it was safer than the mud-brick construction of Circassian and Arab 
rural homes.685 Although both types of homes were made of the same materials, the 
function of the two building styles was quite different. The Bilad al-Sham traditional 
townhouse was mainly a commercial building, and as a result, it was geographically 
constrained to market areas throughout the region. This style of building had existed 
throughout Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, in cities like Haifa and Nablus for centuries.686  
Early versions of these homes contained a central courtyard, with poorly lit and 
ventilated apartments surrounding it. These apartments on the ground floor were used as 
stores and shops instead of living quarters because of these uncomfortable conditions. 
The earlier iterations with large courtyards had largely disappeared by the late nineteenth 
century, in favor of a more condensed design. Over time, these homes adapted to a linear 
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pattern following the market street. This compressed pattern increased the economic 
utility of the building at the cost of its residential inhabitants.687 Bilad al-Sham 
townhouses, which began to appear in Amman during the 1920s, were concentrated in 
and around the suqs of al-balad. These homes generally had shops and other businesses 
on the ground floor, with residences on the second and sometimes third floors. The 
various floors of these buildings frequently rented out to different individuals or 
families.688  
Two extant examples of this style of home were built in 1937, and designed by 
Municipal Engineer Sharif Fawaz al-Muhanna. These homes, located on King Feisal 
Street, were owned originally by Hamid Kilmat and Majid Muhammad respectively. The 
bottom floor of the Hamid Kilmat home, located near the Arab Bank building, operated 
as the “Brazil Café” in 1946. The Majid Muhammad building had a commercial Indian 
shop on its ground floor.689 Many other iterations of the Bilad al-Sham townhouse 
survive today along King Feisal Street, Salt Street, King Hussein Street, Talal Street, and 
Wadi Seer Street. The Bilad al-Sham townhouse is an excellent example of the malleable 
nature of Ottoman architecture. Although the style emerged during the Ottoman period 
throughout the Levant, it was not a static design. It changed over time becoming more 
compact, with the courtyard and garden losing relevance and size in its Ammani 
manifestations.690 The Ammani version of the Bilad al-Sham townhouse prioritized 
economic utility for the building’s owner over residential comforts for the individuals 
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who rented out the other apartments. (Appendix 1, figure 6-11 photo of Bilad al-Sham 
townhouse owned by Hamid Kilmat on King Feisal Street in al-balad.)  
Perhaps the most widely studied type of home found in Mandate era Amman is 
the three-bay house, also referred to as the central hall house.691 These homes were a 
regional subgroup that developed in the late Ottoman period. Three-bay homes featured 
“a closed, cubic body, with rows of windows oriented towards the street [and a] 
rectangular covered central hall flanked by several rooms.” 692 These homes developed 
throughout the Levant, in cities such as Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo. According to 
historian Anne Mollenhauer, these homes were a synthesis of the local liwan-plan of 
Bilad al-Sham homes, houses with a central open iwan hall flanked by rooms, and the 
Anatolian sofa-plan, urban houses with a covered inner hall, known as a sofa. If the three-
bay house is viewed as a synthesis of these styles, it can be understood as an attempt by 
the local population to acknowledge their part in the Ottoman Empire, while still 
preserving a local identity.  
What was most remarkable about the appearance of the three-bay house 
throughout Greater Syria was how the homes interacted with the areas around them. 
Traditional courtyard homes used high plain facades to hide the homes from the public. 
The home was meant to be a private space. Three-bay homes, on the other hand, adopted 
a more modern and open orientation with numerous outward facing windows. These 
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homes also frequently had balconies in front of the triple arched windows.693 This shift 
from an introverted, to an extroverted character, was indicative of a societal change 
towards the built environment and the community at large. “In fact, the emergence of 
these houses is a manifestation of the process of modernization that began to affect the 
Arab World during this period. The traditional inward-looking house was turned inside 
out such that it opened out to its surroundings, rather than presenting them with blank 
facades. Its primary facades and openings no longer faced an interior courtyard, but 
instead faced the outside world.”694 The new elite of the late Ottoman Empire, the efendi 
class, used these homes as a means to more publicly display their wealth and status.695  
In Amman, government officials, Legislative Council representatives, and 
merchants became the local notables, similar to the late Ottoman efendi. The new 
merchant class in particular expanded rapidly towards the end of the Mandate period and 
was responsible for many of the three-bay homes in Amman. Although there had been 
merchants in Amman since its resettlement in 1878, the merchant class only began to 
grow in Amman during the Mandate period. The majority of these merchants originally 
came from neighboring Palestine and Syria. As Amman grew so did its merchant 
population. The influx of cash into Amman through grant-in-aid and other imperial 
projects created new markets for Amman’s merchants.696 However, it was the 
commercial activity associated with World War II that changed the position of Amman’s 
merchant class. The creation of the Middle East Supply Center (MESC) in 1941, and its 
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quota system, was highly beneficial for Transjordan merchants.697 This massive 
accumulation of capital solidified a new merchant-elite class centered in Amman.698 
Much of this surplus capital funneled into new three-bay home construction.  
The earliest appearances of three-bay houses in Amman were closer to the iwan-
style homes of Bilad al-Sham. Two early examples of these homes are the Qa’war house 
built in the 1920s in Jabal al-Weibdeh, and the Amir Shakir house built in Jabal Amman 
in 1928.699 Both of these homes contain a central iwan that had not yet been fully made 
into an interior space. These homes are a deviation from the older iwan-style because 
they incorporate a large number of windows, verandas, and balconies that allow the home 
to both provide privacy, and incorporate views from the surrounding areas into the 
home.700 (Appendix 1, figure 6-12 diagram and photograph of the Qawar home in Jabal 
al-Weibdeh) 
Lebanese influenced triple-arched versions of the three-bay home also appeared in 
Amman. The most famous version of this home in Amman belonged to the Chief 
Minister Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda. He constructed his home in Jabal Amman in 1927 
overlooking the ancient citadel of Amman (Jabal al-Qala’). The house also became the 
home of another Chief Minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda (no relation), and later the 
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headquarters of a local sports club, al-Jazirah Club.701 Other government officials also 
rented three-bay style homes throughout Jabal Amman. For example, Sir Alec Kirkbride 
rented the “Bani Hamidah house” when he was the assistant British Resident.702 In fact, 
all of the British Resident’s staff rented in Jabal Amman after the completion of the new 
British Residence.703 (Appendix 1, figure 6-13 diagrams of the Abu al-Huda house in 
Jabal Amman) 
More common than the Lebanese triple-arch model was the Palestinian triple-bay 
style. This style incorporated traditional techniques such as vaults, thick walls, and 
biforic windows. It is possible that the Palestinian triple-bay home was a response to the 
British Mandate itself because these homes only appeared in Amman after the start of the 
Mandate. The Palestinian triple-bay home were the latest iteration of the triple-bay home 
in Amman and only began to appear in Amman in the 1930s. These homes incorporated 
simpler British interpretations Greco-Roman classical motifs evident “in the abstracted 
ornament and the protruding portico.” This style of triple-bay was far more common than 
the Lebanese variant. It was easier to construct, while still exuding the prestige of a 
triple-bay home. An example of this style is the Sabbagh home built in 1935 in Jabal 
Amman. The Sabbagh home was part of the old British Embassy complex, along with the 
embassy building itself. 704 Another example of this style is the old building of the 
Bishop’s School also found in Jabal Amman.705 (Appendix 1, figure 6-14 diagram of 
Sabbagh home)  
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Many of the three-bay style homes in Amman were concentrated in one 
neighborhood, Jabal Amman. The new neighborhood of Jabal Amman became Amman’s 
first elite neighborhood, rising out of the destruction of the 1927 earthquake. After the 
1927 earthquake, the government and the municipality incentivized government 
employees to move to Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh. Employees were tempted 
with a three-month salary advance of if they would build their homes outside of the 
crowded city center. 706  The earthquake had hardly damaged the homes on the hills, and 
thinning the urban center was thought to be in the best interest of the health of the city. 
New development in Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh had a number of advantages. 
However, Jabal al-Weibdeh’s development did not pick up speed until after independence 
in 1946.707 These two hills were not as steep as the other hills surrounding the city center. 
The ease of climb of Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Weibdeh made construction easier and 
not as expensive. The distance from al-balad provided better security. Until the end of 
the 1920s, there was still fear of Wahabi raids as far north as Amman. Jabal Amman 
delineated the outskirts of the city. The countryside began at the First circle and the 
reservoir of Jabal Amman, and the neighborhood essentially operated as its own 
enclave.708 Perhaps most importantly, the completion of new water reservoir towers in 
both areas made true development possible. This model of development mirrored 
similarly hilly Haifa.709 Previously, water had to be carried up to Jabal Amman on pack 
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animals.710 Understanding the possible advantages, and possessing the resources to fund 
new construction, wealthy merchants, landowners, and government employees flocked to 
Jabal Amman. Soon Jabal Amman became a bastion for the elite inhabitants of the city 
instead of the traditional downtown corridor.  
 Beyond the development of favorable infrastructure, Jabal Amman provided the 
rising elites in Amman the opportunity to separate themselves from the rest of the city. 
Prior to the development of Jabal Amman as a new area, the city had been a collection of 
ethnic and religious enclaves side by side in the city’s central corridor. Jabal Amman 
developed in a markedly different manner. This new neighborhood from the start was a 
mixed community of local Muslims and Christians, as well as Circassians, Palestinians, 
Syrians, and Lebanese. The only barrier to entry into Jabal Amman was resources. This 
division of the city’s population happened naturally; the new elites of Amman moved out 
of the city center and created a discrete more modern “city” alongside the old center 
(medina). Late Ottoman Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv/Jaffa all became dual cities. 
These bastions of modernity and Western architectural styles stood out from their more 
traditional urban counterparts. The evolution of a “dual city” links Amman to all other 
colonial urban centers during the interwar period.711 Jabal Amman became the home of 
the new elite of Amman and its small European population (mainly British officials of the 
Mandate). However, this colonial city was not a byproduct of colonial planning like the 
Heliopolis or Zamalek in Cairo or Place de l’Etoile in Beirut. Akin to the rest of 
Amman’s urban development, the dual city in Amman emerged without government 
intervention. No explicit urban plan dictated the formation of a new modern 
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neighborhood apart from the traditional city center, but it emerged along these lines 
nonetheless.712 However, the competing urban spaces that existed in Amman were not the 
result of a binary division of the city. Although Amman became divided between a more 
and less affluent population, these groups were hardly homogeneous. Amman’s elite 
class by the end of the Mandate was a combination of tribal sheikhs, urban notables, 
landowners, merchants, and civil servants. These varied actors may have resided in a 
single space but their goals and aspirations were quite different.  (Appendix 1, figure 6-15 
1930s photograph of Jabal Amman)  
The demographic and economic division of Amman that began with Jabal 
Amman continues until today. Today, al-balad signifies the demarcation of east and west 
Amman. Jabal Amman has become part of “Westernized” and more affluent western 
Amman while the older Circassian neighborhoods, Citadel Hill (Jabal al-Qal’a), and 
other new neighborhoods have remained the poorer more “traditional” segments of 
modern Amman. Despite these economic divisions, the architecture of Amman from the 
Mandate period still complied with a basic Ammani style. Ammani style homes, 
regardless of their specific category, use “roughly-textured stone blocks (locally known 
as tubzeh blocks) [that] provided the major exterior surface material for the houses.”713 
These homes have minimal detailing and ornamentation. In general, these homes were 
meant to serve the needs of a nuclear family. They are humble buildings with minimal 
monumentality, but possess elegant lines according to architect Rami Daher.714 Such 
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minimalist buildings are in keeping with the feel of Mandate era Amman and represent 
the diverse heritage of the city.715  
Amman’s hybridized heritage coalesced in the city’s downtown corridor. 
Regardless of socio-economic status, everyone in Amman congregated in al-balad. The 
focal point of al-balad, the single space in the city utilized by every Ammani, was Feisal 
Square. Although Anglo-Hashemite authority was magnificently personified on the 
outskirts of the city, it was how both the British and the Amir represented themselves in 
the city’s core that had a far larger socio-cultural impact on the city’s populace.    
 
al-Balad, Feisal Square, and the Heart of Amman 
 
The emergence of al-balad as the center of Amman was not a development of the 
Mandate period. Amman was not the only place to describe its downtown corridor as al-
balad. This popular term was used in both interwar Beirut and Cairo as a response to the 
redistricting of these cities. Al-Balad denoted where the true city was located, opposed to 
new neighborhoods and districts.716  In the case of Amman, this region in the valley of 
Wadi Ras al-‘Ain was the first area inhabited after the re-establishment of Amman in 
1878. The topography of the area naturally funnels to this point of convergence in 
between the surrounding hills. Amman is famous for its countless stairs leading down 
from the hills (jabal) into downtown. These steps ran for hundreds of meters scaling the 
hillsides of the city. The stairs became some of the earliest communal urban spaces in 
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Amman as they funneled its population to its urban core, al-balad.717 As the city grew, 
the centrality of al-balad increased. Although Amman began to divide between a 
prosperous western half and a more impoverished eastern half, al-balad remained the 
common denominator for all the inhabitants of the city.  
This shared importance was because most of the key economic and social services 
of Amman were located in al-balad. Various banks, schools, hospitals, government 
buildings, and hotels all bordered this central downtown corridor of Amman during the 
Mandate period. Newer trappings of the modern world also found their way to al-balad. 
The only gas pump in Amman was located in the middle of King Feisal Street, opposite 
the Ottoman Bank.718 The preeminent hotel of Amman, the Philadelphia Hotel, was 
located opposite of the Roman theater. Numerous suqs, shops, and stalls lined the streets 
of downtown Amman including suq al-Bukharieh, suq al-Bsharat, the halal livestock 
market, and later in the period, suq Mango and suq al-sukkar (sugar market)719 The only 
bakery in Amman where one could buy ready-made bread was located in the middle of 
suq al-Bukharieh.720 In the center of town, morning and night, a crowd was always 
assembled. According to Beatrice Erskine, “Amman seemed like the hub of the universe 
after a plunge into the country. The streets were particularly animated in the Afternoon. 
Men were buying and selling or sitting and gossiping at their doors; cars were worming 
their way through the crowd… And everyone talked at once.”721 This nexus of activity 
and daily life coalesced around the heart of downtown Amman, Feisal Square.  
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While the anchor points of al-balad - the Roman theater, the Umari Mosque and 
the Amman municipality building - existed before the start of the Mandate, they took on 
additional meaning and cultural resonance during the Mandate period. The Anglo-
Hashemite government utilized each of them to reinforce its validity and authority. This 
area made a natural backdrop, and ideal stage, for demonstrations, celebrations, and 
ceremonial displays.722  The true center of the city, known as “Feisal Square” or “Feisal 
Plaza,” was the strip of King Feisal Street between the Husseini Mosque and the “island” 
formed by Radah and Sa’adah Streets, where the municipality building was located.723 
Unlike neighboring Beirut and Damascus, the centrality of Feisal Square was not a result 
of urban planning. Beirut’s Place Hamidiyyeh and later Place de l’Etoile, or Damascus’ 
Martyr Square, were constructed as government centers, and only over time became 
social and commercial hubs.  
Feisal Square followed the opposite trajectory. Feisal Square developed on its 
own without government intervention or planning. 724 The natural gravity of Husseini 
Mosque, and Feisal Square by extension, was indicative of the natural growth of the 
entire city. No other Mandate era capital’s development was as separated from its 
governmental function as Amman’s was. While neighboring capital cities had, their 
urban environments imbued with meaning by the government through urban planning, in 
Amman this was a spontaneous byproduct. Although the streets that comprised Feisal 
Square predated the Mandate, the square underwent a transformation after the 
construction of Husseini Mosque. Prior to the construction of the new mosque, Feisal 
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Square was a logical central meeting point of the city. The city’s inhabitants utilized it 
out of convenience, not necessity. Husseini Mosque, on the other hand, transcended mere 
geographical centrality. Husseini Mosque and Feisal Square became the social, cultural, 
and religious epicenter of Amman. Only after the square generated this cultural gravity 
and heightened significance did the government begin to use it as a stage for government 
rituals. This opportunistic use of space was a reflection of the Transjordan government’s 
limited finances. The government did not have the money to create its own performative 
urban spaces. Instead, the government co-opted Feisal Square. In particular, Feisal 
Square became the stage for the exhibition and performance of Hashemite celebrations, 
ceremonies, and parades. This small space became the proving ground for Hashemite 
authority during the Mandate.  
The utilization of public processions for government purposes had been a 
common trope of the late Ottoman Empire. Public processions and demonstrations were a 
way for the modernizing Ottoman state to spatially reinforce a group identity. The 
Ottomans utilized these celebrations as a way to promote Ottoman identity over divisive, 
and potentially damaging, national and religious identities. For example, Ottoman usage 
of Frank Street in Izmir closely mirrors the pomp and ceremony that the Mandatory state 
imbued into Feisal Square.725 Nearly all government celebrations and parades took place 
on and around Feisal Square. These events further emphasized the dual nature of 
Hashemite authority. Government celebrations in Feisal Square exalted the authority, 
authenticity, and legitimacy of the Transjordanian state to all of Amman, and all of 
Transjordan. The political space of Feisal Square allowed Abdullah to export his 
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monarchical authority and prestige outside the halls of Raghadan Palace. In this way, 
Abdullah imbued into Feisal Square the weight of monarchical authority. The 
celebrations of Feisal Square further reinforced Amman’s identity as a Hashemite 
Versailles. These performances were yet another technique for the government to 
condition the populace into accepting its existence and necessity.  
The victory parade that accompanied Amir Abdullah’s first trip to London in 
1923 was one of the earliest occasions in which the new government utilized rituals and 
ceremonies in Feisal Square.. The government decided that Abdullah should leave his 
capital with all possible “pomp and glory” and ordered Commander Peake to have the 
Reserve Force (the predecessor of the Arab Army/Arab Legion) line the streets of central 
Amman. The newly formed army band, later known as the Massed Band, would march in 
front of the Amir’s car, literally trumpeting his arrival. However, the band had only 
received the instruments fourteen days earlier, and according to Peake, the band produced 
“an incredible amount of tuneless noise,” and he was thankful that “Amman was very 
small so we did not have to suffer long.” The ultimate indignity of the proceedings was 
when asked to play the royal salute the band instead played a tune called “come to the 
cookhouse doors.”726  
Despite the Massed Band’s early misadventure, the band became quite popular in 
Transjordan by the mid-1930s. The Mandatory government used the Roman theater as a 
high visibility stage for performances by the Massed Band. These performances were 
meant to entertain the masses, but they also subtly denoted the martial strength of the 
government. The band became so popular that they were invited to play at a number of 
                                                 





private parties and celebrations, like the opening of the Circassian Charity Association in 
Amman in 1940.727 The most important instrument for the band was bagpipes. This 
instrument was introduced in 1929 by the order of the Amir. The Bagpiper Band, 
originally comprising only six members, marched in front of Amir Abdullah on his 
weekly processions to the Husseini Mosque for Friday prayers. The bagpipes remain an 
integral part of the Massed Bands of the Jordanian Armed Forces (al-Jawqat al-
Musiqiyyah) today.728 (Appendix 1, figure 6-16 photograph of massed band with 
bagpipes celebrating the 24th anniversary of the Arab Revolt in 1940) 
The band played a key role in the military drills and spectacle that were 
“exploited to impress the citizenry with the strength and discipline of the armed 
forces.”729 Historian Eugene Rogan correctly argues that military precision and displays 
of martial strength were critical in the personification of Hashemite authority in Amman, 
and by extension, all of Transjordan. Numerous events were ritualized by the inclusion of 
military processions and displays in Feisal Square throughout the Mandate period. One of 
the most striking examples of such a display was the grandeur that accompanied the 
arrival of Abdullah’s father, King Hussein ibn Ali of the Hijaz, in January of 1924. This 
grand affair angered the British who deemed it a waste of resources that exceeded the 
entertainment allowances of the Chief British Representative and the Amir.730 For the 
British, this superfluous display was merely entertainment, not part of foreign policy. The 
British did not view the grand spectacle as critical for the reinforcement of the Amir’s 
                                                 
727 Munif, Story of a City, 95.  
728 Massad, Colonial Effects, 155-56.  
729 Rogan, “The Making of a Capital,” 103. 





political authority or legitimacy. (Appendix 1, figure 6-17 King Hussein arriving in 
Amman greeted by Commander Peake, British Resident Cox, and Amir Abdullah) 
Regardless of British angst, the event included military parades, band 
performances, and speeches. Ceremonial honorary arches were erected throughout 
Amman in King Hussein’s honor. The event’s choreography even included the minutiae 
of what type of headwear was suitable; kafiyeh was appropriate, tarbush forbidden. 731 
Although somewhat trivial, the headwear choice was an indictment against the Ottoman 
past, which had standardized the tarbush, or fez, in the nineteenth century. Favoring the 
kafiyeh was simultaneously a clear statement against the Ottoman past, while also 
emphasizing the Hashemites’ origins in the Hijaz and their Sharifian heritage. Beatrice 
Erskine described King Hussein’s equally grand departure saying:  
The following day all Amman turned out to see the King and the Emir make a 
State departure, accompanied by the heir-apparent, the Emir Ali (heir to the 
Hijaz). The whole space between the theatre and the villa was thronged, with a 
holiday crowd, the Arab Legion was on duty, boy scouts of all ages from infants 
to young men turned up with banners. The old King was greeted with enthusiasm, 
and after he left the house the guns up above the theatre on the Citadel Hill 
boomed a salute.732 
 
The visit of King Hussein was indicative of the formulaic reception honored guests 
received in Amman. Similar treatment was afforded to Amir Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, various British High Commissioners (including Herbert 
Samuel, J.R. Chancellor, and A.G. Wauchope), King Feisal I and King Feisal II of Iraq, 
amongst others.733 
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Triumphant state celebrations were pivotal to the commemoration and 
reinforcement of Hashemite mystique. Two magnificent examples of such endeavors 
were the gala celebrations for Abdullah’s son, Amir Talal’s wedding in 1934, and the 
annual commemoration of the Arab Revolt, usually held around September 1. Both 
events celebrated different aspects of Hashemite legitimacy through the elaborate staging 
of spectacle.  Talal’s wedding on November 26, 1934, was a national holiday that turned 
Feisal Square into a “mardi gras… with all the color and picturesqueness of an Arab 
‘fantasia… Arches of green trees and shrubs spanned the streets and flags flew from all 
buildings. The scene was climaxed at sundown by a brilliant fireworks in the public 
square.”734 These comments from an American diplomat highlight the revelry and 
carnival atmosphere of the royal wedding. Akin to King Hussein’s visit in 1924, the 
British deemed this wedding unnecessarily showy. The meaning of the pageantry that 
accompanied Talal’s wedding was lost on the British administrators of the Mandate. The 
celebration of Talal’s wedding was a celebration of the monarchy and the future of the 
Hashemite dynasty in Transjordan. The annual commemoration of the Great Arab Revolt 
(also referred to as the “Arab Renaissance”) on the other hand, utilized past Hashemite 
exploits to reinforce Hashemite authority in Transjordan. (Appendix 1, figure 6-18 Amir 
Talal’s wedding procession in 1934) 
This annual event held every September followed a set pattern orchestrated by the 
Amir. There was a ceremonial procession, led by Abdullah, dressed in full Western 
military garb and a kaffiyeh, from Raghadan Palace to Feisal Square. Abdullah’s dress 
paid homage to his cultural Hijazi roots, while simultaneously emphasizing the modernity 
                                                 





of the Transjordanian state. This hybridized image was present in all government 
ceremonies in Feisal Square. The Hashemite rulers of Jordan, including Abdullah’s 
namesake and great-grandson Abdullah II ibn Hussein, use this curious hybridized image 
today. Next, Abdullah would inspect the military and police forces present. Finally, 
Abdullah gave a speech from the balcony of the municipality building, or from a custom-
built platform in the center of Feisal Square, in front of all of the officers of the 
Mandate.735 It was important that these ceremonies reinforced Abdullah’s cultural and 
religious credentials, while simultaneously transforming this credibility into political 
might. These commemorations needed to reinforce Amman’s political, cultural, and 
social centrality. This centrality, in turn, reinforced the importance of Amman. These 
celebrations were regular and standard enough that the British dismissively refer to them 
as “the usual ceremonies” each year in their records.736 Similar standardized ceremonies 
accompanied the annual opening of the Legislative Council (every November 1) and the 
annual celebration of Transjordan’s “Independence” on May 15, 1923.737 (Appendix 1, 
figure 6-19 photo of Abdullah II wearing a military uniform and kaffiyeh. figure 6-20 and 
6-21 are two depictions of the Arab Revolt ceremony in Feisal Square in 1940) 
Activities held in Feisal Square and the Roman theater were not limited to 
military maneuvers and victory parades. Feisal Square remained the cultural and religious 
epicenter of Amman. The events that took place in Feisal Square were indicative of a 
town becoming a city, of a city entering modernity. Numerous cafes, including Hamdan 
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coffee house, the Arab League Café, and al-Shalati coffee house, ringed Feisal Square. 
These coffee houses were open venues of political, cultural, and social debate. Numerous 
book and magazine shops also clustered around the square. 738 These spaces housed much 
of the political discourse of the period.739 These cultural spaces did not belong to the 
government. Instead, the regular inhabitants of Amman controlled these places. It was 
from these cafes that the opposition movement of the late 1920s and early 1930s 
sprouted. The first meeting of the National Congress on July 25, 1928 was held in 
Hamdan coffee house.  
Cinemas in Amman were also critical modern spaces of exchange during the 
Mandate period. The earliest cinema in Amman, founded in 1925 by Rushdi al-Safadi 
called al-Sharq al-Arabi (Arab East), showed open-air performances. A Damascene 
known as Abu Sayyah al-Qabbani established the first movie theater building, al-Nasr 
(victory) cinema, in 1929.740 The most famous cinema in Amman during this period was 
Cinema Petra, built in 1934 by Wadi As’ad and Tawfiq Qattan. Cinema Petra served as a 
place of open cultural, social, and political communication. The cinema hall was a 
dynamic space. It was used for religious celebrations, musical and theater performances, 
literary competitions, and receptions for foreign political dignitaries. Unlike neighboring 
Damascus and Beirut, the cinema in Amman was not utilized by the British for 
propaganda.741 The same degree of contestation and negotiation over the cinema as a 
public space does not seem to have occurred in Amman. Cinema Petra was open to both 
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men and women, with each sex having their own discrete section of the theater. Urban 
historian Renate Dieterich hypothesizes that there likely was no women’s cinema in 
Amman because the potential audience in Amman was much smaller than Damascus, and 
a women's cinema would not be profitable. This multi-faceted space quickly became one 
of the beacons of Amman’s developing diverse urban society and culture.742  
Although open and frank discourse took place in Amman’s cinemas and cafes, the 
public demonstrations and commemorations that took place in Feisal Square and the 
Roman theater remained the more vocal embodiments of Amman’s life apart from the 
Mandatory government. These frequent political demonstrations and protests made 
Amman the home of political opposition throughout the Mandate. In the early years of 
the Mandate between 1921 and 1924, there were protests that pitted the municipality of 
Amman against the nascent Anglo-Hashemite government. On Monday July 24, 1922, 
there was a day of ritualized mourning for the fall of Feisal’s Sharifian state in Syria. The 
performance, according to British Resident Philby, included “Sherifian flags draped in 
black, three minutes [of] silence as a sign of grief and patriotic speeches.” What was 
surprising to Philby was that the municipality of Amman had sponsored this public 
display. Shortly thereafter, Madhhar Beg (a member of majlis al-idarat, the city 
administrative council) and Mayor of Amman Said Khair, were informed that similar 
events would not be tolerated in the future by the Mandatory government.743 By the time 
of British Resident Henry Cox’s arrival in Transjordan in 1924, such divisions between 
the will of the Anglo-Hashemite government and the municipality, had ceased. By 1924, 
the municipality administration functioned as an extension of the Mandatory government. 
                                                 
742 Dieterich, “More Than Movies,” 143-146; Thompson, Colonial Citizens, 202-10. 





The Mandatory government would not tolerate any division within its embryonic capital. 
Although Feisal Square remained a place of popular protest and opposition, this 
opposition never again originated from the members of the Amman municipality during 
the Mandate period.  
The majority of the political protests held in Feisal Square during the Mandate 
were on behalf of the Palestinian cause. In October and November 1933, there were 
protests against the violations of natural rights, and against the “atrocities,” that had 
befallen Palestine. These protests asked the Amir to intervene in the Palestine question. 
The demonstrations were strong enough in November that Commander Peake and the 
chief of police were forced to take refuge within the Ottoman Bank.744 Later, many of the 
shopkeepers of Amman, particularly those from Damascus and Nablus, protested the 
Zionist presence in Palestine by closing their shops as part of the “general strike.” These 
strikes were meant to be part of the larger Palestine Revolt that took place from 1936-
1939. This happened a number of times in 1936 and 1937. Although the strikes had a 
limited impact on Amman, the government warned the strike organizers that “it was not 
prepared to allow political agitation of this kind to proceed unchecked.”745 (Appendix 1, 
Figure 6-22 photograph of protests in Amman in 1933 in opposition to British actions in 
Palestine) 
Numerous student protests also took place in Feisal Square on behalf of the 
Palestinian cause. The source of the unrest generally came from the Salt Secondary 
School. British Resident Cox described these boys as being “badly infected by what they 
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have seen going on in other countries.” The student protests of the Salt Secondary School 
in Amman signify two disparate things. First, they demonstrate that the students in 
Transjordan were aware of the political and social issues of the region. Secondly, the fact 
that the Salt students come to protest in Amman is a de facto acknowledgment of the 
capital, and its role in Transjordan. In response to numerous student protests in Amman 
in 1936, the government closed the Secondary School in Salt, the Arts and Crafts School 
in Amman, and expelled the leaders of the protests. The schools reopened the following 
month but the students were under close government supervision.746 By late 1937, the 
Mandatory government banned the meeting of societies and clubs that did not have 
explicit government permission. This ban essentially outlawed public political protests 
and demonstrations in Amman and throughout Transjordan.747  However, there was one 
more isolated incident in May1941; six boys instigated a public demonstration in Feisal 
Square against the government for their lack of action on Palestine. The boys were dealt 
with swiftly. The government expelled six students permanently and expelled an 
additional forty students temporarily. Thereafter all demonstrations and meetings in 
Transjordan were prohibited.748 
 The other important urban space for public congregation was the Roman theater. 
Although the government occasionally used the Roman theater for its celebrations and 
rituals, it was mainly a space for the people of Amman.749 This was particularly true for 
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Amman’s celebrations of ‘Id. The spectacle of the ‘Id celebrations brought together all of 
Amman into a single enclosed space. Author Abd al-Rahman Munif recalled the annual 
‘Id celebrations of his youth harkening back to the festivals held in the same space by the 
Romans 2000 years before.  
There were the sounds of drums, pipes, singing and dancing, the vendors’ calls, 
children’s’ shouting, the sound of swings, the shouting of photographers and cart 
owners, and clowns calling out ‘a head without a corpse.’ All of those different 
sounds intermingled to create a din which those who were part of it did not feel… 
as though people were bidding farewell to days that they would not see the like of 
for a very long time to come, or as though they were saying in those few hours what 
they had not said on many previous days.750 
 
Husseini Mosque and the Roman Theater acted as the homes of Muslim life in Mandate 
era Amman. The Muslim monopoly over this space was a byproduct of Amman’s 
overwhelmingly Muslim population. This popular version of Islam in Amman utilized the 
central spaces of Amman, Husseini Mosque and the Roman theater, to create a distinctly 
Ammani embodiment of Islamic celebration. The Hashemite throne’s Sharifian 
credentials imbued Husseini Mosque with a more “official” interpretation of Islam that 
respected the Amir’s lineage. The Roman Theater, on the other hand, was generally 
outside the purview of the Anglo-Hashemite state. These celebrations were tolerated by 
the government, which in turn allowed these celebrations to take on a carnevalesque air. 
These spaces existed apart from the Anglo-Hashemite state. Overall, Feisal Square 
represented the inherent duality of the city of Amman. It was used both by the Mandatory 
                                                                                                                                                 
The current government demolished all of the homes in front of the Roman Theater in the 1980s to 
construct the empty Hashimiyya Square. This urban whitewashing has favored ancient heritage over recent 
architectural heritage. For more on the perils of neo-liberal construction approaches see  Rama al-Rabady 
and Shatha Abu-Khafajah, “‘Send in the clown’: Re-inventing Jordan’s downtowns in space and time, case 
of Amman,” Urban Design International (2013), 1-11 and Rami Daher and Irene Maffi, eds., Politics and 
Practices of Cultural Heritage in the Middle East: Positioning the Material Past in Contemporary 
Societies, eds. Rami Daher and Irene Maffi (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).  





government and against the government. Feisal Square was the personification of the 
Mandatory government’s might and its shortcomings. The state aspired to control the 
inhabitants of Transjordan but could not even control the development of its own capital. 
Amman was a real city, not only a symbol of the Anglo-Hashemite state. Amman, as 
embodied by its spiritual core in Feisal Square, was more than just a company town.  
 
Conclusion 
 The urban development of Amman was the physical manifestation of the 
conflicted colonial approach of the British. This dual city and its growing elite were 
personified in Amman’s first gentleman’s club, the King Hussein Club. The notables of 
Amman founded the King Hussein Club in 1943. The club officially opened on June 11, 
1943, with Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, all of the Executive Council Ministers 
and Arab Legion Commander Glubb in attendance. Amir Abdullah did not attend the 
opening, but he had gone to the club that morning to donate a picture of his late father, 
King Hussein.751 The stated “object of the club is to promote cultural and social activity 
and to foster relations of friendship and cooperation between its Arab and British 
Members.” It was hoped that the club would also help British officials transition “from 
administration to the position of adviser.”752 This paternalistic approach was evident in 
the general attitude of the British in Amman. The divided city oscillated between the 
poles of Hashemite and British authority.  
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Although the British closely watched and oversaw all aspects of the Transjordan 
Mandatory government, they generally left the symbol of that government’s might, the 
city of Amman, to develop on its own. This neglect allowed Amman’s architecture and 
general urban fabric to reflect its diverse cultural heritage – Ottoman, Arab, and British. 
However, the majority of the inhabitants of Transjordan continued to understand Amman 
as the personification of Hashemite and British authority in Transjordan despite their 
hands off approach. The poet ‘Arar ridiculed this image forcefully. ‘Arar mocked the 
government both from the inside and the outside. ‘Arar was one of the few people in 
Transjordan who could be considered both a part of the establishment and vocally anti-
establishment. No one was safe from ‘Arar’s cutting gaze. The most frequent victims of 
‘Arar’s attacks were the British officials of Transjordan and the new elites of Amman. 
These elites had embedded themselves in the new district of Jabal Amman and in the 
process created a new city apart from the rest of Amman. This “dual city” connected 
Amman to other colonial cities throughout the world during the interwar period. Unlike 
neighboring dual cities, Amman was created by its inhabitants, not by a colonial 
administrator. The attributes of the dual city, of creating a bifurcated urban space, would 
exist long after Jordan’s independence in 1946.  
Although the physical development of urban space in Amman was ignored by the 
Anglo-Hashemite state, the government closely controlled the use of that space. Feisal 
Square, which developed before the existence of the Mandate, acted as the proving 
ground of Hashemite authority. Feisal Square was as important, if not more important 
than Raghadan Palace, for the reinforcement of Abdullah’s monarchical and sherifian 





Constant celebrations, commemorations, and parades filled Feisal Square during the 
Mandate. These displays supplemented the sparse monumental architecture of Amman as 
the representation of the government’s strength. Public demonstrations of the state’s 
power further disciplined the populace of Transjordan into accepting the supremacy of 
the Anglo-Hashemite government. Although the government did its utmost to control 
Feisal Square’s symbolic meaning for Amman, and the rest of Transjordan, the regular 
population of Amman did not relinquish control over this space. Feisal Square remained 
the home of political protest and religious life in Transjordan throughout the Mandate. 
Regular Ammanis did not allow Amman to exist only as a “company town.” Amman had 
a life separated from the government. This dichotomy between the official image, and 
popular image of Amman, speaks to the role of the capital city during the Transjordan 
Mandate. The city functioned as the clear embodiment of the new strength and resolve of 
the Anglo-Hashemite state. Despite this clear identity, the city continued to have a life of 
its own separated from the colonial apparatus. Amman was simultaneously a product of 
the colonial interwar period and a city that had been left to its own devices. This 
ambivalent existence made Amman both the home of the Hashemite state and the center 



















 The Mandate of Transjordan officially ended on May 25, 1946. The newly 
independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan celebrated this momentous event in the only 
space worthy of such a spectacle: Feisal Square. The coronation of King Abdullah 
“ended” the colonial period in Jordan. However, Jordan remained on the British subsidy 
and kept close relations with the British crown through 1957. The events of the 1948 war, 
more than its independence, forever changed the urban fabric of Amman and the 
demographic makeup of Jordan.  Millions of Palestinians were suddenly incorporated 
into the Hashemite Kingdom and hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed into 
Amman. The days of the quiet, slowly developing capital were over. Seemingly 
overnight, Amman was transformed from a city of roughly 46,000 people in 1946, to a 
city of over 250,000 people by the early 1950s.753 Today, Amman is home to over 2.2 
million people. This demographic explosion drastically changed the urban fabric and 
spatial layout of the city. The one constant following Jordan’s independence was the 
steady centrality of al-balad and Feisal Square.  
 That Feisal Square has remained a crucial place of cultural, religious, and social 
exchange speaks to its inherent natural gravity. The symbolic meaning of this space was 
constructed during the Mandate period and this significance perpetuated itself into the 
independence era. Similarly, the material, political, and symbolic importance of Amman 
was not fleeting. Despite its diminutive size during the Mandate period, the city of 
Amman housed all of the integral components of a successful and cohesive centralized 
state by the end of the British Mandate in 1946. The city of Amman symbolized the 
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authority and might of the Anglo-Hashemite government. The British government needed 
Amman to control the region of Transjordan with minimal direct British intervention. 
Transjordan unto itself was not an important imperial possession for the British; rather 
the territory derived its significance from its central location between Palestine and Iraq. 
For this reason, the British largely ignored the Mandate of Transjordan initially. The 
entire Mandate was analogous to a “Potemkin Village” from 1921-1924; the scaffolding 
of a new government existed only to project the appearance of order and control without 
any actual substance. Only after the British financial intervention of 1924 with British 
Resident Cox did the British begin to monitor the development of Transjordan more 
acutely.  
The Mandate’s growth, predicated on the need to protect larger imperial interests, 
valued the security of Transjordan above everything else. The maintenance of the status 
quo in the region was critical to the success of the Mandatory regime. A strong 
centralized government was crucial for Britain’s regional security goals. The appearance 
of control and structure in Amman and Transjordan initially satisfied these security 
initiatives. Over time, Transjordanian infrastructural development necessitated moving 
beyond mere “Potemkin ministries.” If the Anglo-Hashemite government needed to 
pacify the region, it had to do so through legitimate statecraft and infrastructural 
development. The Mandatory government was successful in keeping Transjordan 
peaceful throughout the Mandate period. Unlike the neighboring states of Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Palestine, no sectarian or nationalist uprisings occurred in Transjordan. In 
order to legitimize its existence and continued importance for the balance of forces in the 





Amman to the Mandate. The infrastructural and institutional development of the capital 
centralized political, social, and economic exchange in Amman. Although the 
government was successful in establishing Amman as the nexus of Transjordanian life it 
did not possess complete control over its populace. Its limited budget and resources 
constantly checked the ambitions of the state. All-encompassing oversight was simply 
beyond the scant means of the state.  
 However, these administrative and institutional advancements were only feasible 
because of the preexisting Ottoman framework. The Transjordanian government heavily 
relied on Ottoman structures and institutions already in place at the time of its founding. 
Transjordan’s limited budget made investment in non-security projects untenable. As a 
result, the reinvigoration of Ottoman institutions was critical for the Mandate to succeed. 
The government simply did not have the resources to dismiss and ignore the Ottoman 
infrastructure that already existed. Only towards the end of the Mandate period did the 
Transjordan state begin to move beyond this largely Ottoman framework. The gradual 
expansion of government responsibilities and functions slowly created a more productive 
and legitimate centralized government. The growth of the transportation and 
communication networks allowed the government to respond to dissident and rebellious 
activity throughout Transjordan more effectively. Coupled with the transformations of 
the Departments of Justice, Public Health, and Education, the new Transjordanian state 
permeated the lives of its populace. However, any improvements made to the 
infrastructural and institutional systems of Transjordan were done in the service of larger 
security concerns. Despite these advancements, Transjordan was never under complete 





throughout much of the Mandate. Furthermore, anything not directly associated with 
defense, control, and security had to be financed from extraordinary funding streams such 
as the Colonial Development Fund, foreign concessions, or local entrepreneurial 
investment. This reliance on foreign capital and local entrepreneurial investment to 
achieve basic infrastructural advancements reflected a failure of the Anglo-Hashemite 
state.  
 Similar interests motivated the formation of Transjordan’s representative body. 
The Legislative Council formed in 1929 to ratify the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan 
Agreement. The political space opened with the creation of the Legislative Council in 
1929 was short lived. The Mandatory state utilized the Legislative Council as a way to 
incorporate formerly autonomous elites into the machinery of the Transjordanian state. 
Amman became the undisputed home of political exchange and power during the 
Mandate. It was also the undisputed home of political opposition throughout the Mandate 
period. After the forced ratification of the 1928 Agreement, the elites of Transjordan 
slowly capitulated to the might of the state. However, the Council did not immediately 
become a rubber stamp for the government. The members of the Council protested 
government initiatives and will after the First Legislative Council, but the united 
opposition of the Council began to wane. One by one, viable outlets for opposition 
disappeared. The open political space that once existed slowly began to close. The 
gradual process of censorship and manipulation robbed Transjordan’s elites of their 
autonomy and their agency.  However, this was not a unilateral exchange. Although these 
elites and urban notables lost a great deal of their autonomy, their position on the Council 





their home districts. Council representatives needed to protect their own personal 
interests and those of their patronage networks. As well, during the years of drought and 
economic depression the salary paid to Legislative Council members became increasingly 
alluring. By the end of the Mandate, the elites that had resisted the state now relied on the 
Mandate government for their authority. The seats of the Legislative Council became 
commodities of status. It was no longer a viable option to exist outside of the government 
edifice. It was more important for the elites of Transjordan to be part of the legislative 
system than to be ostracized from Transjordan’s halls of power. Elites were both 
constrained and supported by the narrow halls of the Legislative Council. If they resisted 
the hold of Amman, they ceased to be relevant in the Mandate’s political landscape. 
Amman became a Hashemite Versailles, which manipulated the elites of Transjordan into 
acquiescence.  
 However, Amman was not only a symbol or a tool of the Mandatory government. 
It was a real urban space. Amman’s urban fabric developed with virtually no oversight 
from the central government. This deliberate choice by the government not to invest in 
the urban development of Transjordan undermined their efforts to transform Amman into 
a Hashemite Versailles. The government strived to imbue Amman with symbolic power 
but left the city to grow haphazardly without order or direction. The centralization project 
undertaken by the Mandatory state caused the cultural and political hybridization of the 
local population in Amman. The resulting unruly urban space was a hybridized amalgam 
of Ottoman, Arab, and British characteristics that are evident in Amman’s residential 
architecture. The monumental architecture of Amman, although minimal, represented the 





Palace, Husseini Mosque, and the British Residence each radiated a distinct type of 
governmental authority, whether it is religious, colonial, or political. Regardless of the 
various nodes of governmental authority in Amman, the nexus of Amman remained in its 
central corridor, al-balad.  
 In the heart of al-balad, Feisal Square developed as the natural epicenter of 
Amman and cultural heart of the entire Mandate. This freedom of development contrasts 
with the tight control that the Mandatory government had over the rest of Transjordan. 
The Anglo-Hashemite state heavily utilized Feisal Square as a site of government 
performances of strength and authority. The stage of Feisal Square reinforced Amman’s 
political centrality and dominance. The transformation of Amman into a Hashemite 
Versailles had destroyed functional authority outside of the capital. Elites chose to be part 
of the system, rather than be relegated to political irrelevance. However, the state did not 
control all of Amman. Oppositional forces and free cultural exchange continued to occur 
in Amman throughout the Mandate. Amman was the seat of the Anglo-Hashemite 
government, but it was not only a proxy for government authority. The natural gravity of 
Feisal Square did not exist because of the state. Feisal Square was the coalescence of life 
in Amman. By the end of the Mandate, Amman existed as the personification of 
infrastructural, political, and cultural life in Transjordan. Although its population 
remained small during the Mandate, the impact of Amman’s diverse heritage and legacy 
were vital to the formation of the Jordanian State. Amman, with its population of over 2.2 
million people, is no longer the small town that it once was during the Mandate period. 







Appendix 1 – images of the Mandate 
Figure 2-1, image of current CMS school building in Jabal Amman. (author’s image) 
 







Figure 3-1, photograph of a kerosene lamp used in the streets of Amman before 
electrification. (Freij, “A Merchant’s Tale Reveals Amman’s Electric Revolution,” The 
















Figure 3-2, schematic for early lights in Amman. (Rashid, Malamih al-Haya al-Sha‘biyya 






























Figure 3-3, photograph of construction of Ras al-Ayn power plant (Bakij, Amman: A 



















































Figure 4-2, photo of prime ministry building which included the prime minister, chief 



























Figure 4-3, official opening of the first normal session of the Legislative Council on 
November 1, 1929. This official opening of the Council took place after the ratification of 
the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement on June 4, 1929. (Bakij, Amman: A History 
















Figure 6-1, Military parade through Feisal Square in Amman in celebration of the 24th 
Anniversary of the Arab Revolt on September 11, 1940. In the foreground a small white 








Figure 6-2, photo of the Ottoman fountain Hamidiyye Sabeel in front of Husseini Mosque 


























Figure 6-3, photo of Husseini Mosque being constructed in 1925. (Bakij, Amman: A 




















Figure 6-4, photo of Raghadan Palace showing Arab Legion Mess Band preparing for a 
performance in honor of the 24th anniversary of the Arab Revolt. (LOC, Matson Registers 




Figure 6-5, architectural plans for the British Residence in Amman. These plans were 









Figure 6-6, photograph of completed British Residence in 1932. Published in Architect’s 




Figure 6-7, photo of a Circassian style home in Jabal al-Qal’a in Amman. (Bakij, 




























Figure 6-8, photograph of citadel hill from 1920s with arrows indicating all of the 






















Figure 6-9, photo of al-Mufti home in downtown Amman. The al-Mufti home was one of 
the oldest multi-storied homes in Amman and frequently hosted foreign dignitaries. 





















































Figure 6-11, Bilad al-Sham townhouse owned by Hamid Kilmat on King Feisal Street in 





















Figure 6-12, diagram and photograph of the Qawar house (Shawash, “Architecture in 




Figure 6-13, diagrams of the Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda home in Jabal Amman (Rifa’i, 












































































Figure 6-16,  Massed Band of the Arab Legion assembled to celebrate the 24th 
anniversary of the Arab Revolt on Septermber 11, 1940. (LOC, Matson Registers 






























Figure 6-17, King Hussein arriving in Amman greeted by Commander Peake, British 
Resident Cox, and Amir Abdullah on January 18, 1924. (LOC, American Colony 



























Figure 6-18, photograph of clans marching to the palace in honor of Amir Talal’s 





Figure 6-19, photograph of Abdullah II depicting him in the same hybridized outfit as his 

























Figure 6-20, photo of Feisal Square and dais during the 24th anniversary of the Arab 





Figure 6-21, photo of the masses assembled for the 24th anniversary of the Arab Revolt. 











Figure 6-22, photograph of protests in Amman in 1933 in opposition to British actions in 





























Appendix 2: Amman Residential Architecture Matrix 































Legislative Councils of Transjordan (1929-1946) 
(FO 371-52945 for TJ personalities according to GB in 1946) 
 
1st Legislative Council 1929-1931 
- ‘Ajlun – (Muslims) ‘Abdullah Kulaib al-Shraidah, ‘Auqlah Muhammad al-
Nusair, and Najib al-Shraidah, (Christian) Najib Abu al-Sha‘r 
- Balqa –  (Muslims) ‘Ala’ al-Din Tuqan (replaced by Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi in 
special election), Sa‘id al-Sulaibi, and Muhammad al-Unsi (Christian) Bakhit al-
Ibrahim (Circassians)  Sa‘id al-Mufti and Shams al-Din Sami 
- Karak – (Muslims) Sheikh Rifaifan al-Majali, ‘Attallah al-Suhaimat, and Salih 
al-‘Auran (Christian) ‘Audah al-Qusus 
- Bedouin – (North) Sheikh Mithqal al-Fayiz  and (South) Sheikh Hamd Ibn Jazi  
 
2nd Legislative Council 1931-1934 
- ‘Ajlun – (Muslims) Qasim al-Hindawi, Mohammad al-Sa‘d al-Batainah, Naji al-
Azzam and (Christian) Salti al-Ibrahim  
- Balqa - (Muslims)Sheikh Majid al-‘Adwan, Sa‘id al-Mufti, Hashim Khair, Adil 
al-Azmah  (Christian)Sa‘id Abu Jabir  and (Circassian) Hussein Yousef Khawaja  
- Karak – (Muslims) Refaifan al-Majali, Hussein al-Tarawnah, Salih al-‘Auran and 
(Christian) Mitri al-Zuraiqat  
- Bedouin – Sheikh Hadithah al-Khraishah (North) and Sheikh Hamd ibn Jazi 
(South)  
 
3rd Legislative Council 1934-1937 
- ‘Ajlun –Mohammad al-Funaish, Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah, Falah al-Zahir, 
and Sulaiman al-Khalil 
- Balqa – Fawzi al-Nablusi, Majid al-‘Adwan, Nazmi ‘Abd al-Hadi, Asaad al-
Khalil, Fawzi al-Mufti, and Wasif al-Bisharat 
- Karak and Ma’an – Refaifan al-Majali, Salih al-‘Auran, Mahmoud Kuraishan, 





- Bedouin – (North) Sheikh Mithqal al-Fayiz and (South) Sheikh Hamd Ibn Jazi 
4th Legislative Council 1937- 1942 (extended term to five year by the Amir due to 
WWII in 1939) 
- ‘Ajlun (excluding Jarash) – (Muslims) Mahmoud al-Funaish, Abdullah al-Kulaib 
al-Shraidah, Mohammad al-Awad, (Christian) Salti al-Ibrahim 
- Balqa (including Jarash) –  (Muslims) Majid al-‘Adwan, Sabri al-Tabba, Sa‘ud 
al-Nablusi, (Circassians) Shawkat Hamid (appointed Mutasarrif), ‘Umar Hikmat 
(replaced Hamid), Hussein Khawaja, (Christian) Khalil al-Sukkar 
- Karak and Ma’an – (Muslims) Sheikh Refaifan al-Majali, Salih al-‘Auran, and 
Mahmoud Kuraishan. (Christian) Ibrahim al-Sharaihah. 
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